Abstract: A fundamental question in cognitive science is whether animals can represent numerosity (a property of a stimulus that is defined by the number of discriminable elements it contains) and use numerical representations computationally. Here, it was shown that rhesus monkeys represent the numerosity of visual stimuli and detect their ordinal disparity. Two monkeys were first trained to respond to exemplars of the numerosities 1 to 4 in an ascending numerical order (1 --> 2 --> 3 --> 4). As a control for non-numerical cues, exemplars were varied with respect to size, shape, and color. The monkeys were later tested, without reward, on their ability to order stimulus pairs composed of the novel numerosities 5 to 9. Both monkeys responded in an ascending order to the novel numerosities. These results show that rhesus monkeys represent the numerosities 1 to 9 on an ordinal scale.

Abstract: The problem of mind is considered in the aspect of natural scientific and philosophical problem of distinction between human and animal. The widespread confusion of the terms “rudiments”, “elements” of specifically human properties in animals and “biological prerequisites” of these properties are critically analysed. The idea is formulated according to which only in the process of anthropogenesis the rudiments of new social property--mind, conscience--could appear in the developing human beings.

Abstract: Planning for future needs, not just current ones, is one of the most formidable human cognitive achievements. Whether this skill is a uniquely human adaptation is a controversial issue. In a study we conducted, bonobos and orangutans selected, transported, and saved appropriate tools above baseline levels to use them 1 hour later (experiment 1). Experiment 2 extended these results to a 14-hour delay between collecting and using the tools. Experiment 3 showed that seeing the apparatus during tool selection was not necessary to succeed. These findings suggest that the precursor skills for planning for the future evolved in great apes before 14 million years ago, when all extant great ape species shared a common ancestor.

Abstract: Human subjects represent the location of a point in 2D space using two independent dimensions (x-y in Euclidean or radius-angle in polar space), and encode location in memory along these dimensions using two levels of representation: a fine-grain value and a category. Here we determined whether monkeys possessed the ability to represent location with these two levels of coding. A rhesus monkey was trained to reproduce the location of a dot in a circle by pointing, after a delay period, on the location where a dot was presented. Five different delay periods (0.5-5 s) were used. The results showed that the monkey used a polar coordinate system to represent the fine-grain spatial coding, where the radius and angle of the dots were encoded independently. The variability of the spatial response and reaction time increased with longer delays. Furthermore, the animal was able to form a categorical representation of space that was delay-dependent. The responses avoided the circumference and the center of the circle, defining a categorical radial prototype around one third of the total radial length. This radial category was observed only at delay durations of 3-5 s. Finally, the monkey also formed angular categories with prototypes at the obliques of the quadrants of the circle, avoiding the horizontal and vertical axes. However, these prototypes were only observed at the 5-s delay and on dots lying on the circumference. These results indicate that monkeys may possess spatial cognitive abilities similar to humans.

Abstract: The extent to which decision-making processes are constrained in animals with small brains is poorly understood. Arthropods have brains much smaller and simpler than those of birds and mammals. This raises questions concerning limitations on how intricate the decision-making processes might be in arthropods. At Los Banos in the Philippines, Scytodes pallidus is a spitting spider that specialises in preying on jumping spiders, and Portia labiata is a jumping spider that preys on S. pallidus. Scytodid spit comes from the mouth, and egg-carrying females are less dangerous than eggless scytodids because the female uses her chelicerae to hold her eggs. Held eggs block her mouth, and she has to release them before she can spit. The Los Banos P. labiata sometimes adjusts its tactics depending on whether the scytodid encountered is carrying eggs or not. When pursuing eggless scytodids, the Los Banos P. labiata usually takes detour routes that enable it to close in from behind (away from the scytodid's line of fire). However, when pursuing egg-carrying scytodids, the Los Banos P. labiata sometimes takes faster direct routes to reach these safer prey. The Los Banos P. labiata apparently makes risk-related adjustments specific to whether scytodids are carrying eggs, but P. labiata from Sagada in the Philippines (allopatric to Scytodes) fails to make comparable risk-related adjustments.