Abstract: The selfish herd hypothesis predicts that aggregations form because individuals move toward one another to minimize their own predation risk. The “dilemma of the selfish herd” is that movement rules that are easy for individuals to follow, fail to produce true aggregations, while rules that produce aggregations require individual behavior so complex that one may doubt most animals can follow them. If natural selection at the individual level is responsible for herding behavior, a solution to the dilemma must exist. Using computer simulations, we examined four different movement rules. Relative predation risk was different for all four movement rules (p<0.05). We defined three criteria for measuring the quality of a movement rule. A good movement rule should (a) be statistically likely to benefit an individual that follows it, (b) be something we can imagine most animals are capable of following, and (c) result in a centrally compact flock. The local crowded horizon rule, which allowed individuals to take the positions of many flock-mates into account, but decreased the influence of flock-mates with distance, best satisfied these criteria. The local crowded horizon rule was very sensitive to the animal's perceptive ability. Therefore, the animal's ability to detect its neighbors is an important factor in the dynamics of group formation.

Abstract: Contraceptive management of publicly valued wildlife species requires safeguards to ensure that these populations are preserved in a healthy state. In addition, reversibility of contraceptive effects and safety in pregnant animals are major concerns. A population of wild horses has been immunized against porcine zona pellucida (PZP) over a 12 year period on Assateague Island National Seashore, MD (ASIS). Mares initially received one or two 65 microg inoculations and once a year 65 microg booster inoculations, all delivered by dart. All young mares aged > 2 years were treated with PZP for 3 consecutive years regardless of whether they have bred successfully and they were then removed from treatment until they had foaled. All mares vaccinated for 1 or 2 consecutive years became fertile again and 69% of mares treated for 3 consecutive years returned to fertility. All five mares treated for 4 or 5 consecutive years have also returned to fertility, but over longer periods of time. Mares treated for 7 consecutive years have not returned to fertility, but several, while still infertile, have started ovulating again. There was no difference in survival rates between foals born to treated and untreated mares, and PZP treatment of pregnant mares did not affect subsequent fertility of their female offspring.

Abstract: Individual recognition has been attributed a crucial role in the evolution of complex social systems such as helping behaviour and cooperation. A classical example for interspecific cooperation is the mutualism between the cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus and its client reef fish species. For stable cooperation to evolve, it is generally assumed that partners interact repeatedly and remember each other's past behaviour. Repeated interactions may be achieved by site fidelity or individual recognition. However, as some cleaner fish have more than 2,300 interactions per day with various individuals per species and various species of clients, basic assumptions of cooperation theory might be violated in this mutualism. We tested the cleaner L. dimidiatus and its herbivorous client, the surgeon fish Ctenochaetus striatus, for their ability to distinguish between a familiar and an unfamiliar partner in a choice experiment. Under natural conditions, cleaners and clients have to build up their relationship, which is probably costly for both. We therefore predicted that both clients and cleaners should prefer the familiar partner in our choice experiment. We found that cleaners spent significantly more time near the familiar than the unfamiliar clients in the first 2 minutes of the experiment. This indicates the ability for individual recognition in cleaners. In contrast, the client C. striatus showed no significant preference. This could be due to a sampling artefact, possibly due to a lack of sufficient motivation. Alternatively, clients may not need to recognise their cleaners but instead remember the defined territories of L. dimidiatus to achieve repeated interactions with the same individual.

Abstract: In many different species it is common for animals to spend large portions of their lives in groups. Such groups need to divide available resources amongst the individuals they contain and this is often achieved by means of a dominance hierarchy. Sometimes hierarchies are stable over a long period of time and new individuals slot into pre-determined positions, but there are many situations where this is not so and a hierarchy is formed out of a group of individuals meeting for the first time. There are several different models both of the formation of such dominance hierarchies and of already existing hierarchies. These models often treat the two phases as entirely separate, whereas in reality, if there is a genuine formation phase to the hierarchy, behaviour in this phase will be governed by the rewards available, which in turn depends upon how the hierarchy operates once it has been formed. This paper describes a method of unifying models of these two distinct phases, assuming that the hierarchy formed is stable. In particular a framework is introduced which allows a variety of different models of each of the two parts to be used in conjunction with each other, thus enabling a wide range of situations to be modelled. Some examples are given to show how this works in practice.

Abstract: Groups of animals often need to make communal decisions, for example about which activities to perform, when to perform them and which direction to travel in; however, little is known about how they do so. Here, we model the fitness consequences of two possible decision-making mechanisms: 'despotism' and 'democracy'. We show that under most conditions, the costs to subordinate group members, and to the group as a whole, are considerably higher for despotic than for democratic decisions. Even when the despot is the most experienced group member, it only pays other members to accept its decision when group size is small and the difference in information is large. Democratic decisions are more beneficial primarily because they tend to produce less extreme decisions, rather than because each individual has an influence on the decision per se. Our model suggests that democracy should be widespread and makes quantitative, testable predictions about group decision-making in non-humans.