Abstract: When a preliminary experiment in sodium-replete ponies revealed an increase, but not a significant increase, in salt consumption after furosemide treatment, the experiment was repeated using sodium-deficient horses in which aldosterone levels might be expected to be elevated to test the hypothesis that a background of aldosterone is necessary for salt appetite. Ten Standardbred mares were injected intravenously with furosemide or an equivalent volume of 0.9% sodium chloride as a control to test the effect of furosemide on their salt appetite and blood constituents. Sodium intake and sodium loss in urine, as well as water intake and urine output, were measured and compared to determine accuracy of compensation for natriuresis and diuresis. Plasma protein and packed cell volume showed significant increases in response to furosemide treatment (F = 29.31, P less than 0.001 and F = 11.20, P less than 0.001, respectively). There were no significant changes in plasma sodium concentration or osmolality in response to the treatment (P greater than 0.05). The furosemide-treated horses consumed 126 +/- 14.8 g salt, significantly more than when they were given the control injection (94.5 +/- 9.8 g; t = 2.22, P = 0.05). In response to furosemide, horses lost 962 +/- 79.7 and consumed 2,170 +/- 5 meq sodium; however, compared with control, they lost 955 meq more sodium and ingested only 570 meq more sodium, so they were undercompensating for natriuresis. The furosemide-treated horses drank 9.6 +/- 0.8 kg of water, significantly more than when they received the control injection (6.4 +/- 0.8 kg; t = 6.9, P less than 0.001).(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

Abstract: Faecal samples were collected at weekly intervals from pregnant Lipizzan mares during Weeks 7-16 following mating and from Lipizzan, Trotter and Thoroughbred mares during the last 3 months of gestation. After parturition, samples were taken daily from the Thoroughbred mares for another 6 days. Non-pregnant mares served as controls. The concentrations of unconjugated oestrogens (Eg), 20 alpha-OH-progestagens (20 alpha-G) and 20 beta-OH-progestagens (20 beta-G) were measured by enzyme immunoassay. In the faeces of Lipizzan mares, immunoreactive progestagens were significantly (P less than 0.01) elevated above the levels in non-pregnant mares by Week 11, and Eg by Week 13 of pregnancy onwards. During the last 3 months of gestation, concentrations of Eg were significantly higher in Trotter mares than in Lipizzan and Thoroughbred mares. Concentrations of 20 alpha-G and 20 beta-G increased to maximal values in the last month of gestation. There was no significant difference among the 3 breeds with respect to 20 alpha-G but, during the 10 weeks before parturition, concentrations of 20 beta-G in the Lipizzan mares were significantly lower (P less than 0.05) than those in the Thoroughbred mares. They were also significantly lower than those of the Trotter mares during the last 4 weeks of gestation. After parturition, the concentrations of Eg and progestagens had declined to baseline values by Days 3 and 4 respectively. From these results we conclude that high concentrations of progestagens with 20 alpha- and 20 beta-hydroxyl groups are present in the faeces of pregnant mares, especially during the last month of gestation.

Abstract: In general, codes that have been designed to safeguard the welfare of animals emphasize the importance of providing an environment that will ensure good health and a normal physiological and physical state, that is, they emphasize the animals' physical needs. If mental needs are mentioned, they are always relegated to secondary importance. The argument is put forward here that animal welfare is dependent solely on the cognitive needs of the animals concerned. In general, if these cognitive needs are met, they will protect the animals' physical needs. It is contended that in the few cases in which they do not safeguard the physical needs, it does not matter from a welfare point of view. The human example is given of being ill. It is argued that welfare is only adversely affected when a person feels ill, knows that he or she is ill, or even thinks that he or she is ill, all of which processes are cognitive ones. The implications for welfare of animals possessing certain cognitive abilities are discussed. For example, the extent to which animals are aware of their internal state while performing behavior known to be indicative of so-called states of suffering, such as fear, frustration, and pain, will determine how much they are actually suffering. With careful experimentation it may be possible to determine how negative they feel these states to be. Similarly, the extent to which animals think about items or events absent from their immediate environment will determine how frustrated they are in the absence of the real item or event but in the presence of the cognitive representation.

Abstract: Animals process sensory information according to specific computational rules and, subsequently, form representations of their environments that form the basis for decisions and choices. The specific computational rules used by organisms will often be evolutionarily adaptive by generating higher probabilities of survival, reproduction, and resource acquisition. Experiments with enclosed colonies of bumblebees constrained to foraging on artificial flowers suggest that the bumblebee's cognitive architecture is designed to efficiently exploit floral resources from spatially structured environments given limits on memory and the neuronal processing of information. A non-linear relationship between the biomechanics of nectar extraction and rates of net energetic gain by individual bees may account for sensitivities to both the arithmetic mean and variance in reward distributions in flowers. Heuristic rules that lead to efficient resource exploitation may also lead to subjective misperception of likelihoods. Subjective probability formation may then be viewed as a problem in pattern recognition subject to specific sampling schemes and memory constraints.

Abstract: We report that an African gray parrot (Psittacus erithacus), Alex, responds to stimuli on a relative basis. Previous laboratory studies with artificial stimuli (such as pure tones) suggest that birds make relational responses as a secondary strategy, only after they have acquired information about the absolute values of the stimuli. Alex, however, after learning to respond to a small set of exemplars on the basis of relative size, transferred this behavior to novel situations that did not provide specific information about the absolute values of the stimuli. He responded to vocal questions about which was the larger or smaller exemplar by vocally labeling its color or material, and he responded “none” if the exemplars did not differ in size. His overall accuracy was 78.7%.