|
|
de Waal, F. B. M., & Luttrell, L. M. (1988). Mechanisms of social reciprocity in three primate species: Symmetrical relationship characteristics or cognition? Ethology and Sociobiology, 9(2–4), 101–118.
Abstract: Agonistic intervention behavior was observed in captive groups of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), and stumptail monkeys (M. arctoides). Reciprocity correlations of interventions were determined while removing from the data the effects of several symmetrical relationship characteristics, that is, matrillineal kinship, proximity relations, and same-sex combination. It was considered likely that if significant reciprocity persisted after controlling for these characteristics, the reciprocity was based on cognitive mechanisms. Statistical significance was tested by means of recently developed matrix permutation procedures. All three species exhibited significant reciprocity with regard to beneficial interventions, even after controlling for symmetrical traits. Harmful interventions were, however, reciprocal among chimpanzees only. This species showed a “revenge system”, that is, if A often intervened against B, B did the same to A. In contrast, both macaque species showed significantly inversed reciprocity in their harmful interventions: if A often intervened against B, B rarely intervened against A. Further analysis indicates that the strict hierarchy of macaques prevents them from achieving complete reciprocity. Compared to chimpanzees, macaques rarely intervene against higher ranking group members. The observed contrast can be partially explained on the basis of differences in available space, as indicated by a comparison of indoor and outdoor living conditions for the chimpanzee colony. Yet, even when such spatial factors are taken into account, substantial behavior differences between chimpanzees and macaques remain.
|
|
|
|
Russell, C. L., Bard, K. A., & Adamson, L. B. (1997). Social referencing by young chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). J. Comp. Psychol., 111(2), 185–191.
Abstract: Social referencing is the seeking of information from another individual and the use of that information to evaluate a situation. It is a well-documented ability in human infants but has not been studied experimentally in nonhuman primates. Seventeen young nursery-reared chimpanzees (14 to 41 months old) were observed in a standard social referencing paradigm in which they received happy and fear messages concerning novel objects from a familiar human caregiver. Each chimpanzee looked referentially at their caregiver, and the emotional messages that they received differentially influenced their gaze behavior and avoidance of the novel objects. It is concluded that chimpanzees can acquire information about their complex social and physical environments through social referencing and can use emotional information to alter their own behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
|
|
|
|
Quaresmini, C., Forrester, G. S., Spiezio, C., & Vallortigara, G. (2014). Social environment elicits lateralized behaviors in gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 128(3), 276–284.
Abstract: The influence of the social environment on lateralized behaviors has now been investigated across a wide variety of animal species. New evidence suggests that the social environment can modulate behavior. Currently, there is a paucity of data relating to how primates navigate their environmental space, and investigations that consider the naturalistic context of the individual are few and fragmented. Moreover, there are competing theories about whether only the right or rather both cerebral hemispheres are involved in the processing of social stimuli, especially in emotion processing. Here we provide the first report of lateralized social behaviors elicited by great apes. We employed a continuous focal animal sampling method to record the spontaneous interactions of a captive zoo-living colony of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and a biological family group of peer-reared western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla). We specifically focused on which side of the body (i.e., front, rear, left, right) the focal individual preferred to keep conspecifics. Utilizing a newly developed quantitative corpus-coding scheme, analysis revealed both chimpanzees and gorillas demonstrated a significant group-level preference for focal individuals to keep conspecifics positioned to the front of them compared with behind them. More interestingly, both groups also manifested a population-level bias to keep conspecifics on their left side compared with their right side. Our findings suggest a social processing dominance of the right hemisphere for context-specific social environments. Results are discussed in light of the evolutionary adaptive value of social stimulus as a triggering factor for the manifestation of group-level lateralized behaviors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
|
|
|
|
Beck, B. B. (1982). Chimpocentrism: Bias in cognitive ethology. Journal of Human Evolution, 11(1), 3–17.
Abstract: Herring gulls drop hard-shelled mollusks and hermit crab-inhabited molluskan prey in order to break the shells and gain access to the edible interior. A field study of predatory shell dropping on Cape Cod, Massachusetts, U.S.A. showed that the gulls usually drop the same shell repeatedly, orient directly to dropping sites that are invisible from the point at which the mollusks are captured, drop preferentially on hard surfaces, adjust dropping heights to suit the area and elasticity of the substrate, orient directly into the wind while dropping, sever the large defensive cheliped of hermit crabs before consumption, and rinse prey that is difficult to swallow. Proficiency in prey dropping is acquired through dropping objects in play, trial-and-error learning, and perhaps, observation learning.
Observable attributes of predatory shell-dropping support inferences that the gulls are capable of extended concentration, purposefulness, mental representation of spatially and temporally displaced environmental features, cognitive mapping, cognitive modeling, selectivity, and strategy formation. Identical cognitive processes have been inferred to underlie the most sophisticated forms of chimpanzee tool-use.
Advanced cognitive capacities are not restricted to chimpanzees and other pongids, and are not associated uniquely with tool use. The chimpocentric bias should be abandoned, and reconstructions of the evolution of intelligence should be modified accordingly.
|
|
