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Bennett, A. T. (1996). Do animals have cognitive maps? J Exp Biol, 199(Pt 1), 219–224.
Abstract: Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided.
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No authors listed. (1995). Workshop on the geographic spread of Aedes albopictus in Europe and the concern among public health authorities. Proceedings of a workshop held at the Istituto Superiore di Sanita, Rome, Italy, 19-20 December 1994. In Parassitologia (Vol. 37, pp. 87–90).
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Macphail, E. M. (1996). Cognitive function in mammals: the evolutionary perspective. Brain Res Cogn Brain Res, 3(3-4), 279–290.
Abstract: The work of behavioural pharmacologists has concentrated on small animals, such as rodents and pigeons. The validity of extrapolation of their findings to humans depends upon the existence of parallels in both physiology and psychology between these animals and humans. This paper considers the question whether there are in fact substantial cognitive parallels between, first, different non-human groups of vertebrates and, second, non-humans and humans. Behavioural data from 'simple' tasks, such as habituation and conditioning, do not point to species differences among vertebrates. Using examples that concentrate on the performance of rodents and birds, it is argued that, similarly, data from more complex tasks (learning-set formation, transitive inference, and spatial memory serve as examples) reveal few if any cognitive differences amongst non-human vertebrates. This conclusion supports the notion that association formation may be the critical problem-solving process available to non-human animals; associative mechanisms are assumed to have evolved to detect causal links between events, and would therefore be relevant in all ecological niches. In agreement with this view, recent advances in comparative neurology show striking parallels in functional organisation of mammalian and avian telencephalon. Finally, it is argued that although the peculiarly human capacity for language marks a large cognitive contrast between humans and non-humans, there is good evidence-in particular, from work on implicit learning--that the learning mechanisms available to non--humans are present and do play an important role in human cognition.
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Whiten, A., Custance, D. M., Gomez, J. C., Teixidor, P., & Bard, K. A. (1996). Imitative learning of artificial fruit processing in children (Homo sapiens) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). J Comp Psychol, 110(1), 3–14.
Abstract: Observational learning in chimpanzees and young children was investigated using an artificial fruit designed as an analog of natural foraging problems faced by primates. Each of 3 principal components could be removed in 2 alternative ways, demonstration of only one of which was watched by each subject. This permitted subsequent imitation by subjects to be distinguished from stimulus enhancement. Children aged 2-4 years evidenced imitation for 2 components, but also achieved demonstrated outcomes through their own techniques. Chimpanzees relied even more on their own techniques, but they did imitate elements of 1 component of the task. To our knowledge, this is the first experimental evidence of chimpanzee imitation in a functional task designed to simulate foraging behavior hypothesized to be transmitted culturally in the wild.
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Williams, N. (1997). Evolutionary psychologists look for roots of cognition (Vol. 275).
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de Wall, F. B., & Aureli, F. (1997). Conflict resolution and distress alleviation in monkeys and apes. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 807, 317–328.
Abstract: Research on nonhuman primates has produced compelling evidence for reconciliation and consolation, that is, postconflict contacts that serve to respectively repair social relationships and reassure distressed individuals, such as victims of attack. This has led to a view of conflict and conflict resolution as an integrated part of social relationships, hence determined by social factors and modifiable by the social environment. Implications of this new model of social conflict are discussed along with evidence for behavioral flexibility, the value of cooperation, and the possibility that distress alleviation rests on empathy, a capacity that may be present in chimpanzees and humans but not in most other animals.
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Wasserman, E. A. (1997). The science of animal cognition: past, present, and future. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 23(2), 123–135.
Abstract: The field of animal cognition is strongly rooted in the philosophy of mind and in the theory of evolution. Despite these strong roots, work during the most famous and active period in the history of our science-the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s-may have diverted us from the very questions that were of greatest initial interest to the comparative analysis of learning and behavior. Subsequently, the field has been in steady decline despite its increasing breadth and sophistication. Renewal of the field of animal cognition may require a return to the original questions of animal communication and intelligence using the most advanced tools of modern psychological science. Reclaiming center stage in contemporary psychology will be difficult; planning that effort with a host of strategies should enhance the chances of success.
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Parker, S. T. (1997). A general model for the adaptive function of self-knowledge in animals and humans. Conscious Cogn, 6(1), 75–86.
Abstract: This article offers a general definition of self-knowledge that embraces all forms and levels of self-knowledge in animals and humans. It is hypothesized that various levels of self-knowledge constitute an ordinal scale such that each species in a lineage displays the forms of self-knowledge found in related species as well as new forms it and its sister species may have evolved. Likewise, it is hypothesized that these various forms of levels of self-knowledge develop in the sequence in which they evolved. Finally, a general hypothesis for the functional significance of self-knowledge is proposed along with subhypotheses regarding the adaptive significance of various levels of self-knowledge in mammals including human and nonhuman primates. The general hypothesis is that self-knowledge serves as a standard for assessing the qualities of conspecifics compared to those of the self. Such assessment is crucial to deciding among alternative reproductive and subsistence strategies. The qualities that are assessed, which vary across taxa, range from the size and strength of the self to its mathematical or musical abilities. This so-called assessment model of self-knowledge is based on evolutionary biological models for social selection and the role of assessment in animal communication.
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Lemasson, J. J., Fontenille, D., Lochouarn, L., Dia, I., Simard, F., Ba, K., et al. (1997). Comparison of behavior and vector efficiency of Anopheles gambiae and An. arabiensis (Diptera:Culicidae) in Barkedji, a Sahelian area of Senegal. J Med Entomol, 34(4), 396–403.
Abstract: The ecology, population dynamics, and malaria vector efficiency of Anopheles gambiae and An. arabiensis were studied for 2 yr in a Sahelian village of Senegal. Anophelines were captured at human bait and resting indoors by pyrethrum spray. Mosquitoes belonging to the An. gambiae complex were identified by polymerase chain reaction. Of 26,973 females, An. arabiensis represented 79% of the mosquitoes captured and remained in the study area longer than An. gambiae after the rains terminated. There were no differences in nocturnal biting cycles or endophagous rates between An. gambiae and An. arabiensis. Based on an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay test of bloodmeals, the anthropophilic rate of these 2 vectors were both approximately 60%, when comparisons were made during the same period. Overall, 18% of the resting females had patent mixed bloodmeals, mainly human-bovine. The parity rates of An. gambiae and An. arabiensis varied temporally. Despite similar behavior, the Plasmodium falciparum circumsporozoite protein (CSP) rates were different between An. gambiae (4.1%) and An. arabiensis (1.3%). P. malariae and P. ovale only represented 4% of the total Plasmodium identified in mosquitoes. Transmission was seasonal, occurring mainly during 4 mo. The CSP entomological inoculation rates were 128 bites per human per year for the 1st yr and 100 for the 2nd yr. Because of the combination of a high human biting rate and a low CSP rate, An. arabiensis accounted for 63% of transmission. Possible origin of differences in CSP rate between An. gambiae and An. arabiensis is discussed in relation to the parity rate, blood feeding frequency, and the hypothesis of genetic factors.
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Joffe, T. H., & Dunbar, R. I. (1997). Visual and socio-cognitive information processing in primate brain evolution. Proc Biol Sci, 264(1386), 1303–1307.
Abstract: Social group size has been shown to correlate with neocortex size in primates. Here we use comparative analyses to show that social group size is independently correlated with the size of non-V1 neocortical areas, but not with other more proximate components of the visual system or with brain systems associated with emotional cueing (e.g. the amygdala). We argue that visual brain components serve as a social information 'input device' for socio-visual stimuli such as facial expressions, bodily gestures and visual status markers, while the non-visual neocortex serves as a 'processing device' whereby these social cues are encoded, interpreted and associated with stored information. However, the second appears to have greater overall importance because the size of the V1 visual area appears to reach an asymptotic size beyond which visual acuity and pattern recognition may not improve significantly. This is especially true of the great ape clade (including humans), that is known to use more sophisticated social cognitive strategies.
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