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Author Tebbich, S.; Seed, A.M.; Emery, N.J.; Clayton, N.S.
Title Non-tool-using rooks, Corvus frugilegus, solve the trap-tube problem Type Journal Article
Year 2007 Publication Animal Cognition Abbreviated Journal Anim. Cogn.
Volume 10 Issue 2 Pages 225-231
Keywords Animals; Behavior, Animal/*physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Crows/*physiology; Female; Male; Problem Solving/*physiology
Abstract The trap-tube problem is used to assess whether an individual is able to foresee the outcome of its actions. To solve the task, an animal must use a tool to push a piece of food out of a tube, which has a trap along its length. An animal may learn to avoid the trap through a rule based on associative processes, e.g. using the distance of trap or food as a cue, or by understanding relations between cause and effect. This task has been used to test physical cognition in a number of tool-using species, but never a non-tool-user. We developed an experimental design that enabled us to test non-tool-using rooks, Corvus frugilegus. Our modification of the task removed the cognitive requirements of active tool use but still allowed us to test whether rooks can solve the trap-tube problem, and if so how. Additionally, we developed two new control tasks to determine whether rooks were able to transfer knowledge to similar, but novel problems, thus revealing more about the mechanisms involved in solving the task. We found that three out of seven rooks solved the modified trap-tube problem task, showing that the ability to solve the trap-tube problem is not restricted to tool-using animals. We found no evidence that the birds solved the task using an understanding of its causal properties, given that none of the birds passed the novel transfer tasks.
Address Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, CB2 3EB, UK. st281@cam.ac.uk
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1435-9448 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes (up) PMID:17171360 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2429
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Author Overli, O.; Sorensen, C.; Pulman, K.G.T.; Pottinger, T.G.; Korzan, W.; Summers, C.H.; Nilsson, G.E.
Title Evolutionary background for stress-coping styles: relationships between physiological, behavioral, and cognitive traits in non-mammalian vertebrates Type Journal Article
Year 2007 Publication Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews Abbreviated Journal Neurosci Biobehav Rev
Volume 31 Issue 3 Pages 396-412
Keywords Adaptation, Psychological/*physiology; Animals; Behavior, Animal/*physiology; Biogenic Monoamines/physiology; Brain/physiology; Cognition/*physiology; Evolution; Glucocorticoids/*physiology; Individuality; Lizards; Oncorhynchus mykiss; Social Dominance; Stress, Psychological/*psychology
Abstract Reactions to stress vary between individuals, and physiological and behavioral responses tend to be associated in distinct suites of correlated traits, often termed stress-coping styles. In mammals, individuals exhibiting divergent stress-coping styles also appear to exhibit intrinsic differences in cognitive processing. A connection between physiology, behavior, and cognition was also recently demonstrated in strains of rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss) selected for consistently high or low cortisol responses to stress. The low-responsive (LR) strain display longer retention of a conditioned response, and tend to show proactive behaviors such as enhanced aggression, social dominance, and rapid resumption of feed intake after stress. Differences in brain monoamine neurochemistry have also been reported in these lines. In comparative studies, experiments with the lizard Anolis carolinensis reveal connections between monoaminergic activity in limbic structures, proactive behavior in novel environments, and the establishment of social status via agonistic behavior. Together these observations suggest that within-species diversity of physiological, behavioral and cognitive correlates of stress responsiveness is maintained by natural selection throughout the vertebrate sub-phylum.
Address Department of Animal and Aquacultural Sciences, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, P.O. Box 5003, N-1432 As, Norway. oyvind.overli@umb.no
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0149-7634 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes (up) PMID:17182101 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2801
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Author Grosenick, L.; Clement, T.S.; Fernald, R.D.
Title Fish can infer social rank by observation alone Type Journal Article
Year 2007 Publication Nature Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 445 Issue 7126 Pages 429-432
Keywords Aggression/physiology; Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Female; Fishes/*physiology; Learning/*physiology; Male; Models, Biological; *Social Dominance; Territoriality
Abstract Transitive inference (TI) involves using known relationships to deduce unknown ones (for example, using A > B and B > C to infer A > C), and is thus essential to logical reasoning. First described as a developmental milestone in children, TI has since been reported in nonhuman primates, rats and birds. Still, how animals acquire and represent transitive relationships and why such abilities might have evolved remain open problems. Here we show that male fish (Astatotilapia burtoni) can successfully make inferences on a hierarchy implied by pairwise fights between rival males. These fish learned the implied hierarchy vicariously (as 'bystanders'), by watching fights between rivals arranged around them in separate tank units. Our findings show that fish use TI when trained on socially relevant stimuli, and that they can make such inferences by using indirect information alone. Further, these bystanders seem to have both spatial and featural representations related to rival abilities, which they can use to make correct inferences depending on what kind of information is available to them. Beyond extending TI to fish and experimentally demonstrating indirect TI learning in animals, these results indicate that a universal mechanism underlying TI is unlikely. Rather, animals probably use multiple domain-specific representations adapted to different social and ecological pressures that they encounter during the course of their natural lives.
Address Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 94305, USA. logang@stanford.edu
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1476-4687 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes (up) PMID:17251980 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 600
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Author Terrace, H.S.
Title Chunking by a pigeon in a serial learning task Type Journal Article
Year 1987 Publication Nature Abbreviated Journal Nature
Volume 325 Issue 7000 Pages 149-151
Keywords Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Columbidae/*physiology; Feedback; Learning/*physiology; Male
Abstract A basic principle of human memory is that lists that can be organized into memorable 'chunks' are easier to remember. Memory span is limited to a roughly constant number of chunks and is to a large extent independent of the amount of informaton contained in each chunk. Depending on the ingenuity of the code used to integrate discrete items into chunks, one can substantially increase the number of items that can be recalled correctly. Newly developed paradigms for studying memory in non-verbal organisms allow comparison of the abilities of human and non-human subjects to memorize lists. Here I present two types of evidence that pigeons 'chunk' 5-element lists whose components (colours and achromatic geometric forms) are clustered into distinct groups. Those lists were learned twice as rapidly as a homogeneous list of colours or heterogeneous lists in which the elements are not clustered. The pigeons were also tested for knowledge of the order of two elements drawn from the 5-element lists. They responded in the correct order only to those subsets that contained a chunk boundary. Thus chunking can be studied profitably in animal subjects; the cognitive processes that allow an organism to form chunks do no presuppose linguistic competence.
Address
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0028-0836 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes (up) PMID:3808071 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2792
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Author Boysen, S.T.; Berntson, G.G.
Title Responses to quantity: perceptual versus cognitive mechanisms in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) Type Journal Article
Year 1995 Publication Journal of Experimental Psychology. Animal Behavior Processes Abbreviated Journal J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process
Volume 21 Issue 1 Pages 82-86
Keywords Animals; Behavior, Animal; Choice Behavior; Cognition/*physiology; Female; *Pan troglodytes; Perception/*physiology; Reinforcement (Psychology); Task Performance and Analysis
Abstract Two chimpanzees were trained to select among 2 different amounts of candy (1-6 items). The task was designed so that selection of either array by the active (selector) chimpanzee resulted in that array being given to the passive (observer) animal, with the remaining (nonselected) array going to the selector. Neither animal was able to select consistently the smaller array, which would reap the larger reward. Rather, both animals preferentially selected the larger array, thereby receiving the smaller number of reinforcers. When Arabic numerals were substituted for the food arrays, however, the selector animal evidenced more optimal performance, immediately selecting the smaller numeral and thus receiving the larger reward. These findings suggest that a basic predisposition to respond to the perceptual-motivational features of incentive stimuli can interfere with task performance and that this interference can be overridden when abstract symbols serve as choice stimuli.
Address Comparative Cognition Project, Ohio State University, Columbus 43210-1222
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Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0097-7403 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes (up) PMID:7844508 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2783
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Author Gallistel, C.R.; Cramer, A.E.
Title Computations on metric maps in mammals: getting oriented and choosing a multi-destination route Type Journal Article
Year 1996 Publication The Journal of Experimental Biology Abbreviated Journal J Exp Biol
Volume 199 Issue Pt 1 Pages 211-217
Keywords Animals; Brain/physiology; Cercopithecus aethiops; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; Mammals/*physiology; Movement; Orientation/*physiology; Rats; Space Perception; Visual Pathways/*physiology
Abstract The capacity to construct a cognitive map is hypothesized to rest on two foundations: (1) dead reckoning (path integration); (2) the perception of the direction and distance of terrain features relative to the animal. A map may be constructed by combining these two sources of positional information, with the result that the positions of all terrain features are represented in the coordinate framework used for dead reckoning. When animals need to become reoriented in a mapped space, results from rats and human toddlers indicate that they focus exclusively on the shape of the perceived environment, ignoring non-geometric features such as surface colors. As a result, in a rectangular space, they are misoriented half the time even when the two ends of the space differ strikingly in their appearance. In searching for a hidden object after becoming reoriented, both kinds of subjects search on the basis of the object's mapped position in the space rather than on the basis of its relationship to a goal sign (e.g. a distinctive container or nearby marker), even though they have demonstrably noted the relationship between the goal and the goal sign. When choosing a multidestination foraging route, vervet monkeys look at least three destinations ahead, even though they are only capable of keeping a maximum of six destinations in mind at once.
Address Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles 90095, USA
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0022-0949 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes (up) PMID:8576692 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2757
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Author Bennett, A.T.
Title Do animals have cognitive maps? Type Journal Article
Year 1996 Publication The Journal of Experimental Biology Abbreviated Journal J Exp Biol
Volume 199 Issue Pt 1 Pages 219-224
Keywords Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Humans; Space Perception/*physiology; Visual Pathways
Abstract Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided.
Address Department of Pure Mathematics, University of Adelaide, Australia
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Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0022-0949 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes (up) PMID:8576693 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2756
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Author Wasserman, E.A.; Gagliardi, J.L.; Cook, B.R.; Kirkpatrick-Steger, K.; Astley, S.L.; Biederman, I.
Title The pigeon's recognition of drawings of depth-rotated stimuli Type Journal Article
Year 1996 Publication Journal of Experimental Psychology. Animal Behavior Processes Abbreviated Journal J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process
Volume 22 Issue 2 Pages 205-221
Keywords Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Columbidae; Discrimination (Psychology); Form Perception/*physiology; Learning/*physiology; Photic Stimulation; Rotation
Abstract Four experiments used a four-choice discrimination learning paradigm to explore the pigeon's recognition of line drawings of four objects (an airplane, a chair, a desk lamp, and a flashlight) that were rotated in depth. The pigeons reliably generalized discriminative responding to pictorial stimuli over all untrained depth rotations, despite the bird's having been trained at only a single depth orientation. These generalization gradients closely resembled those found in prior research that used other stimulus dimensions. Increasing the number of different vantage points in the training set from one to three broadened the range of generalized testing performance, with wider spacing of the training orientations more effectively broadening generalized responding. Template and geon theories of visual recognition are applied to these empirical results.
Address Department of Psychology, University of Iowa, Iowa City 52242-1407, USA. ed-wasserman@uiowa.educ
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0097-7403 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes (up) PMID:8618103 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2780
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Author Macphail, E.M.
Title Cognitive function in mammals: the evolutionary perspective Type Journal Article
Year 1996 Publication Brain research. Cognitive brain research Abbreviated Journal Brain Res Cogn Brain Res
Volume 3 Issue 3-4 Pages 279-290
Keywords Animals; Cognition/*physiology; Conditioning (Psychology)/*physiology; Evolution; Humans; Learning/*physiology; Task Performance and Analysis
Abstract The work of behavioural pharmacologists has concentrated on small animals, such as rodents and pigeons. The validity of extrapolation of their findings to humans depends upon the existence of parallels in both physiology and psychology between these animals and humans. This paper considers the question whether there are in fact substantial cognitive parallels between, first, different non-human groups of vertebrates and, second, non-humans and humans. Behavioural data from 'simple' tasks, such as habituation and conditioning, do not point to species differences among vertebrates. Using examples that concentrate on the performance of rodents and birds, it is argued that, similarly, data from more complex tasks (learning-set formation, transitive inference, and spatial memory serve as examples) reveal few if any cognitive differences amongst non-human vertebrates. This conclusion supports the notion that association formation may be the critical problem-solving process available to non-human animals; associative mechanisms are assumed to have evolved to detect causal links between events, and would therefore be relevant in all ecological niches. In agreement with this view, recent advances in comparative neurology show striking parallels in functional organisation of mammalian and avian telencephalon. Finally, it is argued that although the peculiarly human capacity for language marks a large cognitive contrast between humans and non-humans, there is good evidence-in particular, from work on implicit learning--that the learning mechanisms available to non--humans are present and do play an important role in human cognition.
Address Department of Psychology, University of York at Heslington, UK
Corporate Author Thesis
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Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0926-6410 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes (up) PMID:8806029 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 603
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Author Allen, C.
Title Assessing animal cognition: ethological and philosophical perspectives Type Journal Article
Year 1998 Publication Journal of Animal Science Abbreviated Journal J. Anim Sci.
Volume 76 Issue 1 Pages 42-47
Keywords Agriculture; Animal Welfare; Animals; Animals, Domestic/physiology/*psychology; Behavior, Animal/*physiology; Cognition/*physiology; *Ethology; *Philosophy; Research
Abstract Developments in the scientific and philosophical study of animal cognition and mentality are of great importance to animal scientists who face continued public scrutiny of the treatment of animals in research and agriculture. Because beliefs about animal minds, animal cognition, and animal consciousness underlie many people's views about the ethical treatment of nonhuman animals, it has become increasingly difficult for animal scientists to avoid these issues. Animal scientists may learn from ethologists who study animal cognition and mentality from an evolutionary and comparative perspective and who are at the forefront of the development of naturalistic and laboratory techniques of observation and experimentation that are capable of revealing the cognitive and mental properties of nonhuman animals. Despite growing acceptance of the ethological study of animal cognition, there are critics who dispute the scientific validity of the field, especially when the topic is animal consciousness. Here, a proper understanding of developments in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science can help to place cognitive studies on a firm methodological and philosophical foundation. Ultimately, this is an interdisciplinary task, involving scientists and philosophers. Animal scientists are well-positioned to contribute to the study of animal cognition because they typically have access to a large pool of potential research subjects whose habitats are more controlled than in most field studies while being more natural than most laboratory psychology experiments. Despite some formidable questions remaining for analysis, the prospects for progress in assessing animal cognition are bright.
Address Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, College Station 77843-4237, USA
Corporate Author Thesis
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Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0021-8812 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes (up) PMID:9464883 Approved no
Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2750
Permanent link to this record