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Mori, U. (1979). Ecological and sociological studies of gelada baboons. Individual relationships within a unit. Contrib Primatol, 16, 93–124.
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Dunbar, R. I., & Dunbar, E. P. (1976). Contrasts in social structure among black-and-white colobus monkey groups. Anim. Behav., 24(1), 84–92.
Abstract: Three types of Colobus guereza groups may be distinguished on the bases of size and composition, namely small one-male groups, large, one-male groups and multi-male groups. The social structure of each type of group is described in terms of the distribution of non-agonistic interactions, the frequency and distribution of agonistic behaviour and the organization of the roles of vigilance, territorial defence and leadership. A number of differences are found between the group types which appear to be related to the differences in group size and composition. It is suggested that these group types represent stages in the life-cycle of colobus groups, and that such an interpretation may help to resolve some of the conflicting reports in the literature.
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Hrdy, S. B. (1974). Male-male competition and infanticide among the langurs (Presbytis entellus) of Abu, Rajasthan. Folia Primatol (Basel), 22(1), 19–58.
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Meese, G. B., & Ewbank, R. (1973). Exploratory behaviour and leadership in the domesticated pig. Br. Vet. J., 129(3), 251–259.
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Saayman, G. S. (1971). Behaviour of the adult males in a troop of free-ranging Chacma baboons (Papio ursinus). Folia Primatol (Basel), 15(1), 36–57.
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Packer, C., & Heinsohn, R. (1996). Response:Lioness leadership. Science, 271(5253), 1215–1216.
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Gary C. Jahn, & Craig Packer, R. H. (1996). Lioness leadership. Science, 271(5253), 1216–1219.
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Whiten, A. (2000). Social complexity and social intelligence. In Novartis Foundation Symposium (Vol. 233, pp. 185–96; discussion pp. 196–201).
Abstract: When we talk of the 'nature of intelligence', or any other attribute, we may be referring to its essential structure, or to its place in nature, particularly the function it has evolved to serve. Here I examine both, from the perspective of the evolution of intelligence in primates. Over the last 20 years, the Social (or 'Machiavellian') Intelligence Hypothesis has gained empirical support. Its core claim is that the intelligence of primates is primarily an adaptation to the special complexities of primate social life. In addition to this hypothesis about the function of intellect, a secondary claim is that the very structure of intelligence has been moulded to be 'social' in character, an idea that presents a challenge to orthodox views of intelligence as a general-purpose capacity. I shall outline the principal components of social intelligence and the environment of social complexity it engages with. This raises the question of whether domain specificity is an appropriate characterization of social intelligence and its subcomponents, like theory of mind. As a counter-argument to such specificity I consider the hypothesis that great apes exhibit a cluster of advanced cognitive abilities that rest on a shared capacity for second-order mental representation.
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Huber, L., & Gajdon, G. K. (2006). Technical intelligence in animals: the kea model. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 295–305.
Abstract: The ability to act on information flexibly is one of the cornerstones of intelligent behavior. As particularly informative example, tool-oriented behavior has been investigated to determine to which extent nonhuman animals understand means-end relations, object affordances, and have specific motor skills. Even planning with foresight, goal-directed problem solving and immediate causal inference have been a focus of research. However, these cognitive abilities may not be restricted to tool-using animals but may be found also in animals that show high levels of curiosity, object exploration and manipulation, and extractive foraging behavior. The kea, a New Zealand parrot, is a particularly good example. We here review findings from laboratory experiments and field observations of keas revealing surprising cognitive capacities in the physical domain. In an experiment with captive keas, the success rate of individuals that were allowed to observe a trained conspecific was significantly higher than that of naive control subjects due to their acquisition of some functional understanding of the task through observation. In a further experiment using the string-pulling task, a well-probed test for means-end comprehension, we found the keas finding an immediate solution that could not be improved upon in nine further trials. We interpreted their performance as insightful in the sense of being sensitive of the relevant functional properties of the task and thereby producing a new adaptive response without trial-and-error learning. Together, these findings contribute to the ongoing debate on the distribution of higher cognitive skills in the animal kingdom by showing high levels of sensorimotor intelligence in animals that do not use tools. In conclusion, we suggest that the 'Technical intelligence hypothesis' (Byrne, Machiavellian intelligence II: extensions and evaluations, pp 289-211, 1997), which has been proposed to explain the origin of the ape/monkey grade-shift in intelligence by a selection pressure upon an increased efficiency in foraging behavior, should be extended, that is, applied to some birds as well.
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Barrett, L., & Henzi, P. (2005). The social nature of primate cognition. Proc Biol Sci, 272(1575), 1865–1875.
Abstract: The hypothesis that the enlarged brain size of the primates was selected for by social, rather than purely ecological, factors has been strongly influential in studies of primate cognition and behaviour over the past two decades. However, the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, also known as the social brain hypothesis, tends to emphasize certain traits and behaviours, like exploitation and deception, at the expense of others, such as tolerance and behavioural coordination, and therefore presents only one view of how social life may shape cognition. This review outlines work from other relevant disciplines, including evolutionary economics, cognitive science and neurophysiology, to illustrate how these can be used to build a more general theoretical framework, incorporating notions of embodied and distributed cognition, in which to situate questions concerning the evolution of primate social cognition.
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