Abstract: This paper reviews evidence that increases the probability that many animals experience at least simple levels of consciousness. First, the search for neural correlates of consciousness has not found any consciousness-producing structure or process that is limited to human brains. Second, appropriate responses to novel challenges for which the animal has not been prepared by genetic programming or previous experience provide suggestive evidence of animal consciousness because such versatility is most effectively organized by conscious thinking. For example, certain types of classical conditioning require awareness of the learned contingency in human subjects, suggesting comparable awareness in similarly conditioned animals. Other significant examples of versatile behavior suggestive of conscious thinking are scrub jays that exhibit all the objective attributes of episodic memory, evidence that monkeys sometimes know what they know, creative tool-making by crows, and recent interpretation of goal-directed behavior of rats as requiring simple nonreflexive consciousness. Third, animal communication often reports subjective experiences. Apes have demonstrated increased ability to use gestures or keyboard symbols to make requests and answer questions; and parrots have refined their ability to use the imitation of human words to ask for things they want and answer moderately complex questions. New data have demonstrated increased flexibility in the gestural communication of swarming honey bees that leads to vitally important group decisions as to which cavity a swarm should select as its new home. Although no single piece of evidence provides absolute proof of consciousness, this accumulation of strongly suggestive evidence increases significantly the likelihood that some animals experience at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings. The next challenge for cognitive ethologists is to investigate for particular animals the content of their awareness and what life is actually like, for them.

Abstract: This research examined exchange and value attribution in tufted capuchin monkeys ( Cebus apella). We presented subjects with opportunities to obtain various foods and a tool from an experimenter in exchange for the foods or tool in the subjects' possession. The times elapsed before the first chow biscuits were expelled and/or an exchange took place were recorded as the dependent measures. Laboratory chow biscuits, grapes, apples, and a metal bolt (a tool used to probe for syrup) were used as experimental stimuli. The subjects demonstrated the ability to recognize that exchanges could occur when an experimenter was present with a desirable food. Results indicate that subjects exhibited significant variation in their willingness to barter based upon the types of foods that were both in their possession and presented by the experimenter. Subjects more readily traded chow biscuits for fruit, and more readily traded apples for grapes than grapes for apples. During the exchange of tools and food, the subjects preferred the following in descending order when the probing apparatus was baited with sweet syrup: grapes, metal bolts, and chow biscuits. However when the apparatus was not baited, the values changed to the following in descending order: grapes, chow, and metal bolts. These results indicate that tufted capuchins recognize opportunities to exchange and engage in a simple barter system whereby low-valued foods are readily traded for more highly valued food. Furthermore, these capuchins demonstrate that their value for a tool changes depending upon its utility.

Abstract: Techniques traditionally used in developmental research with infants have been widely used with nonhuman primates in the investigation of comparative cognitive abilities. Recently, researchers have shown that human infants and monkeys select the larger of two numerosities in a spontaneous forced-choice discrimination task. Here we adopt the same method to assess in a series of experiments spontaneous choice of the larger of two numerosities in a species of amphibian, red-backed salamanders ( Plethodon cinereus). The findings indicate that salamanders “go for more,” just like human babies and monkeys. This rudimentary capacity is a type of numerical discrimination that is spontaneously present in this amphibian.

Abstract: Twelve pigeons ( Columba livia) were trained on a go/no-go schedule to discriminate between two kinds of movement patterns of dots, which to human observers appear to be “intentional” and “non-intentional” movements. In experiment 1, the intentional motion stimulus contained one dot (a “wolf”) that moved systematically towards another dot as though stalking it, and three distractors (“sheep”). The non-intentional motion stimulus consisted of four distractors but no stalker. Birds showed some improvement of discrimination as the sessions progressed, but high levels of discrimination were not reached. In experiment 2, the same birds were tested with different stimuli. The same parameters were used but the number of intentionally moving dots in the intentional motion stimulus was altered, so that three wolves stalked one sheep. Despite the enhanced difference of movement patterns, the birds did not show any further improvement in discrimination. However, birds for which the non-intentional stimulus was associated with reward showed a decline in discrimination. These results indicated that pigeons can discriminate between stimuli that do and do not contain an element that human observer see as moving intentionally. However, as no feature-positive effect was found in experiment 1, it is assumed that pigeons did not perceive or discriminate these stimuli on the basis that the intentional stimuli contained a feature that the non-intentional stimuli lacked, though the convergence seen in experiment 2 may have been an effective feature for the pigeons. Pigeons seem to be able to recognise some form of multiple simultaneously goal-directed motions, compared to random motions, as a distinctive feature, but do not seem to use simple “intentional” motion paths of two geometrical figures, embedded in random motions, as a feature whose presence or absence differentiates motion displays.

Abstract: Three tests investigated how the geometric relation between object/landmarks and goals influenced spatial choice behavior in rats. Two groups searched for hidden food in an object-filled circular arena containing 24 small poles. For the “Proximal” group, four distinct objects in a square configuration were placed close to four baited poles. For the “Distal” group, the identical configuration of objects was rotated 45° relative to the poles containing the hidden food. The Proximal group learned to locate the baited poles more quickly than the Distal group. Tests with removed and rearranged landmarks indicated that the two groups learned to use the objects differently. The results suggested that close proximity of objects to goals encouraged their use as beacons, while greater distance of objects from goals resulted in the global encoding of the geometric properties of the arena and the use of the objects as landmarks.