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Hare, B., Brown, M., Williamson, C., & Tomasello, M. (2002). The domestication of social cognition in dogs. Science, 298(5598), 1634–1636.
Abstract: Dogs are more skillful than great apes at a number of tasks in which they must read human communicative signals indicating the location of hidden food. In this study, we found that wolves who were raised by humans do not show these same skills, whereas domestic dog puppies only a few weeks old, even those that have had little human contact, do show these skills. These findings suggest that during the process of domestication, dogs have been selected for a set of social-cognitive abilities that enable them to communicate with humans in unique ways.
Keywords: Animals; *Animals, Domestic; *Behavior, Animal; *Cognition; *Cues; *Dogs; Food; Humans; Memory; Pan troglodytes; *Social Behavior; Species Specificity; Vision; Wolves
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (1984). Grooming, alliances and reciprocal altruism in vervet monkeys. Nature, 308(5959), 541–543.
Abstract: Reciprocal altruism refers to the exchange of beneficial acts between individuals, in which the benefits to the recipient exceed the cost to the altruist. Theory predicts that cooperation among unrelated animals can occur whenever individuals encounter each other regularly and are capable of adjusting their cooperative behaviour according to experience. Although the potential for reciprocal altruism exists in many animal societies, most interactions occur between closely related individuals, and examples of reciprocity among non-kin are rare. The field experiments on vervet monkeys which we present here demonstrate that grooming between unrelated individuals increases the probability that they will subsequently attend to each others' solicitations for aid. Vervets appear to be more willing to aid unrelated individuals if those individuals have behaved affinitively toward them in the recent past. In contrast, recent grooming between close genetic relatives appears to have no effect on their willingness to respond to each other's solicitations for aid.
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Heyes, C. M. (1994). Social learning in animals: categories and mechanisms. Biol. Rev., 69(2), 207–231.
Abstract: There has been relatively little research on the psychological mechanisms of social learning. This may be due, in part, to the practice of distinguishing categories of social learning in relation to ill-defined mechanisms (Davis, 1973; Galef, 1988). This practice both makes it difficult to identify empirically examples of different types of social learning, and gives the false impression that the mechanisms responsible for social learning are clearly understood. It has been proposed that social learning phenomena be subsumed within the categorization scheme currently used by investigators of asocial learning. This scheme distinguishes categories of learning according to observable conditions, namely, the type of experience that gives rise to a change in an animal (single stimulus vs. stimulus-stimulus relationship vs. response-reinforcer relationship), and the type of behaviour in which this change is detected (response evocation vs. learnability) (Rescorla, 1988). Specifically, three alignments have been proposed: (i) stimulus enhancement with single stimulus learning, (ii) observational conditioning with stimulus-stimulus learning, or Pavlovian conditioning, and (iii) observational learning with response-reinforcer learning, or instrumental conditioning. If, as the proposed alignments suggest, the conditions of social and asocial learning are the same, there is some reason to believe that the mechanisms underlying the two sets of phenomena are also the same. This is so if one makes the relatively uncontroversial assumption that phenomena which occur under similar conditions tend to be controlled by similar mechanisms. However, the proposed alignments are intended to be a set of hypotheses, rather than conclusions, about the mechanisms of social learning; as a basis for further research in which animal learning theory is applied to social learning. A concerted attempt to apply animal learning theory to social learning, to find out whether the same mechanisms are responsible for social and asocial learning, could lead both to refinements of the general theory, and to a better understanding of the mechanisms of social learning. There are precedents for these positive developments in research applying animal learning theory to food aversion learning (e.g. Domjan, 1983; Rozin & Schull, 1988) and imprinting (e.g. Bolhuis, de Vox & Kruit, 1990; Hollis, ten Cate & Bateson, 1991). Like social learning, these phenomena almost certainly play distinctive roles in the antogeny of adaptive behaviour, and they are customarily regarded as 'special kinds' of learning (Shettleworth, 1993).(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)
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Caldwell, C. A., & Whiten, A. (2004). Testing for social learning and imitation in common marmosets, Callithrix jacchus, using an artificial fruit. Anim. Cogn., 7(2), 77–85.
Abstract: We tested for social learning and imitation in common marmosets using an artificial foraging task and trained conspecific demonstrators. We trained a demonstrator marmoset to open an artificial fruit, providing a full demonstration of the task to be learned. Another marmoset provided a partial demonstration, controlling for stimulus enhancement effects, by eating food from the outside of the apparatus. We thus compared three observer groups, each consisting of four animals: those that received the full demonstration, those that received the partial demonstration, and a control group that saw no demonstration prior to testing. Although none of the observer marmosets succeeded in opening the artificial fruit during the test periods, there were clear effects of demonstration type. Those that saw the full demonstration manipulated the apparatus more overall, whereas those from the control group manipulated it the least of the three groups. Those from the full-demonstration group also contacted the particular parts of the artificial fruit that they had seen touched (localised stimulus enhancement) to a greater extent than the other two groups. There was also an interaction between the number of hand and mouth touches made to the artificial fruit for the full- and partial-demonstration groups. Whether or not these data represent evidence for imitation is discussed. We also propose that the clear differences between the groups suggest that social learning mechanisms provide real benefits to these animals in terms of developing novel food-processing skills analogous to the one presented here.
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Biro, D., Sumpter, D. J. T., Meade, J., & Guilford, T. (2006). From Compromise to Leadership in Pigeon Homing. Curr Biol, 16(21), 2123–2128.
Abstract: Summary A central problem faced by animals traveling in groups is how navigational decisions by group members are integrated, especially when members cannot assess which individuals are best informed or have conflicting information or interests , , , and . Pigeons are now known to recapitulate faithfully their individually distinct habitual routes home , and , and this provides a novel paradigm for investigating collective decisions during flight under varying levels of interindividual conflict. Using high-precision GPS tracking of pairs of pigeons, we found that if conflict between two birds' directional preferences was small, individuals averaged their routes, whereas if conflict rose over a critical threshold, either the pair split or one of the birds became the leader. Modeling such paired decision-making showed that both outcomes--compromise and leadership--could emerge from the same set of simple behavioral rules. Pairs also navigated more efficiently than did the individuals of which they were composed, even though leadership was not necessarily assumed by the more efficient bird. In the context of mass migration of birds and other animals, our results imply that simple self-organizing rules can produce behaviors that improve accuracy in decision-making and thus benefit individuals traveling in groups , and .
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Larose, C., Richard-Yris, M. - A., Hausberger, M., & Rogers, L. J. (2006). Laterality of horses associated with emotionality in novel situations. Laterality, 11(4), 355–367.
Abstract: We have established that lateral biases are characteristic of visual behaviour in 65 horses. Two breeds, Trotters and French Saddlebreds aged 2 to 3, were tested on a novel object test. The main finding was a significant correlation between emotionality index and the eye preferred to view the novel stimulus: the higher the emotionality, the more likely that the horse looked with its left eye. The less emotive French Saddlebreds, however, tended to glance at the object using the right eye, a tendency that was not found in the Trotters, although the emotive index was the same for both breeds. The youngest French Saddlebreds did not show this trend. These results are discussed in relation to the different training practices for the breeds and broader findings on lateralisation in different species.
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Amé, J. - M., Halloy, J., Rivault, C., Detrain, C., & Deneubourg, J. L. (2006). Collegial decision making based on social amplification leads to optimal group formation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 103(15), 5835–5840.
Abstract: Group-living animals are often faced with choosing between one or more alternative resource sites. A central question in such collective decision making includes determining which individuals induce the decision and when. This experimental and theoretical study of shelter selection by cockroach groups demonstrates that choices can emerge through nonlinear interaction dynamics between equal individuals without perfect knowledge or leadership. We identify a simple mechanism whereby a decision is taken on the move with limited information and signaling and without comparison of available opportunities. This mechanism leads to optimal mean benefit for group individuals. Our model points to a generic self-organized collective decision-making process independent of animal species.
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Mori, U. (1979). Ecological and sociological studies of gelada baboons. Individual relationships within a unit. Contrib Primatol, 16, 93–124.
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Whiten, A. (2000). Social complexity and social intelligence. In Novartis Foundation Symposium (Vol. 233, pp. 185–96; discussion pp. 196–201).
Abstract: When we talk of the 'nature of intelligence', or any other attribute, we may be referring to its essential structure, or to its place in nature, particularly the function it has evolved to serve. Here I examine both, from the perspective of the evolution of intelligence in primates. Over the last 20 years, the Social (or 'Machiavellian') Intelligence Hypothesis has gained empirical support. Its core claim is that the intelligence of primates is primarily an adaptation to the special complexities of primate social life. In addition to this hypothesis about the function of intellect, a secondary claim is that the very structure of intelligence has been moulded to be 'social' in character, an idea that presents a challenge to orthodox views of intelligence as a general-purpose capacity. I shall outline the principal components of social intelligence and the environment of social complexity it engages with. This raises the question of whether domain specificity is an appropriate characterization of social intelligence and its subcomponents, like theory of mind. As a counter-argument to such specificity I consider the hypothesis that great apes exhibit a cluster of advanced cognitive abilities that rest on a shared capacity for second-order mental representation.
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Barrett, L., & Henzi, P. (2005). The social nature of primate cognition. Proc Biol Sci, 272(1575), 1865–1875.
Abstract: The hypothesis that the enlarged brain size of the primates was selected for by social, rather than purely ecological, factors has been strongly influential in studies of primate cognition and behaviour over the past two decades. However, the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, also known as the social brain hypothesis, tends to emphasize certain traits and behaviours, like exploitation and deception, at the expense of others, such as tolerance and behavioural coordination, and therefore presents only one view of how social life may shape cognition. This review outlines work from other relevant disciplines, including evolutionary economics, cognitive science and neurophysiology, to illustrate how these can be used to build a more general theoretical framework, incorporating notions of embodied and distributed cognition, in which to situate questions concerning the evolution of primate social cognition.
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