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Scheumann, M., & Call, J. (2004). The use of experimenter-given cues by South African fur seals (Arctocephalus pusillus). Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 224–230.
Abstract: Dogs can use a variety of experimenter-given cues such as pointing, head direction, and eye direction to locate food hidden under one of several containers. Some authors have proposed that this is a result of the domestication process. In this study we tested four captive fur seals in a two alternative object choice task in which subjects had to use one of the following experimenter-given cues to locate the food: (1) the experimenter pointed and gazed at one of the objects, (2) the experimenter pointed at only one of the objects, (3) the experimenter gazed at only one of the objects, (4) the experimenter glanced at only one of the objects, (5) the experimenter pointed and gazed at one of the objects but was sitting closer to one object than to the other, (6) the experimenter pointed only with the index finger at one of the objects, (7) the experimenter presented a replica of one of the objects. The fur seals were able to use cues which involved a fully exposed arm or a head direction, but failed to use glance only, the index finger pointing and the object replica cues. The results showed that a domestication process was not necessary to develop receptive skills to cues given by an experimenter. Instead, we hypothesize that close interactions with humans prior to testing enabled fur seals to uses ome gestural cues without formal training. We also analyzed the behavior of the seals depending on the level of difficulty of the task. Behavioral signs of hesitation increased with task difficulty. This suggests that the fur seals were sensitive to task difficulty.
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Kaminski, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2004). Body orientation and face orientation: two factors controlling apes' behavior from humans. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 216–223.
Abstract: A number of animal species have evolved the cognitive ability to detect when they are being watched by other individuals. Precisely what kind of information they use to make this determination is unknown. There is particular controversy in the case of the great apes because different studies report conflicting results. In experiment 1, we presented chimpanzees, orangutans, and bonobos with a situation in which they had to request food from a human observer who was in one of various attentional states. She either stared at the ape, faced the ape with her eyes closed, sat with her back towards the ape, or left the room. In experiment 2, we systematically crossed the observer's body and face orientation so that the observer could have her body and/or face oriented either towards or away from the subject. Results indicated that apes produced more behaviors when they were being watched. They did this not only on the basis of whether they could see the experimenter as a whole, but they were sensitive to her body and face orientation separately. These results suggest that body and face orientation encode two different types of information. Whereas face orientation encodes the observer's perceptual access, body orientation encodes the observer's disposition to transfer food. In contrast to the results on body and face orientation, only two of the tested subjects responded to the state of the observer's eyes.
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Call, J. (2002). A fish-eye lens for comparative studies: broadening the scope of animal cognition. Anim. Cogn., 5(1), 15–16.
Abstract: ? is the article no longer available?
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Call, J., Hare, B. A., & Tomasello, M. (1998). Chimpanzee gaze following in an object-choice task. Anim. Cogn., 1(2), 89–99.
Abstract: Many primate species reliably track and follow the visual gaze of conspecifics and humans, even to locations above and behind the subject. However, it is not clear whether primates follow a human's gaze to find hidden food under one of two containers in an object-choice task. In a series of experiments six adult female chimpanzees followed a human's gaze (head and eye direction) to a distal location in space above and behind them, and checked back to the human's face when they did not find anything interesting or unusual. This study also assessed whether these same subjects would also use the human's gaze in an object-choice task with three types of occluders: barriers, tubes, and bowls. Barriers and tubes permitted the experimenter to see their contents (i.e., food) whereas bowls did not. Chimpanzees used the human's gaze direction to choose the tube or barrier containing food but they did not use the human's gaze to decide between bowls. Our findings allowed us to discard both simple orientation and understanding seeing-knowing in others as the explanations for gaze following in chimpanzees. However, they did not allow us to conclusively choose between orientation combined with foraging tendencies and understanding seeing in others. One interesting possibility raised by these results is that studies in which the human cannot see the reward at the time of subject choice may potentially be underestimating chimpanzees' social knowledge.
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Call, J., Agnetta, B., & Tomasello, M. (2000). Cues that chimpanzees do and do not use to find hidden objects. Anim. Cogn., 3(1), 23–34.
Abstract: Chimpanzees follow conspecific and human gaze direction reliably in some situations, but very few chimpanzees reliably use gaze direction or other communicative signals to locate hidden food in the object-choice task. Three studies aimed at exploring factors that affect chimpanzee performance in this task are reported. In the first study, vocalizations and other noises facilitated the performance of some chimpanzees (only a minority). In the second study, various behavioral cues were given in which a human experimenter either touched, approached, or actually lifted and looked under the container where the food was hidden. Each of these cues led to enhanced performance for only a very few individuals. In the third study – a replication with some methodological improvements of a previous experiment – chimpanzees were confronted with two experimenters giving conflicting cues about the location of the hidden food, with one of them (the knower) having witnessed the hiding process and the other (the guesser) not. In the crucial test in which a third experimenter did the hiding, no chimpanzee found the food at above chance levels. Overall, in all three studies, by far the best performers were two individuals who had been raised in infancy by humans. It thus seems that while chimpanzees are very good at “behavior reading” of various sorts, including gaze following, they do not understand the communicative intentions (informative intentions) behind the looking and gesturing of others – with the possible exception of enculturated chimpanzees, who still do not understand the differential significance of looking and gesturing done by people who have different knowledge about states of affairs in the world.
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Call, J., & Carpenter, M. (2001). Do apes and children know what they have seen? Anim. Cogn., 3(4), 207–220.
Abstract: Chimpanzees and young children understand much about what other individuals have and have not seen. This study investigates what they understand about their own visual perception. Chimpanzees, orangutans, and 2.5-year-old children were presented with a finding game in which food or stickers were hidden in one of two or three tubes. We varied whether subjects saw the baiting of the tubes, whether subjects could see through the tubes, and whether there was a delay between baiting and presentation of the tubes to subjects. We measured not only whether subjects chose the correct tube but also, more importantly, whether they spontaneously looked into one or more of the tubes before choosing one. Most apes and children appropriately looked into the tubes before choosing one more often when they had not seen the baiting than when they had seen the baiting. In general, they used efficient search strategies more often than insufficient or excessive ones. Implications of subjects' search patterns for their understanding of seeing and knowing in the self are discussed.
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Bräuer, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Chimpanzees do not take into account what others can hear in a competitive situation. Anim. Cogn., 11(1), 1435–9448.
Abstract: Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) know what others can and cannot see in a competitive situation. Does this reflect a general understanding the perceptions of others` In a study by Hare et al. (2000) pairs of chimpanzees competed over two pieces of food. Subordinate individuals preferred to approach food that was behind a barrier that the dominant could not see, suggesting that chimpanzees can take the visual perspective of others. We extended this paradigm to the auditory modality to investigate whether chimpanzees are sensitive to whether a competitor can hear food rewards being hidden. Results suggested that the chimpanzees did not take what the competitor had heard into account, despite being able to locate the hiding place themselves by the noise.
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MacLean, E., Matthews, L., Hare, B., Nunn, C., Anderson, R., Aureli, F., et al. (2012). How does cognition evolve? Phylogenetic comparative psychology. Anim. Cogn., 15(2), 223–238.
Abstract: Now more than ever animal studies have the potential to test hypotheses regarding how cognition evolves. Comparative psychologists have developed new techniques to probe the cognitive mechanisms underlying animal behavior, and they have become increasingly skillful at adapting methodologies to test multiple species. Meanwhile, evolutionary biologists have generated quantitative approaches to investigate the phylogenetic distribution and function of phenotypic traits, including cognition. In particular, phylogenetic methods can quantitatively (1) test whether specific cognitive abilities are correlated with life history (e.g., lifespan), morphology (e.g., brain size), or socio-ecological variables (e.g., social system), (2) measure how strongly phylogenetic relatedness predicts the distribution of cognitive skills across species, and (3) estimate the ancestral state of a given cognitive trait using measures of cognitive performance from extant species. Phylogenetic methods can also be used to guide the selection of species comparisons that offer the strongest tests of a priori predictions of cognitive evolutionary hypotheses (i.e., phylogenetic targeting). Here, we explain how an integration of comparative psychology and evolutionary biology will answer a host of questions regarding the phylogenetic distribution and history of cognitive traits, as well as the evolutionary processes that drove their evolution.
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Bräuer, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2004). Visual perspective taking in dogs (Canis familiaris) in the presence of barriers. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 88(3-4), 299–317.
Abstract: Previous studies have shown that dogs have developed a special sensitivity to the communicative signals and attentional states of humans. The aim of the current study was to further investigate what dogs know about the visual perception of humans and themselves. In the first two experiments we investigated whether dogs were sensitive to the properties of barriers as blocking the visual access of humans. We presented dogs with a situation in which a human forbade them to take a piece of food, but the type and orientation of the barrier allowed the dog to take the food undetected in some conditions. Dogs differentiated between effective and ineffective barriers, based on their orientation or the particular features of the barriers such as size or the presence of window. In the third study we investigated whether dogs know about what they themselves have seen. We presented subjects with two boxes and placed food in one of them. In the Seen condition the location of the food was shown to the dogs while in the Unseen condition dogs were prevented from seeing the destination of the food. Before selecting one of the boxes by pressing a lever, dogs had the opportunity to seek extra information regarding the contents of the boxes, which would be particularly useful in the condition in which they had not seen where the food was hidden. Dogs rarely used the opportunity to seek information about the contents of the box before making their choice in any condition. Therefore, we found no evidence suggesting that dogs have access to what they themselves have seen, which contrasts with the positive evidence about visual perspective taking in others from the first two experiments and previous studies.
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Kaminski, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Goats' behaviour in a competitive food paradigm: Evidence for perspective taking? Behaviour, 143, 1341–1356.
Abstract: Many mammalian species are highly social, creating intra-group competition for such things as food and mates. Recent research with nonhuman primates indicates that in competitive situations individuals know what other individuals can and cannot see, and they use this knowledge to their advantage in various ways. In the current study, we extended these findings to a non-primate species, the domestic goat, using the conspecific competition paradigm developed by Hare et al. (2000). Like chimpanzees and some other nonhuman primates, goats live in fission-fusion societies, form coalitions and alliances, and are known to reconcile after fights. In the current study, a dominant and a subordinate individual competed for food, but in some cases the subordinate could see things that the dominant could not. In the condition where dominants could only see one piece of food but subordinates could see both, subordinates' preferences depended on whether they received aggression from the dominant animal during the experiment. Subjects who received aggression preferred the hidden over the visible piece of food, whereas subjects who never received aggression significantly preferred the visible piece. By using this strategy, goats who had not received aggression got significantly more food than the other goats. Such complex social interactions may be supported by cognitive mechanisms similar to those of chimpanzees. We discuss these results in the context of current issues in mammalian cognition and socio-ecology.
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