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Fuentes, A., Malone, N., Sanz, C., Matheson, M., & Vaughan, L. (2002). Conflict and post-conflict behavior in a small group of chimpanzees. Primates, 43(3), 223–235.
Abstract: Chimpanzee research plays a central role in the discussions of conflict negotiation. Reconciliation, or the attraction and affiliation of former opponents following conflict, has been proposed as a central element of conflict negotiation in chimpanzees and various other taxa. In an attempt to expand the database of chimpanzee conflict resolution, conflict and post-conflict behavior were recorded for a small group of socially housed chimpanzees at the Chimpanzee and Human Communication Institute, at Central Washington University. Data were collected over six 6-week periods between 1997 and 2000, for a total of 840 hours of observation, resulting in a substantial post-conflict (PC) and matched control (MC) data set. The data demonstrate this group's tendencies to maintain visual contact and closer proximity after conflicts. Dyadic corrected conciliatory tendencies ranged between 0 – 37.5% and averaged 17.25% across all dyads. Individual corrected conciliatory tendencies ranged between 5.8 and 32%. The results of this study combined with recent publications on captive and free-ranging chimpanzee post-conflict behavior suggest that variation in post-conflict behavior may be important to our understanding of chimpanzee conflict negotiation, and may also have implications for the design and management of captive chimpanzee enclosures and social groups, respectively.
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Sachs, E. (1967). Dissociation of learning in rats and its similarities to dissociative states in man. Proc Annu Meet Am Psychopathol Assoc, 55, 249–304.
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Johnstone, R. A. (2001). Eavesdropping and animal conflict. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 98(16), 9177–9180.
Abstract: Fights between pairs of animals frequently take place within a wider social context. The displays exchanged during conflict, and the outcome of an encounter, are often detectable by individuals who are not immediately involved. In at least some species, such bystanders are known to eavesdrop on contests between others, and to modify their behavior toward the contestants in response to the observed interaction. Here, I extend Maynard Smith's well known model of animal aggression, the Hawk-Dove game, to incorporate the possibility of eavesdroppers. I show that some eavesdropping is favored whenever the cost of losing an escalated fight exceeds the value of the contested resource, and that its equilibrium frequency is greatest when costs are relatively high. Eavesdropping reduces the risk of escalated conflict relative to that expected by chance, given the level of aggression in the population. However, it also promotes increased aggression, because it enhances the value of victory. The net result is that escalated conflicts are predicted to occur more frequently when eavesdropping is possible.
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Flack, J. C., Krakauer, D. C., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). Robustness mechanisms in primate societies: a perturbation study. Proc Biol Sci, 272(1568), 1091–1099.
Abstract: Conflict management mechanisms have a direct, critical effect on system robustness because they mitigate conflict intensity and help repair damaged relationships. However, robustness mechanisms can also have indirect effects on system integrity by facilitating interactions among components. We explore the indirect role that conflict management mechanisms play in the maintenance of social system robustness, using a perturbation technique to 'knockout' components responsible for effective conflict management. We explore the effects of knockout on pigtailed macaque (Macaca nemestrina) social organization, using a captive group of 84 individuals. This system is ideal in addressing this question because there is heterogeneity in performance of conflict management. Consequently, conflict managers can be easily removed without disrupting other control structures. We find that powerful conflict managers are essential in maintaining social order for the benefit of all members of society. We show that knockout of components responsible for conflict management results in system destabilization by significantly increasing mean levels of conflict and aggression, decreasing socio-positive interaction and decreasing the operation of repair mechanisms.
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de Waal, F. B. (2000). Primates--A natural heritage of conflict resolution. Science, 289(5479), 586–590.
Abstract: The traditional notion of aggression as an antisocial instinct is being replaced by a framework that considers it a tool of competition and negotiation. When survival depends on mutual assistance, the expression of aggression is constrained by the need to maintain beneficial relationships. Moreover, evolution has produced ways of countering its disruptive consequences. For example, chimpanzees kiss and embrace after fights, and other nonhuman primates engage in similar “reconciliations.” Theoretical developments in this field carry implications for human aggression research. From families to high schools, aggressive conflict is subject to the same constraints known of cooperative animal societies. It is only when social relationships are valued that one can expect the full complement of natural checks and balances.
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Flack, J. C., de Waal, F. B. M., & Krakauer, D. C. (2005). Social structure, robustness, and policing cost in a cognitively sophisticated species. Am Nat, 165(5), E126–139.
Abstract: Conflict management is one of the primary requirements for social complexity. Of the many forms of conflict management, one of the rarest and most interesting is third-party policing, or intervening impartially to control conflict. Third-party policing should be hard to evolve because policers personally pay a cost for intervening, while the benefits are diffused over the whole group. In this study we investigate the incidence and costs of policing in a primate society. We report quantitative evidence of non-kin policing in the nonhuman primate, the pigtailed macaque. We find that policing is effective at reducing the intensity of or terminating conflict when performed by the most powerful individuals. We define a measure, social power consensus, that predicts effective low-cost interventions by powerful individuals and ineffective, relatively costly interventions by low-power individuals. Finally, we develop a simple probabilistic model to explore whether the degree to which policing can effectively reduce the societal cost of conflict is dependent on variance in the distribution of power. Our data and simple model suggest that third-party policing effectiveness and cost are dependent on power structure and might emerge only in societies with high variance in power.
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