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Cattell, R. B., & Korth, B. (1973). The isolation of temperament dimensions in dogs. Behav Biol, 9(1), 15–30.
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Morley, K. I., & Montgomery, G. W. (2001). The genetics of cognitive processes: candidate genes in humans and animals. Behav Genet, 31(6), 511–531.
Abstract: It has been hypothesized that numerous genes contribute to individual variation in human cognition. An extensive search of the scientific literature was undertaken to identify candidate genes which might contribute to this complex trait. A list of over 150 candidate genes that may influence some aspect of cognition was compiled. Some genes are particularly strong candidates based on evidence for involvement in cognitive processes in humans, mice, and Drosophila melanogaster. This survey confirms that many genes are associated with cognitive variation and highlights the potential importance of animal models in the study of human cognition.
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Bouchard, T. J. J., & Loehlin, J. C. (2001). Genes, evolution, and personality. Behav Genet, 31(3), 243–273.
Abstract: There is abundant evidence, some of it reviewed in this paper, that personality traits are substantially influenced by the genes. Much remains to be understood about how and why this is the case. We argue that placing the behavior genetics of personality in the context of epidemiology, evolutionary psychology, and neighboring psychological domains such as interests and attitudes should help lead to new insights. We suggest that important methodological advances, such as measuring traits from multiple viewpoints, using large samples, and analyzing data by modern multivariate techniques, have already led to major changes in our view of such perennial puzzles as the role of “unshared environment” in personality. In the long run, but not yet, approaches via molecular genetics and brain physiology may also make decisive contributions to understanding the heritability of personality traits. We conclude that the behavior genetics of personality is alive and flourishing but that there remains ample scope for new growth and that much social science research is seriously compromised if it does not incorporate genetic variation in its explanatory models.
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Weiss, A., King, J. E., & Figueredo, A. J. (2000). The heritability of personality factors in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Behav Genet, 30(3), 213–221.
Abstract: Human personality and behavior genetic studies have resulted in a growing consensus that five heritable factors account for most variance in human personality. Prior research showed that chimpanzee personality is composed of a dominance-related factor and five human-like factors--Surgency, Dependability, Emotional Stability, Agreeableness, and Openness. Genetic, shared zoo, and nonshared environmental variance components of the six factors were estimated by regressing squared phenotypic differences of all possible pairs of chimpanzees onto 1 – Rij, where Rij equals the degree of relationship and a variable indicating whether the pair was housed in the same zoo. Dominance showed significant narrow-sense heritability. Shared zoo effects accounted for only a negligible proportion of the variance for all factors.
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Lafferty, K. D. (2005). Look what the cat dragged in: do parasites contribute to human cultural diversity? Behav. Process., 68(3), 279–282.
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McClearn, G. E. (1971). Behavioral genetics. Behav Sci, 16(1), 64–81.
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Dow, M., Ewing, A. W., & Sutherland, I. (1976). Studies on the behaviour of cyprinodont fish. III. The temporal patterning of aggression in Aphyosemion striatum (Boulenger). Behaviour, 59(3-4), 252–268.
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Detmer, D. (1992). Response: of pigs and primitive notions. Between Species, 8(4), 203–208.
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Panksepp, J. (2005). Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans. Conscious Cogn, 14(1), 30–80.
Abstract: The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain-mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic (“instinctual”), albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems-including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones-effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain.
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Parker, S. T. (1997). A general model for the adaptive function of self-knowledge in animals and humans. Conscious Cogn, 6(1), 75–86.
Abstract: This article offers a general definition of self-knowledge that embraces all forms and levels of self-knowledge in animals and humans. It is hypothesized that various levels of self-knowledge constitute an ordinal scale such that each species in a lineage displays the forms of self-knowledge found in related species as well as new forms it and its sister species may have evolved. Likewise, it is hypothesized that these various forms of levels of self-knowledge develop in the sequence in which they evolved. Finally, a general hypothesis for the functional significance of self-knowledge is proposed along with subhypotheses regarding the adaptive significance of various levels of self-knowledge in mammals including human and nonhuman primates. The general hypothesis is that self-knowledge serves as a standard for assessing the qualities of conspecifics compared to those of the self. Such assessment is crucial to deciding among alternative reproductive and subsistence strategies. The qualities that are assessed, which vary across taxa, range from the size and strength of the self to its mathematical or musical abilities. This so-called assessment model of self-knowledge is based on evolutionary biological models for social selection and the role of assessment in animal communication.
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