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Müller, A. E., & Thalmann, U. (2000). Origin and evolution of primate social organisation: a reconstruction. Biological Reviews, 75, 405–435.
Abstract: Abstract
The evolution and origin of primate social organisation has attracted the attention of many researchers, and a solitary pattern, believed to be present in most nocturnal prosimians, has been generally considered as the most primitive system. Nocturnal prosimians are in fact mostly seen alone during their nightly activities and therefore termed “solitary foragers”, but that does not mean that they are not social. Moreover, designating their social organisation as “solitary”, implies that their way of life is uniform in all species. It has, however, emerged over the last decades that all of them exhibit not only some kind of social network but also that those networks differ among species. There is a need to classify these social networks in the same manner as with group-living (gregarious) animals if we wish to link up the different forms of primate social organisation with ecological, morphological or phylogenetic variables. In this review, we establish a basic classification based on spatial relations and sociality in order to describe and cope properly with the social organisation patterns of the different species of nocturnal prosimians and other mammals that do not forage in cohesive groups. In attempting to trace the ancestral pattern of primate social organisation, the Malagasy mouse and dwarf lemurs and the Afro-Asian bushbabies and lorises are of special interest because they are thought to approach the ancestral conditions most closely. These species have generally been believed to exhibit a dispersed harem system as their pattern of social organisation (“dispersed” means that individuals forage solitarily but exhibit a social network). Therefore, the ancestral pattern of primate social organisation was inferred to be a dispersed harem. In fact, new field data on cheirogaleids combined with a review of patterns of social organisation in strepsirhines (lemurs, bushbabies and lorises) revealed that they exhibit either dispersed multi-male systems or dispersed monogamy rather than a dispersed harem system. Therefore, the concept of a dispersed harem system as the ancestral condition of primate social organisation can no longer be supported. In combination with data on social organisation patterns in “primitive” placentals and marsupials, and in monotremes, it is in fact most probable that promiscuity is the ancestral pattern for mammalian social organisation. Subsequently, a dispersed multi-male system derived from promiscuity should be regarded as the ancestral condition for primates. We further suggest that the gregarious patterns of social organisation in Aotus and Avahi, and the dispersed form in Tarsius evolved from the gregarious patterns of diurnal primates rather than from the dispersed nocturnal type. It is consequently proposed that, in addition to Aotus and Tarsius, Avahi is also secondarily nocturnal.
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Marino, L. (2002). Convergence of complex cognitive abilities in cetaceans and primates. Brain Behav Evol, 59(1-2), 21–32.
Abstract: What examples of convergence in higher-level complex cognitive characteristics exist in the animal kingdom? In this paper I will provide evidence that convergent intelligence has occurred in two distantly related mammalian taxa. One of these is the order Cetacea (dolphins, whales and porpoises) and the other is our own order Primates, and in particular the suborder anthropoid primates (monkeys, apes, and humans). Despite a deep evolutionary divergence, adaptation to physically dissimilar environments, and very different neuroanatomical organization, some primates and cetaceans show striking convergence in social behavior, artificial 'language' comprehension, and self-recognition ability. Taken together, these findings have important implications for understanding the generality and specificity of those processes that underlie cognition in different species and the nature of the evolution of intelligence.
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Lefebvre, L., Reader, S. M., & Sol, D. (2004). Brains, Innovations and Evolution in Birds and Primates. Brain. Behav. Evol., 63(4), 233–246.
Abstract: Abstract
Several comparative research programs have focusedon the cognitive, life history and ecological traits thataccount for variation in brain size. We review one ofthese programs, a program that uses the reported frequencyof behavioral innovation as an operational measureof cognition. In both birds and primates, innovationrate is positively correlated with the relative size of associationareas in the brain, the hyperstriatum ventrale andneostriatum in birds and the isocortex and striatum inprimates. Innovation rate is also positively correlatedwith the taxonomic distribution of tool use, as well asinterspecific differences in learning. Some features ofcognition have thus evolved in a remarkably similar wayin primates and at least six phyletically-independent avianlineages. In birds, innovation rate is associated withthe ability of species to deal with seasonal changes in theenvironment and to establish themselves in new regions,and it also appears to be related to the rate atwhich lineages diversify. Innovation rate provides a usefultool to quantify inter-taxon differences in cognitionand to test classic hypotheses regarding the evolution ofthe brain.
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Bermudez, J. L. (1996). The moral significance of birth. Ethics, 106(2), 378–403.
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Pérez-Barbería, F. J., Shultz, S., Dunbar, R. I. M., & Janis, C. (2007). Evidence For Coevolution Of Sociality And Relative Brain Size In Three Orders Of Mammals. Evolution, 61(12), 2811–2821.
Abstract: Abstract
As the brain is responsible for managing an individual's behavioral response to its environment, we should expect that large relative brain size is an evolutionary response to cognitively challenging behaviors. The “social brain hypothesis” argues that maintaining group cohesion is cognitively demanding as individuals living in groups need to be able to resolve conflicts that impact on their ability to meet resource requirements. If sociality does impose cognitive demands, we expect changes in relative brain size and sociality to be coupled over evolutionary time. In this study, we analyze data on sociality and relative brain size for 206 species of ungulates, carnivores, and primates and provide, for the first time, evidence that changes in sociality and relative brain size are closely correlated over evolutionary time for all three mammalian orders. This suggests a process of coevolution and provides support for the social brain theory. However, differences between taxonomic orders in the stability of the transition between small-brained/nonsocial and large-brained/social imply that, although sociality is cognitively demanding, sociality and relative brain size can become decoupled in some cases. Carnivores seem to have been especially prone to this.
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Dunbar, R. I. M. (1998). The social brain hypothesis. Evol. Anthropol., 6(5), 178–190.
Abstract: Conventional wisdom over the past 160 years in the cognitive and neurosciences has assumed that brains evolved to process factual information about the world. Most attention has therefore been focused on such features as pattern recognition, color vision, and speech perception. By extension, it was assumed that brains evolved to deal with essentially ecological problem-solving tasks. © 1998 Wiley-Liss, Inc.
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Russon, A. E., & Galdikas, B. M. F. (1995). Constraints on great apes' imitation: Model and action selectivity in rehabilitant orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus) imitation. J. Comp. Psychol., 109(1), 5–17.
Abstract: We discuss selectivity in great ape imitation, on the basis of an observational study of spontaneous imitation in free-ranging rehabilitant orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Research on great ape imitation has neglected selectivity, although comparative evidence suggests it may be important. We observed orangutans in central Indonesian Borneo and assessed patterns in the models and actions they spontaneously imitated. The patterns we found resembled those reported in humans. Orangutans preferred models with whom they had positive affective relationships (e.g., important caregiver or older sibling) and actions that reflected their current competence, were receptively familiar, and were relevant to tasks that faced them. Both developmental and individual variability were found. We discuss the probable functions of imitation for great apes and the role of selectivity in directing it. We also make suggestions for more effective elicitation of imitation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Cantlon, J. F., & Brannon, E. M. (2007). How Much Does Number Matter to a Monkey (Macaca mulatta)? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 33(1), 32–41.
Abstract: Although many animal species can represent numerical values, little is known about how salient number is relative to other object properties for nonhuman animals. In one hypothesis, researchers propose that animals represent number only as a last resort, when no other properties differentiate stimuli. An alternative hypothesis is that animals automatically, spontaneously, and routinely represent the numerical attributes of their environments. The authors compared the influence of number versus that of shape, color, and surface area on rhesus monkeys' (Macaca mulatta) decisions by testing them on a matching task with more than one correct answer: a numerical match and a nonnumerical (color, surface area, or shape) match. The authors also tested whether previous laboratory experience with numerical discrimination influenced a monkey's propensity to represent number. Contrary to the last-resort hypothesis, all monkeys based their decisions on numerical value when the numerical ratio was favorable.
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2001). Cognitive strategies and the representation of social relations by monkeys. Nebr Symp Motiv, 47, 145–177.
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Whiten, A. (2000). Social complexity and social intelligence. In Novartis Foundation Symposium (Vol. 233, pp. 185–96; discussion pp. 196–201).
Abstract: When we talk of the 'nature of intelligence', or any other attribute, we may be referring to its essential structure, or to its place in nature, particularly the function it has evolved to serve. Here I examine both, from the perspective of the evolution of intelligence in primates. Over the last 20 years, the Social (or 'Machiavellian') Intelligence Hypothesis has gained empirical support. Its core claim is that the intelligence of primates is primarily an adaptation to the special complexities of primate social life. In addition to this hypothesis about the function of intellect, a secondary claim is that the very structure of intelligence has been moulded to be 'social' in character, an idea that presents a challenge to orthodox views of intelligence as a general-purpose capacity. I shall outline the principal components of social intelligence and the environment of social complexity it engages with. This raises the question of whether domain specificity is an appropriate characterization of social intelligence and its subcomponents, like theory of mind. As a counter-argument to such specificity I consider the hypothesis that great apes exhibit a cluster of advanced cognitive abilities that rest on a shared capacity for second-order mental representation.
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