Abstract: Individual humans, and members of diverse other species, show consistent differences in
aggressiveness, shyness, sociability and activity. Such intraspecific differences in
behaviour have been widely assumed to be non-adaptive variation surrounding
(possibly) adaptive population-average behaviour. Nevertheless, in keeping with recent
calls to apply Darwinian reasoning to ever-finer scales of biological variation, we sketch
the fundamentals of an adaptive theory of consistent individual differences in behaviour.
Our thesis is based on the notion that such .personality differences. can be selected for if
fitness payoffs are dependent on both the frequencies with which competing strategies
are played and an individual`s behavioural history. To this end, we review existing models
that illustrate this and propose a game theoretic approach to analyzing personality
differences that is both dynamic and state-dependent. Our motivation is to provide
insights into the evolution and maintenance of an apparently common animal trait:
personality, which has far reaching ecological and evolutionary implications.

Abstract: Concerning hunting in chimpanzees, cooperation has generally been attributed to the behaviour of two or more individuals acting together to achieve a common goal (Boesch and Boesch, 1989). The common goal is often considered as the concrete result of a common action by two or several individuals. Although this result could be used as a criterion for cooperation, it could also be an outcome due to chance. We suggest that the goal, viewed as a concrete benefit shared by the partners, is not a requisite of cooperation but rather a possible consequence of a common action largely submitted to social constraints. Individuals engaged in a cooperative task in order to solve a problem have to exchange information to adjust to each other's behaviour. However, evidence of communication between partners during simultaneous cooperation is rare. An experiment in which two chimpanzees each had to simultaneously pull a handle to get a fruit was performed. We analysed not only the concrete result of the partners' activity but also what the individuals took into account before pulling a handle. We tried to specify what the chimpanzees learned by means of a series of logical propositions which we were able to confront the experimental results.

Abstract: Abstract
The evolution and origin of primate social organisation has attracted the attention of many researchers, and a solitary pattern, believed to be present in most nocturnal prosimians, has been generally considered as the most primitive system. Nocturnal prosimians are in fact mostly seen alone during their nightly activities and therefore termed “solitary foragers”, but that does not mean that they are not social. Moreover, designating their social organisation as “solitary”, implies that their way of life is uniform in all species. It has, however, emerged over the last decades that all of them exhibit not only some kind of social network but also that those networks differ among species. There is a need to classify these social networks in the same manner as with group-living (gregarious) animals if we wish to link up the different forms of primate social organisation with ecological, morphological or phylogenetic variables. In this review, we establish a basic classification based on spatial relations and sociality in order to describe and cope properly with the social organisation patterns of the different species of nocturnal prosimians and other mammals that do not forage in cohesive groups. In attempting to trace the ancestral pattern of primate social organisation, the Malagasy mouse and dwarf lemurs and the Afro-Asian bushbabies and lorises are of special interest because they are thought to approach the ancestral conditions most closely. These species have generally been believed to exhibit a dispersed harem system as their pattern of social organisation (“dispersed” means that individuals forage solitarily but exhibit a social network). Therefore, the ancestral pattern of primate social organisation was inferred to be a dispersed harem. In fact, new field data on cheirogaleids combined with a review of patterns of social organisation in strepsirhines (lemurs, bushbabies and lorises) revealed that they exhibit either dispersed multi-male systems or dispersed monogamy rather than a dispersed harem system. Therefore, the concept of a dispersed harem system as the ancestral condition of primate social organisation can no longer be supported. In combination with data on social organisation patterns in “primitive” placentals and marsupials, and in monotremes, it is in fact most probable that promiscuity is the ancestral pattern for mammalian social organisation. Subsequently, a dispersed multi-male system derived from promiscuity should be regarded as the ancestral condition for primates. We further suggest that the gregarious patterns of social organisation in Aotus and Avahi, and the dispersed form in Tarsius evolved from the gregarious patterns of diurnal primates rather than from the dispersed nocturnal type. It is consequently proposed that, in addition to Aotus and Tarsius, Avahi is also secondarily nocturnal.

Abstract: Abstract
Several comparative research programs have focusedon the cognitive, life history and ecological traits thataccount for variation in brain size. We review one ofthese programs, a program that uses the reported frequencyof behavioral innovation as an operational measureof cognition. In both birds and primates, innovationrate is positively correlated with the relative size of associationareas in the brain, the hyperstriatum ventrale andneostriatum in birds and the isocortex and striatum inprimates. Innovation rate is also positively correlatedwith the taxonomic distribution of tool use, as well asinterspecific differences in learning. Some features ofcognition have thus evolved in a remarkably similar wayin primates and at least six phyletically-independent avianlineages. In birds, innovation rate is associated withthe ability of species to deal with seasonal changes in theenvironment and to establish themselves in new regions,and it also appears to be related to the rate atwhich lineages diversify. Innovation rate provides a usefultool to quantify inter-taxon differences in cognitionand to test classic hypotheses regarding the evolution ofthe brain.

Abstract: Recent experimental research has revealed forms of human behavior involving interaction among unrelated individuals that have proven difficult to explain in terms of kin or reciprocal altruism. One such trait, strong reciprocity is a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid. We present evidence supporting strong reciprocity as a schema for predicting and understanding altruism in humans. We show that under conditions plausibly characteristic of the early stages of human evolution, a small number of strong reciprocators could invade a population of self-regarding types, and strong reciprocity is an evolutionary stable strategy. Although most of the evidence we report is based on behavioral experiments, the same behaviors are regularly described in everyday life, for example, in wage setting by firms, tax compliance, and cooperation in the protection of local environmental public goods.