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Dunbar, R. (2003). Evolution of the social brain. Science, 302(5648), 1160–1161.
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Moehlman, P. D. (2005). Endangered wild equids. Sci Am, 292(3), 74–81.
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Choleris, E., & Kavaliers, M. (1999). Social Learning in Animals: Sex Differences and Neurobiological Analysis. Pharmacol. Biochem. Behav., 64(4), 767–776.
Abstract: Social learning where an “individual's behavior is influenced by observation of, or interaction with, another animal or its products” has been extensively documented in a broad variety of species, including humans. Social learning occurs within the complex framework of an animal's social interactions that are markedly affected by factors such as dominance hierarchies, family bonds, age, and sex of the interacting individuals. Moreover, it is clear that social learning is influenced not only by important sexually dimorphic social constraints but also that it involves attention, motivational, and perceptual mechanisms, all of which exhibit substantial male-female differences. Although sex differences have been demonstrated in a wide range of cognitive and behavioral processes, investigations of male-female differences in social learning and its neurobiological substrates have been largely neglected. As such, sex differences in social learning and its neurobiological substrates merit increased attention. This review briefly considers various aspects of the study of social learning in mammals, and indicates where male-female differences have either been described, neglected and, or could have a potential impact. It also describes the results of neurobiological investigations of social learning and considers the relevance of these findings to other sexually dimorphic cognitive processes.
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Pepperberg, I. M. (2002). In search of king Solomon's ring: cognitive and communicative studies of Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus). Brain Behav Evol, 59(1-2), 54–67.
Abstract: During the past 24 years, I have used a modeling technique (M/R procedure) to train Grey parrots to use an allospecific code (English speech) referentially; I then use the code to test their cognitive abilities. The oldest bird, Alex, labels more than 50 different objects, 7 colors, 5 shapes, quantities to 6, 3 categories (color, shape, material) and uses 'no', 'come here', wanna go X' and 'want Y' (X and Y are appropriate location or item labels). He combines labels to identify, request, comment upon or refuse more than 100 items and to alter his environment. He processes queries to judge category, relative size, quantity, presence or absence of similarity/difference in attributes, and show label comprehension. He semantically separates labeling from requesting. He thus exhibits capacities once presumed limited to humans or nonhuman primates. Studies on this and other Greys show that parrots given training that lacks some aspect of input present in M/R protocols (reference, functionality, social interaction) fail to acquire referential English speech. Examining how input affects the extent to which parrots acquire an allospecific code may elucidate mechanisms of other forms of exceptional learning: learning unlikely in the normal course of development but that can occur under certain conditions.
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Drent, P. J., van Oers, K., & van Noordwijk, A. J. (2003). Realized heritability of personalities in the great tit (Parus major). Proc Biol Sci, 270(1510), 45–51.
Abstract: Behaviour under conditions of mild stress shows consistent patterns in all vertebrates: exploratory behaviour, boldness, aggressiveness covary in the same way. The existence of highly consistent individual variation in these behavioural strategies, also referred to as personalities or coping styles, allows us to measure the behaviour under standardized conditions on birds bred in captivity, link the standardized measurements to the behaviour under natural conditions and measure natural selection in the field. We have bred the great tit (Parus major), a classical model species for the study of behaviour under natural conditions, in captivity. Here, we report a realized heritability of 54 +/- 5% for early exploratory behaviour, based on four generations of bi-directional artificial selection. In addition to this, we measured hand-reared juveniles and their wild-caught parents in the laboratory. The heritability found in the mid-offspring-mid-parent regression was significantly different from zero. We have thus established the presence of considerable amounts of genetic variation for personality types in a wild bird.
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Brauer, J., Kaminski, J., Riedel, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Making inferences about the location of hidden food: social dog, causal ape. J Comp Psychol, 120(1), 38–47.
Abstract: Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) and great apes from the genus Pan were tested on a series of object choice tasks. In each task, the location of hidden food was indicated for subjects by some kind of communicative, behavioral, or physical cue. On the basis of differences in the ecologies of these 2 genera, as well as on previous research, the authors hypothesized that dogs should be especially skillful in using human communicative cues such as the pointing gesture, whereas apes should be especially skillful in using physical, causal cues such as food in a cup making noise when it is shaken. The overall pattern of performance by the 2 genera strongly supported this social-dog, causal-ape hypothesis. This result is discussed in terms of apes' adaptations for complex, extractive foraging and dogs' adaptations, during the domestication process, for cooperative communication with humans.
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Grosenick, L., Clement, T. S., & Fernald, R. D. (2007). Fish can infer social rank by observation alone. Nature, 445(7126), 429–432.
Abstract: Transitive inference (TI) involves using known relationships to deduce unknown ones (for example, using A > B and B > C to infer A > C), and is thus essential to logical reasoning. First described as a developmental milestone in children, TI has since been reported in nonhuman primates, rats and birds. Still, how animals acquire and represent transitive relationships and why such abilities might have evolved remain open problems. Here we show that male fish (Astatotilapia burtoni) can successfully make inferences on a hierarchy implied by pairwise fights between rival males. These fish learned the implied hierarchy vicariously (as 'bystanders'), by watching fights between rivals arranged around them in separate tank units. Our findings show that fish use TI when trained on socially relevant stimuli, and that they can make such inferences by using indirect information alone. Further, these bystanders seem to have both spatial and featural representations related to rival abilities, which they can use to make correct inferences depending on what kind of information is available to them. Beyond extending TI to fish and experimentally demonstrating indirect TI learning in animals, these results indicate that a universal mechanism underlying TI is unlikely. Rather, animals probably use multiple domain-specific representations adapted to different social and ecological pressures that they encounter during the course of their natural lives.
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Acuna, B. D., Sanes, J. N., & Donoghue, J. P. (2002). Cognitive mechanisms of transitive inference. Exp Brain Res, 146(1), 1–10.
Abstract: We examined how the brain organizes interrelated facts during learning and how the facts are subsequently manipulated in a transitive inference (TI) paradigm (e.g., if A<B and B<C, then A<C). This task determined features such as learned facts and behavioral goals, but the learned facts could be organized in any of several ways. For example, if one learns a list by operating on paired items, the pairs may be stored individually as separate facts and reaction time (RT) should decrease with learning. Alternatively, the pairs may be stored as a single, unified list, which may yield a different RT pattern. We characterized RT patterns that occurred as participants learned, by trial and error, the predetermined order of 11 shapes. The task goal was to choose the shape occurring closer to the end of the list, and feedback about correctness was provided during this phase. RT increased even as its variance decreased during learning, suggesting that the learnt knowledge became progressively unified into a single representation, requiring more time to manipulate as participants acquired relational knowledge. After learning, non-adjacent (NA) list items were presented to examine how participants reasoned in a TI task. The task goal also required choosing from each presented pair the item occurring closer to the list end, but without feedback. Participants could solve the TI problems by applying formal logic to the previously learnt pairs of adjacent items; alternatively, they could manipulate a single, unified representation of the list. Shorter RT occurred for NA pairs having more intervening items, supporting the hypothesis that humans employ unified mental representations during TI. The response pattern does not support mental logic solutions of applying inference rules sequentially, which would predict longer RT with more intervening items. We conclude that the brain organizes information in such a way that reflects the relations among the items, even if the facts were learned in an arbitrary order, and that this representation is subsequently used to make inferences.
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Dusek, J. A., & Eichenbaum, H. (1997). The hippocampus and memory for orderly stimulus relations. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 94(13), 7109–7114.
Abstract: Human declarative memory involves a systematic organization of information that supports generalizations and inferences from acquired knowledge. This kind of memory depends on the hippocampal region in humans, but the extent to which animals also have declarative memory, and whether inferential expression of memory depends on the hippocampus in animals, remains a major challenge in cognitive neuroscience. To examine these issues, we used a test of transitive inference pioneered by Piaget to assess capacities for systematic organization of knowledge and logical inference in children. In our adaptation of the test, rats were trained on a set of four overlapping odor discrimination problems that could be encoded either separately or as a single representation of orderly relations among the odor stimuli. Normal rats learned the problems and demonstrated the relational memory organization through appropriate transitive inferences about items not presented together during training. By contrast, after disconnection of the hippocampus from either its cortical or subcortical pathway, rats succeeded in acquiring the separate discrimination problems but did not demonstrate transitive inference, indicating that they had failed to develop or could not inferentially express the orderly organization of the stimulus elements. These findings strongly support the view that the hippocampus mediates a general declarative memory capacity in animals, as it does in humans.
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Boyd, L. (1986). Behavior problems of equids in zoos. Vet Clin North Am Equine Pract, 2(3), 653–664.
Abstract: Behavior problems in zoo equids commonly result from a failure to provide for needs basic to equine nature. Equids are gregarious, and failure to provide companions may result in pacing. Wild equids spend 60 to 70 per cent of their time grazing, and failure to provide ad libitum roughage contributes to the problems of pacing, cribbing, wood chewing, and coprophagia. Mimicking the normal processes of juvenile dispersal, bachelor-herd formation, and mate acquisition reduces the likelihood of agonistic and reproductive behavior problems. Infanticide can be avoided by introducing new stallions to herds containing only nonpregnant mares and older foals.
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