Dyer, F. C. (1998). Spatial Cognition: Lessons from Central-place Foraging Insects. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 119–154). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary Spatial orientation has played an extremely important role in the development of ideas about the behavioral capacities of animals. Indeed, as the modern scientific study of animal behavior emerged from its roots in zoology and experimental psychology, studies of spatial orientation figured in the work of many of the pioneering researchers, including Tinbergen (), von ), Watson () and .
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Smith, W. J. (1998). Cognitive Implications of an Information-sharing Model of Animal Communication. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 227–243). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary In social communication, one animal signals and another responds. Several cognitive steps are involved as the second animal selects its responses; these steps can be described as follows in terms of an informational model. First, the responding individual must evaluate the information made available by the signaling on the basis of other information, available from sources contextual to the signal. Second, the respondent must fit all of the relevant information into patterns generated from recall of past events (conscious recall is not generally required; pattern fitting is a fundamental skill). Third, conditional predictions must be made; and fourth, the individual must test and modify any of these predictions for which significant consequences exist. Many vertebrate animals appear to respond to signaling with considerable flexibility. Communicative events are thus complex but are by no means intractable. Indeed, communication provides us with excellent opportunities to investigate animal cognition.
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Beer, C. G. (1998). Varying Views of Animal and Human Cognition. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 435–456). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary In this chapter I want to stand back from the splendid empirical work on animal cognitive capacities that is the focus of this book, and look at the broader context of cognitive concerns within which the work can be viewed. Indeed even the term `cognitive ethology' currently connotes and denotes more than is represented here, as other collections of articles, such as and , exemplify. I include the current descendants of behavioristic learning theory, evolutionary epistemology, evolutionary psychology and the recent comparative turn that has been taken in cognitive science. These several approaches, despite their considerable overlap, often appear independent and even ignorant of one another. Like the proverbial blind men feeling the hide of an elephant, they touch hands from time to time, yet collectively have only a piecemeal and distributed understanding of the shape of the whole. Although each approach may indeed need the space to work out its own conceptual and methodological preoccupations without confounding interference from other views, a utopian spirit envisages an ultimate coming together, a more comprehensive realization of the synthetic approach to animal cognition that is this book's theme.
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Kamil, A. C. (1998). On the Proper Definition of Cognitive Ethology. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 1–28). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary The last 20-30 years have seen two `scientific revolutions' in the study of animal behavior: the cognitive revolution that originated in psychology, and the Darwinian, behavioral ecology revolution that originated in biology. Among psychologists, the cognitive revolution has had enormous impact. Similarly, among biologists, the Darwinian revolution has had enormous impact. The major theme of this chapter is that these two scientific research programs need to be combined into a single approach, simultaneously cognitive and Darwinian, and that this single approach is most appropriately called cognitive ethology.
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Virányi, Z., Range, F., & Huber, L. (2008). Attentiveness toward others and social learning in domestic dogs. In L. S. Röska-hardy, & E. Neumann-held (Eds.), Learning from Animals?: Examining the Nature of Human Uniqueness (pp. 141–154). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
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Bouman, I. (1998). The reintroduction of Przewalski horses in the Hustain Nuruu Mountain Forest Steppe Reserve in Mongolia. Mededelingen: Netherlands Commission for International Nature Protection, 32.
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Alexander, F., & Chowdhury, A. K. (1958). Enzymes in the ileal juice of the horse. Nature, 181(4603), 190.
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de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). A century of getting to know the chimpanzee. Nature, 437(7055), 56–59.
Abstract: A century of research on chimpanzees, both in their natural habitat and in captivity, has brought these apes socially, emotionally and mentally much closer to us. Parallels and homologues between chimpanzee and human behaviour range from tool-technology and cultural learning to power politics and intercommunity warfare. Few behavioural domains have remained untouched by this increased knowledge, which has dramatically challenged the way we view ourselves. The sequencing of the chimpanzee genome will no doubt bring more surprises and insights. Humans do occupy a special place among the primates, but this place increasingly has to be defined against a backdrop of substantial similarity.
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Whiten, A., Horner, V., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). Conformity to cultural norms of tool use in chimpanzees. Nature, 437(7059), 737–740.
Abstract: Rich circumstantial evidence suggests that the extensive behavioural diversity recorded in wild great apes reflects a complexity of cultural variation unmatched by species other than our own. However, the capacity for cultural transmission assumed by this interpretation has remained difficult to test rigorously in the field, where the scope for controlled experimentation is limited. Here we show that experimentally introduced technologies will spread within different ape communities. Unobserved by group mates, we first trained a high-ranking female from each of two groups of captive chimpanzees to adopt one of two different tool-use techniques for obtaining food from the same 'Pan-pipe' apparatus, then re-introduced each female to her respective group. All but two of 32 chimpanzees mastered the new technique under the influence of their local expert, whereas none did so in a third population lacking an expert. Most chimpanzees adopted the method seeded in their group, and these traditions continued to diverge over time. A subset of chimpanzees that discovered the alternative method nevertheless went on to match the predominant approach of their companions, showing a conformity bias that is regarded as a hallmark of human culture.
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Brosnan, S. F., & De Waal, F. B. M. (2003). Monkeys reject unequal pay. Nature, 425(6955), 297–299.
Abstract: During the evolution of cooperation it may have become critical for individuals to compare their own efforts and pay-offs with those of others. Negative reactions may occur when expectations are violated. One theory proposes that aversion to inequity can explain human cooperation within the bounds of the rational choice model, and may in fact be more inclusive than previous explanations. Although there exists substantial cultural variation in its particulars, this 'sense of fairness' is probably a human universal that has been shown to prevail in a wide variety of circumstances. However, we are not the only cooperative animals, hence inequity aversion may not be uniquely human. Many highly cooperative nonhuman species seem guided by a set of expectations about the outcome of cooperation and the division of resources. Here we demonstrate that a nonhuman primate, the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella), responds negatively to unequal reward distribution in exchanges with a human experimenter. Monkeys refused to participate if they witnessed a conspecific obtain a more attractive reward for equal effort, an effect amplified if the partner received such a reward without any effort at all. These reactions support an early evolutionary origin of inequity aversion.
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