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Byrne R.W. (2000). - Animal Cognition in Nature, edited by Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg and Alan C. Kamil. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 4, 73.
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Tomasello M., Call J., & Hare B. (2003). Chimpanzees understand psychological states – the question is which ones and to what extent. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 7, 153–156.
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Bolhuis, J. J., & Macphail, E. M. (2001). A critique of the neuroecology of learning and memory. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 5(10), 426–433.
Abstract: Recent years have seen the emergence of neuroecology, the study of the neural mechanisms of behaviour guided by functional and evolutionary principles. This research has been of enormous value for our understanding of the evolution of brain- and species-specific behaviour. However, we question the validity of the neuroecological approach when applied to the analysis of learning and memory, given its arbitrary assumption that different [`]problems' engage different memory mechanisms. Differences in memory-based performance in [`]natural' tasks do not prove differences in memory capacity; similarly, differences in the use of memory in the natural environment do not provide a sound basis for expecting differences in anatomical structures that subserve learning and memory. This critique is illustrated with examples taken from the study of the neurobiology of food storing and song learning in birds.
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Holekamp, K. E. (2006). Questioning the social intelligence hypothesis. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 11(2), 65–69.
Abstract: The social intelligence hypothesis posits that complex cognition and enlarged [`]executive brains' evolved in response to challenges that are associated with social complexity. This hypothesis has been well supported, but some recent data are inconsistent with its predictions. It is becoming increasingly clear that multiple selective agents, and non-selective constraints, must have acted to shape cognitive abilities in humans and other animals. The task now is to develop a larger theoretical framework that takes into account both inter-specific differences and similarities in cognition. This new framework should facilitate consideration of how selection pressures that are associated with sociality interact with those that are imposed by non-social forms of environmental complexity, and how both types of functional demands interact with phylogenetic and developmental constraints.
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Povinelli, D. J., & Vonk, J. (2003). Chimpanzee minds: suspiciously human? Trends. Cognit. Sci., 7(4), 157–160.
Abstract: Chimpanzees undoubtedly form concepts related to the statistical regularities in behavior. But do they also construe such abstractions in terms of mental states – that is, do they possess a [`]theory of mind'? Although both anecdotal and experimental data have been marshaled to support this idea, we show that no explanatory power or economy of expression is gained by such an assumption. We suggest that additional experiments will be unhelpful as long as they continue to rely upon determining whether subjects interpret behavioral invariances in terms of mental states. We propose a paradigm shift to overcome this limitation.
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