|
|
Dorrance, B. R., & Zentall, T. R. (2002). Imitation of conditional discriminations in pigeons (Columba livia). J Comp Psychol, 116(3), 277–285.
Abstract: In the present experiments, the 2-action method was used to determine whether pigeons could learn to imitate a conditional discrimination. Demonstrator pigeons (Columba livia) stepped on a treadle in the presence of 1 light and pecked at the treadle in the presence of another light. Demonstration did not seem to affect acquisition of the conditional discrimination (Experiment 1) but did facilitate its reversal of the conditional discrimination (Experiments 2 and 3). The results suggest that pigeons are not only able to learn a specific behavior by observing another pigeon, but they can also learn under which circumstances to perform that behavior. The results have implications for proposed mechanisms of imitation in animals.
|
|
|
|
Wagner, G. (1975). [Flight leadership in flocks of homing pigeons]. Z. Tierpsychol., (39), 61–74.
Abstract: Groups of 3-5 homing pigeons individually recognizable by different colours of their plumage were followed by helicopter on their way home. In most cases the animals flew together as a group with frequently changing leadership. Flight formations in terms of leadership were noted every minute. It was examined statistically whether the flight order varies at random or whether there are leading and led birds. In 6 out of 7 experiments with groups of 4-5 pigeons flight order was far from random, one or two pigeons proving to be leaders. In only one experiment leadership did not differ from a random distribution. No correlation could be found between the tendency to lead within a group and homing performance of the single pigeon when released individually.
|
|
|
|
Goto, K., Lea, S. E. G., & Dittrich, W. H. (2002). Discrimination of intentional and random motion paths by pigeons. Anim. Cogn., 5(3), 119–127.
Abstract: Twelve pigeons ( Columba livia) were trained on a go/no-go schedule to discriminate between two kinds of movement patterns of dots, which to human observers appear to be “intentional” and “non-intentional” movements. In experiment 1, the intentional motion stimulus contained one dot (a “wolf”) that moved systematically towards another dot as though stalking it, and three distractors (“sheep”). The non-intentional motion stimulus consisted of four distractors but no stalker. Birds showed some improvement of discrimination as the sessions progressed, but high levels of discrimination were not reached. In experiment 2, the same birds were tested with different stimuli. The same parameters were used but the number of intentionally moving dots in the intentional motion stimulus was altered, so that three wolves stalked one sheep. Despite the enhanced difference of movement patterns, the birds did not show any further improvement in discrimination. However, birds for which the non-intentional stimulus was associated with reward showed a decline in discrimination. These results indicated that pigeons can discriminate between stimuli that do and do not contain an element that human observer see as moving intentionally. However, as no feature-positive effect was found in experiment 1, it is assumed that pigeons did not perceive or discriminate these stimuli on the basis that the intentional stimuli contained a feature that the non-intentional stimuli lacked, though the convergence seen in experiment 2 may have been an effective feature for the pigeons. Pigeons seem to be able to recognise some form of multiple simultaneously goal-directed motions, compared to random motions, as a distinctive feature, but do not seem to use simple “intentional” motion paths of two geometrical figures, embedded in random motions, as a feature whose presence or absence differentiates motion displays.
|
|
|
|
Kaiser, D. H., Zentall, T. R., & Neiman, E. (2002). Timing in pigeons: effects of the similarity between intertrial interval and gap in a timing signal. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(4), 416–422.
Abstract: Previous research suggests that when a fixed interval is interrupted (known as the gap procedure), pigeons tend to reset memory and start timing from 0 after the gap. However, because the ambient conditions of the gap typically have been the same as during the intertrial interval (ITI), ambiguity may have resulted. In the present experiment, the authors found that when ambient conditions during the gap were similar to the ITI, pigeons tended to reset memory, but when ambient conditions during the gap were different from the ITI, pigeons tended to stop timing, retain the duration of the stimulus in memory, and add to that time when the stimulus reappeared. Thus, when the gap was unambiguous, pigeons timed accurately.
|
|
|
|
Fremouw, T., Herbranson, W. T., & Shimp, C. P. (2002). Dynamic shifts of pigeon local/global attention. Anim. Cogn., 5(4), 233–243.
Abstract: It has previously been shown that pigeons can shift attention between parts and wholes of complex stimuli composed of larger, “global” characters constructed from smaller, “local” characters. The base-rate procedure used biased target level within any condition at either the local or global level; targets were more likely at one level than at the other. Biasing of target level in this manner demonstrated shifts of local/global attention over a time span consisting of several days with a fixed base rate. Experiment 1 examined the possibility that pigeons can shift attention between local and global levels of perceptual analysis in seconds rather than days. The experiment used priming cues the color of which predicted on a trial-by-trial basis targets at different perceptual levels. The results confirmed that pigeons, like humans, can display highly dynamic stimulus-driven shifts of local/global attention. Experiment 2 changed spatial relations between features of priming cues and features of targets within a task otherwise similar to that used in experiment 1. It was predicted that this change in cues might affect asymmetry but not the occurrence of a priming effect. A priming effect was again obtained, thereby providing generality to the claim that pigeons can learn that trial-by-trial primes predict targets at different levels of perceptual analysis. Pigeons can display perceptual, stimulus-driven priming of a highly dynamic nature.
|
|
|
|
Fairhurst, S., Gallistel, C. R., & Gibbon, J. (2003). Temporal landmarks: proximity prevails. Anim. Cogn., 6(2), 113–120.
Abstract: Subjects in conditioning experiments time their conditioned responses relative to the onsets of the conditioned stimuli (CSs). These onsets are temporal landmarks, by reference to which subjects may estimate the location of the unconditioned stimulus (US) in time. In a serial compound conditioning paradigm, a long duration CS comes on first, followed later by a second shorter CS, creating both a long-range and a short-range predictor of the US. We ask whether displacing the short-range predictor relative to the long-range predictor causes subjects to strike a compromise between the different temporal locations predicted by the two CSs. In three experiments with pigeons, we varied the training conditions so as to favor or militate against this outcome. However, in all conditions, there was no compromise; after the onset of the displaced short-range CS, the timing of conditioned responding was governed by it alone. This result contrasts with the compromises that are seen when the feeding time predicted by a CS is put in conflict with the time predicted by the circadian clock, and with the similar compromises sometimes seen when a nearby spatial landmark is displaced relative to a larger spatial context.
|
|
|
|
Zentall, T. R., Clement, T. S., & Weaver, J. E. (2003). Symmetry training in pigeons can produce functional equivalences. Psychon Bull Rev, 10(2), 387–391.
Abstract: Functional stimulus equivalence has been demonstrated using a transfer of training design with matching-to-sample training in which two sample stimuli are associated with the same comparison stimulus (A-B, C-B; many-to-one matching). Equivalence is shown by training a new association (A-D) and demonstrating the presence of an emergent relation (C-D). In the present experiment, we show that symmetry training, in which a bidirectional association is trained between two stimuli (A-B, B-A, using successive stimulus presentations followed by reinforcement), can also produce functional equivalence using a transfer of training design (i.e., train B-C, test A-C). The results suggest that training pigeons in the substitutability of two stimuli may be sufficient to produce functional stimulus equivalence between them. The results also have implications for the development of an emergent transitive relation, because training on A-B and B-C relations results in the emergence of an untrained A-C relation, if B-A training also is provided.
|
|
|
|
Sole, L. M., Shettleworth, S. J., & Bennett, P. J. (2003). Uncertainty in pigeons. Psychon Bull Rev, 10(3), 738–745.
Abstract: Pigeons classified a display of illuminated pixels on a touchscreen as sparse or dense. Correct responses were reinforced with six food pellets; incorrect responses were unreinforced. On some trials an uncertain response option was available. Pecking it was always reinforced with an intermediate number of pellets. Like monkeys and people in related experiments, the birds chose the uncertain response most often when the stimulus presented was difficult to classify correctly, but in other respects their behavior was not functionally similar to human behavior based on conscious uncertainty or to the behavior of monkeys in comparable experiments. Our data were well described by a signal detection model that assumed that the birds were maximizing perceived reward in a consistent way across all the experimental conditions.
|
|
|
|
Cerutti, D. T., & Staddon, J. E. R. (2004). Immediacy versus anticipated delay in the time-left experiment: a test of the cognitive hypothesis. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 30(1), 45–57.
Abstract: In the time-left experiment (J. Gibbon & R. M. Church, 1981), animals are said to compare an expectation of a fixed delay to food, for one choice, with a decreasing delay expectation for the other, mentally representing both upcoming time to food and the difference between current time and upcoming time (the cognitive hypothesis). The results of 2 experiments support a simpler view: that animals choose according to the immediacies of reinforcement for each response at a time signaled by available time markers (the temporal control hypothesis). It is not necessary to assume that animals can either represent or subtract representations of times to food to explain the results of the time-left experiment.
|
|
|
|
Klein, E. D., & Zentall, T. R. (2003). Imitation and affordance learning by pigeons (Columba livia). J Comp Psychol, 117(4), 414–419.
Abstract: The bidirectional control procedure was used to determine whether pigeons (Columba livia) would imitate a demonstrator that pushed a sliding screen for food. One group of observers saw a trained demonstrator push a sliding screen door with its beak (imitation group), whereas 2 other groups watched the screen move independently (possibly learning how the environment works) with a conspecific either present (affordance learning with social facilitation) or absent (affordance learning alone). A 4th group could not see the screen being pushed (sound and odor control). Imitation was evidenced by the finding that pigeons that saw a demonstrator push the screen made a higher proportion of matching screen pushes than observers in 2 appropriate control conditions. Further, observers that watched a screen move without a demonstrator present made a significantly higher proportion of matching screen pushes than would be expected by chance. Thus, these pigeons were capable of affordance learning.
|
|
