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Janson, C., & Byrne, R. (2007). What wild primates know about resources: opening up the black box. Anim. Cogn., 10(3), 357–367.
Abstract: Abstract We present the theoretical and practical difficulties of inferring the cognitive processes involved in spatial movement decisions of primates and other animals based on studies of their foraging behavior in the wild. Because the possible cognitive processes involved in foraging are not known a priori for a given species, some observed spatial movements could be consistent with a large number of processes ranging from simple undirected search processes to strategic goal-oriented travel. Two basic approaches can help to reveal the cognitive processes: (1) experiments designed to test specific mechanisms; (2) comparison of observed movements with predicted ones based on models of hypothesized foraging modes (ideally, quantitative ones). We describe how these two approaches have been applied to evidence for spatial knowledge of resources in primates, and for various hypothesized goals of spatial decisions in primates, reviewing what is now established. We conclude with a synthesis emphasizing what kinds of spatial movement data on unmanipulated primate populations in the wild are most useful in deciphering goal-oriented processes from random processes. Basic to all of these is an estimate of the animals ability to detect resources during search. Given knowledge of the animals detection ability, there are several observable patterns of resource use incompatible with a pure search process. These patterns include increasing movement speed when approaching versus leaving a resource, increasingly directed movement toward more valuable resources, and directed travel to distant resources from many starting locations. Thus, it should be possible to assess and compare spatial cognition across a variety of primate species and thus trace its ecological and evolutionary correlates.
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Defolie, C., Malassis, R., Serre, M., & Meunier, H. (2015). Tufted capuchins (Cebus apella) adapt their communicative behaviour to human’s attentional states. Anim. Cogn., 18(3), 747–755.
Abstract: Animal communication has become a widely studied field of research, especially because of the associated debates on the origin of human language. Due to their phylogenetic proximity with humans, non-human primates represent a suitable model to investigate the precursors of language. This study focuses on the perception of the attentional states of others, an important prerequisite to intentional communication. We investigated whether capuchins (Cebus apella) produce a learnt pointing gesture towards a hidden and unreachable food reward as a function of the attentional status of the human experimenter. For that purpose, we tested five subjects that we first trained to indicate by a pointing gesture towards the human partner the position of a reward hidden by an assistant. Then, capuchins were tested in two experimental conditions randomly ordered. In the first condition—motivation trial—the experimenter was attentive to the subject gestures and rewarded him immediately when it pointed towards the baited cylinder. During the second condition—test trial—the experimenter adopted one of the following attention states and the subject was rewarded after 10 s has elapsed, regardless of the subject’s behaviour. Five attentional states were tested: (1) experimenter absent, (2) experimenter back to the monkey, (3) experimenter’s head away, (4) experimenter watching above the monkey, and (5) experimenter watching the monkey face. Our results reveal a variation in our subjects’ communicative behaviours with a discrimination of the different postural clues (body and head orientation) available in our experimental conditions. This study suggests that capuchins can flexibly use a communicative gesture to adapt to the attentional state of their partner and provides evidence that acquired communicative gestures of monkeys might be used intentionally.
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de Waal, F. B. M. (2003). Darwin's legacy and the study of primate visual communication. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 1000, 7–31.
Abstract: After Charles Darwin's The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, published in 1872, we had to wait 60 years before the theme of animal expressions was picked up by another astute observer. In 1935, Nadezhda Ladygina-Kohts published a detailed comparison of the expressive behavior of a juvenile chimpanzee and of her own child. After Kohts, we had to wait until the 1960s for modern ethological analyses of primate facial and gestural communication. Again, the focus was on the chimpanzee, but ethograms on other primates appeared as well. Our understanding of the range of expressions in other primates is at present far more advanced than that in Darwin's time. A strong social component has been added: instead of focusing on the expressions per se, they are now often classified according to the social situations in which they typically occur. Initially, quantitative analyses were sequential (i.e., concerned with temporal associations between behavior patterns), and they avoided the language of emotions. I will discuss some of this early work, including my own on the communicative repertoire of the bonobo, a close relative of the chimpanzee (and ourselves). I will provide concrete examples to make the point that there is a much richer matrix of contexts possible than the common behavioral categories of aggression, sex, fear, play, and so on. Primate signaling is a form of negotiation, and previous classifications have ignored the specifics of what animals try to achieve with their exchanges. There is also increasing evidence for signal conventionalization in primates, especially the apes, in both captivity and the field. This process results in group-specific or “cultural” communication patterns.
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Gallup, G. G. J. (1997). On the rise and fall of self-conception in primates. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 818, 72–82.
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Swartz, K. B. (1997). What is mirror self-recognition in nonhuman primates, and what is it not? Ann N Y Acad Sci, 818, 64–71.
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Kendrick, K. M. (1998). Intelligent perception. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 57(3-4), 213–231.
Abstract: For an animal from any species to exhibit intelligent perception it must be capable of being consciously aware of what it perceives and capable of learning from this experience. Although many organisms, and for that matter machines, are capable of rapid adaptive learning in response to perception of environmental changes, such adaptations can occur without them being consciously aware either of external stimuli or their response to them. While behavioural and neurophysiological evidence suggests that, apart from ourselves, other higher primates must also be capable of such awareness, an important central question is whether such awareness is a characteristic of primate evolution or if it also occurs in sub-primate mammals as well. In this review I will examine our behavioural and neurophysiological evidence from visual and olfactory recognition studies in the sheep to support the argument that they are likely to be aware of and learn about both social and non-social objects and that they are therefore capable of intelligent perception. However, the impact of motivational changes on these perceptual processes suggests that they may be limited in terms of both prospection and retrospection and dealing with symbolic associations.
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Hoff, M. P., Powell, D. M., Lukas, K. E., & Maple, T. L. (1997). Individual and social behavior of lowland gorillas in outdoor exhibits compared with indoor holding areas. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 54(4), 359–370.
Abstract: The behavior of nine lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) living in three social groups at Zoo Atlanta was compared in an indoor holding area versus an outdoor exhibit. Focal animal data were collected for each animal during 15 min observation sessions, alternating between indoors and outdoors. A variety of solitary and social behaviors differed in the two conditions. All individual and social behaviors that showed a difference, except eating, occurred more indoors than outdoors. These included aggressive displays, reclining, self manipulation, and social examination of others. Additionally, the gorillas spent more time closer together in the indoor condition. A variety of other behaviors measured did not change between the two environments. There was a clear effect on behavior of the different housing conditions in which the gorillas were kept. It is suggested that the differences in aggressive behavior may be related to environmental complexity. It is further suggested that zoos should be aware that differences in behavior reported by caretaking staff, researchers and visitors may be a reflection of the differing environmental circumstances in which the animals are observed.
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Sterck, E., Watts, D., & van Schaik, C. (1997). The evolution of female social relationships in nonhuman primates. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol., 41(5), 291–309.
Abstract: Considerable interspeci®c variation in female social relationships occurs in gregarious primates, particularly with regard to agonism and cooperation between females and to the quality of female relationships with males. This variation exists alongside variation in female philopatry and dispersal. Socioecological theories have tried to explain variation in female-female social relationships from an evolutionary perspective focused on ecological factors, notably predation and food distribution. According to the current ``ecological model'', predation risk forces females of most diurnal primate species to live in groups; the strength of the contest component of competition for resources within and between groups then largely determines social relationships between females. Social elationships among gregarious females are here characterized as DispersalEgalitarian, Resident-Nepotistic, Resident-Nepotistic-Tolerant, or Resident-Egalitarian. This ecological model has successfully explained i€erences in the occurrence of formal submission signals, decided dominance relation ships, coalitions and female philopatry. Group size and female rank generally a€ect female reproduction success as the model predicts, and studies of closely related species in di€erent ecological circumstances underscore the importance of the model. Some cases, however, can only be explained when we extend the model to incorporate the e€ects of infanticide risk and habitat saturation. We review evidence in support of the ecological model and test the power of alternative models that invoke between-group competition, forced female philopatry, demographic female recruitment, male interventions into female aggression, and male harassment.
Not one of these models can replace the ecological model, which already encompasses the between-group competition. Currently the best model, which explains
several phenomena that the ecological model does not, is a ``socioecological model'' based on the combined importance of ecological factors, habitat saturation and infanticide avoidance. We note some points of similarity and divergence with other mammalian taxa; these remain to be explored in detail.
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Meunier, H., Leca, J. B., Deneubourg, J. L., & Petit, O. (2006). Group movement decisions in capuchin monkeys: the utility of an experimental study and a mathematical model to explore the relationship between individual and collective behaviours. Behaviour, 143, 1511–1527.
Abstract: In primate groups, collective movements are typically described as processes dependent on leadership mechanisms. However, in some species, decision-making includes negotiations and distributed leadership. These facts suggest that simple underlying processes may explain certain decision mechanisms during collective movements. To study such processes, we have designed experiments on white-faced capuchin monkeys (Cebus capucinus) during which we provoked collective movements involving a binary choice. These experiments enabled us to analyse the spatial decisions of individuals in the group. We found that the underlying process includes anonymous mimetism, which means that each individual may influence all members of the group. To support this result, we created a mathematical model issued from our experimental data. A totally anonymous model does not fit perfectly with our experimental distribution. A more individualised model, which takes into account the specific behaviour of social peripheral individuals, revealed the validity of the mimetism hypothesis. Even though white-faced capuchins have complex cognitive abilities, a coexistence of anonymous and social mechanisms appears to influence their choice of direction during collective movements. The present approach may offer vital insights into the relationships between individual behaviours and their emergent collective acts.
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Chalmeau, R., & Gallo, A. (1995). Cooperation in primates: Critical analysis of behavioural criteria. Behav. Process., 35(1-3), 101–111.
Abstract: Concerning hunting in chimpanzees, cooperation has generally been attributed to the behaviour of two or more individuals acting together to achieve a common goal (Boesch and Boesch, 1989). The common goal is often considered as the concrete result of a common action by two or several individuals. Although this result could be used as a criterion for cooperation, it could also be an outcome due to chance. We suggest that the goal, viewed as a concrete benefit shared by the partners, is not a requisite of cooperation but rather a possible consequence of a common action largely submitted to social constraints. Individuals engaged in a cooperative task in order to solve a problem have to exchange information to adjust to each other's behaviour. However, evidence of communication between partners during simultaneous cooperation is rare. An experiment in which two chimpanzees each had to simultaneously pull a handle to get a fruit was performed. We analysed not only the concrete result of the partners' activity but also what the individuals took into account before pulling a handle. We tried to specify what the chimpanzees learned by means of a series of logical propositions which we were able to confront the experimental results.
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