Abstract: In modern intensive husbandry systems there is an increasing tendency for animals to interact with technical equipment. If the animal-technology interface is well-designed this may improve animal welfare by offering challenges for cognitive adaptation. Here a system and its application is presented that acoustically calls individual pigs out of a group (n = 8) to a feeding station. In three different learning phases, the computer-controlled “call-feeding-station” (CFS) trained the animals to recognize a specific acoustic signal as a summons for food, using a combination of classical and operant conditioning techniques. The experimental group's stall contained four CFSs, at each of which one animal at a time was able to feed. When an animal had learned to discriminate and recognize its individual acoustic signal it had to localize the particular CFS that was calling and to enter inside it. Then, it received a portion of feed, the amount of which was adapted to the respective age of the animals. Each animal was called at several, unpredictable times each day and the computer programme ensured that the total feed supply was sufficient for each animal. In the last phase of the experiment the animals, in addition, had to press a button with an increasing fixed ratio for the delivery of feed. It was demonstrated that the pigs were able to adapt quickly to the CFSs. Although they were challenged over 12 h daily by requirements of attention, sensory localization and motor efforts to gain comparatively low amounts of feed, they performed well and reached fairly constant success rates between 90 and 95% and short delays between 14 and 16 s between a summons and the food release in the last phase of the experiment. The weight gain during the experiment was the same as in a conventionally fed control group (n = 8). We therefore conclude that CFSs present a positive challenge to the animals with no negative effects on performance but with a potentially beneficial role for welfare and against boredom. The system is also a suitable experimental platform for research on the effects of successful adaptation by rewarded cognitive processes in pigs.

Abstract: Locating and capturing food are suggested as significant selection pressures for the evolution of various cognitive abilities in mammals and birds. The hypothesis is proposed that aspects of food procuring behaviour should be strongly indicative of particular cognitive abilities. Experimental data concerning higher mental abilities in mammals and birds are reviewed. These data deal with self-recognition studies, rule-learning experiments, number concept, deceptive abilities, tool-use and observational learning. A Darwinian approach reveals: (1) the adaptiveness of particular abilities for particular niches, (2) that in complex foraging environments, increases in foraging efficiencies in animals should result from the evolution of particular cognitive abilities, (3) that phenomena such as convergent mental evolution should be expected to have taken place across taxonomic groups for species exploiting similar niches, (4) that divergence in mental ability should also have taken place where related species have exploited dissimilar niches. Experimental data of higher mental abilities in animals concur with a Darwinian explanation for the distribution of these cognitive abilities and no anomalies have been found. There are, as a consequence, significant implications for the welfare of animals subject to training when training methodology gives little or no consideration to the various mental abilities of species.

Abstract: Ten patients with semantic dementia resulting from bilateral anterior temporal lobe atrophy, and 10 matched controls, were tested on an object recognition task in which they were invited to choose (from a four-item array) the picture representing “the same thing” as an object picture that they had just inspected and attempted to name. The target in the response array was never physically identical to the studied picture but differed from it – in the various conditions – in size, angle of view, colour or exemplar (e.g. a different breed of dog). In one test block for each patient, the response array was presented immediately after the studied picture was removed; in another block, a 2 min filled delay was inserted between study and test. The patients performed relatively well when the studied object and target response differed only in the size of the picture on the page, but were significantly impaired as a group in the other three type-of-change conditions, even with no delay between study and test. The five patients whose structural brain imaging revealed major right-temporal atrophy were more impaired overall, and also more affected by the 2 min delay, than the five patients with an asymmetric pattern characterised by predominant left-sided atrophy. These results are interpreted in terms of a hypothesis that successful classification of an object token as an object type is not a pre-semantic ability but rather results from interaction of perceptual and conceptual processing.

Abstract: Four experiments investigated Stroop interference using geometrically transformed words. Over experiments, reading was made increasingly difficult by manipulating orientation uncertainty and the number of noncolor words. As a consequence, time to read color words aloud increased dramatically. Yet, even when reading a color word was considerably slower than naming the color of ink in which the word was printed, Stroop interference persisted virtually unaltered. This result is incompatible with the simple horse race model widely used to explain color-word interference. When reading became extremely slow, a reversed Stroop effect--interference in reading the word due to an incongruent ink color--appeared for one transformation together with the standard Stroop interference. Whether or not the concept of automaticity is invoked, relative speed of processing the word versus the color does not provide an adequate overall explanation of the Stroop phenomenon.

Abstract: Episodic memory refers to a system of memory with the capacity to recollect specific events from an individual's life. Some psychologists have suggested that episodic memory is a uniquely human phenomenon. We challenge that idea and present evidence that great apes and other primates may possess episodic-like memory. We review criteria developed to assess episodic-like memory in nonhumans, and how they apply to primates. In particular, we discuss the criteria of Clayton et al. [2001], who stated that episodic-like memory is based on the retrieval of multiple and integrated components of an event. We then review eight studies examining memory in great apes and apply the Clayton et al. criteria to each of them. We summarize the evidence that is compatible with the existence of episodic-like memory, although none of the data completely satisfy the Clayton et al. criteria. Morover, feelings of pastness and feelings of confidence, which mark episodic memory in humans, have not been empirically addressed in nonhuman primates. Future studies should be directed at these aspects of memory in primates. We speculate on the functional significance of episodic memory in nonhuman primates.