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| Author |
James, R.; Bennett, P.G.; Krause, J. |
| Title |
Geometry for mutualistic and selfish herds: the limited domain of danger |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
2004 |
Publication |
Journal of Theoretical Biology |
Abbreviated Journal |
J. Theor. Biol. |
| Volume |
228 |
Issue |
1 |
Pages |
107-113 |
| Keywords |
Aggregation; Selfish herd; Limited domains |
| Abstract |
We present a two-dimensional individual-based model of aggregation behaviour in animals by introducing the concept of a “limited domain of danger”, which represents either a limited detection range or a limited attack range of predators. The limited domain of danger provides a suitable framework for the analysis of individual movement rules under real-life conditions because it takes into account the predator's prey detection and capture abilities. For the first time, a single geometrical construct can be used to analyse the predation risk of both peripheral and central individuals in a group. Furthermore, our model provides a conceptual framework that can be equally applied to aggregation behaviour and refuge use and thus presents a conceptual advance on current theory that treats these antipredator behaviours separately. An analysis of individual movement rules using limited domains of danger showed that the time minimization strategy outcompetes the nearest neighbour strategy proposed by Hamilton's (J. Theor. Biol. 31 (1971) 295) selfish herd model, whereas a random strategy confers no benefit and can even be disadvantageous. The superior performance of the time minimization strategy highlights the importance of taking biological constraints, such as an animal's orientation relative to its neighbours, into account when searching for efficient movement rules underlying the aggregation process. |
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552 |
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| Author |
Reluga, T.C.; Viscido, S. |
| Title |
Simulated evolution of selfish herd behavior |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
2005 |
Publication |
Journal of Theoretical Biology |
Abbreviated Journal |
J. Theor. Biol. |
| Volume |
234 |
Issue |
2 |
Pages |
213-225 |
| Keywords |
Selfish herd; Behavior; Evolution; Predation risk |
| Abstract |
Single species aggregations are a commonly observed phenomenon. One potential explanation for these aggregations is provided by the selfish herd hypothesis, which states that aggregations result from individual efforts to reduce personnel predation risk at the expense of group-mates. Not all movement rules based on the selfish herd hypothesis are consistent with observed animal behavior. Previous work has shown that herd-like aggregations are not generated by movement rules limited to local interactions between nearest neighbors. Instead, rules generating realistic herds appear to require delocalized interactions. To date, it has been an open question whether or not the necessary delocalization can emerge from local interactions under natural selection. To address this question, we study an individual-based model with a single quantitative genetic trait that controls the influence of neighbors as a function of distance. The results indicate that predation-based selection can increase the influence of distant neighbors relative to near neighbors. Our results lend support for the idea that selfish herd behavior can arise from localized movement rules under natural selection. |
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553 |
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Viscido, S.V.; Miller, M.; Wethey, D.S. |
| Title |
The dilemma of the selfish herd: the search for a realistic movement rule |
Type |
Journal Article |
| Year |
2002 |
Publication |
Journal of theoretical biology |
Abbreviated Journal |
J. Theor. Biol. |
| Volume |
217 |
Issue |
2 |
Pages |
183-194 |
| Keywords |
Animals; *Behavior, Animal; *Mass Behavior; Models, Biological; *Motor Activity; Predatory Behavior |
| Abstract |
The selfish herd hypothesis predicts that aggregations form because individuals move toward one another to minimize their own predation risk. The “dilemma of the selfish herd” is that movement rules that are easy for individuals to follow, fail to produce true aggregations, while rules that produce aggregations require individual behavior so complex that one may doubt most animals can follow them. If natural selection at the individual level is responsible for herding behavior, a solution to the dilemma must exist. Using computer simulations, we examined four different movement rules. Relative predation risk was different for all four movement rules (p<0.05). We defined three criteria for measuring the quality of a movement rule. A good movement rule should (a) be statistically likely to benefit an individual that follows it, (b) be something we can imagine most animals are capable of following, and (c) result in a centrally compact flock. The local crowded horizon rule, which allowed individuals to take the positions of many flock-mates into account, but decreased the influence of flock-mates with distance, best satisfied these criteria. The local crowded horizon rule was very sensitive to the animal's perceptive ability. Therefore, the animal's ability to detect its neighbors is an important factor in the dynamics of group formation. |
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Department of Biological Sciences, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, 29208, USA. viscido@u.washington.edu |
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0022-5193 |
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PMID:12202112 |
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554 |
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Viscido, S.V.; Miller, M.; Wethey, D.S. |
| Title |
The response of a selfish herd to an attack from outside the group perimeter |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
2001 |
Publication |
Journal of theoretical biology |
Abbreviated Journal |
J. Theor. Biol. |
| Volume |
208 |
Issue |
3 |
Pages |
315-328 |
| Keywords |
Animals; *Behavior, Animal; *Computer Simulation; Models, Biological; *Movement; Predatory Behavior |
| Abstract |
According to the selfish herd hypothesis, animals can decrease predation risk by moving toward one another if the predator can appear anywhere and will attack the nearest target. Previous studies have shown that aggregations can form using simple movement rules designed to decrease each animal's Domain of Danger. However, if the predator attacks from outside the group's perimeter, these simple movement rules might not lead to aggregation. To test whether simple selfish movement rules would decrease predation risk for those situations when the predator attacks from outside the flock perimeter, we constructed a computer model that allowed flocks of 75 simulated fiddler crabs to react to one another, and to a predator attacking from 7 m away. We attacked simulated crab flocks with predators of different sizes and attack speeds, and computed relative predation risk after 120 time steps. Final trajectories showed flight toward the center of the flock, but curving away from the predator. Path curvature depended on the predator's size and approach speed. The average crab experienced a greater decrease in predation risk when the predator was small or slow moving. Regardless of the predator's size and speed, however, predation risk always decreased as long as crabs took their flock-mates into account. We conclude that, even when flight away from an external predator occurs, the selfish avoidance of danger can lead to aggregation. |
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Department of Biological Sciences, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208, U.S.A. viscido@u.washington.edu |
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0022-5193 |
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PMID:11207093 |
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555 |
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Suzuki, Y.; Toquenaga, Y. |
| Title |
Effects of information and group structure on evolution of altruism: analysis of two-score model by covariance and contextual analyses |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
2005 |
Publication |
Journal of theoretical biology |
Abbreviated Journal |
J. Theor. Biol. |
| Volume |
232 |
Issue |
2 |
Pages |
191-201 |
| Keywords |
*Altruism; Analysis of Variance; *Communication; Cooperative Behavior; *Evolution; Game Theory; *Group Structure; Humans; Models, Genetic; Models, Psychological; Selection (Genetics); Trust |
| Abstract |
An altruistic individual has to gamble on cooperation to a stranger because it does not know whether the stranger is trustworthy before direct interaction. Nowak and Sigmund (Nature 393 (1998a) 573; J. Theor. Biol. 194 (1998b) 561) presented a new theoretical framework of indirect reciprocal altruism by image scoring game where all individuals are informed about a partner's behavior from its image score without direct interaction. Interestingly, in a simplified version of the image scoring game, the evolutionarily stability condition for altruism became a similar form of Hamilton's rule, i.e. inequality that the probability of getting correct information is more than the ratio of cost to benefit. Since the Hamilton's rule was derived by evolutionarily stable analysis, the evolutionary meaning of the probability of getting correct information has not been clearly examined in terms of kin and group selection. In this study, we applied covariance analysis to the two-score model for deriving the Hamilton's rule. We confirmed that the probability of getting correct information was proportional to the bias of altruistic interactions caused by using information about a partner's image score. The Hamilton's rule was dependent on the number of game bouts even though the information reduced the risk of cooperation to selfish one at the first encounter. In addition, we incorporated group structure to the two-score model to examine whether the probability of getting correct information affect selection for altruism by group selection. We calculated a Hamilton's rule of group selection by contextual analysis. Group selection is very effective when either the probability of getting correct information or that of future interaction, or both are low. The two Hamilton's rules derived by covariance and contextual analyses demonstrated the effects of information and group structure on the evolution of altruism. We inferred that information about a partner's behavior and group structure can produce flexible pathways for the evolution of altruism. |
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Integrative Environmental Sciences, Graduate School of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1, Ten-Nou-Dai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8572, Japan. yukari@pe.ies.life.tsukuba.ac.jp |
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0022-5193 |
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PMID:15530489 |
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556 |
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Reeve, H. Kern |
| Title |
Evolutionarily stable communication between kin: a general model |
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Journal Article |
| Year |
1997 |
Publication |
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences |
Abbreviated Journal |
Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. |
| Volume |
264 |
Issue |
(1384) |
Pages |
1037-1040. |
| Keywords |
Signalling Systems |
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At present, the most general evolutionary theory of honest communication is Grafen's model of Zahavi's 'handicap' signalling system, in which honesty of signals about the signaller's quality (e.g. mate suitability or fighting ability) is maintained by the differentially high cost of signals to signallers having lower quality. The latter model is here further generalized to include any communication between signallers and receivers that are genetically related (e.g. parents and begging offspring, cooperative or competing siblings). Signalling systems involving relatives are shown to be evolutionarily stable, despite a potential pay-off for false signalling, if the Zahavian assumption of differential signal costs holds and there are diminishing reproductive returns to the signaller as the receiver's assessed value of its attribute increases, or if, regardless of whether the Zahavian assumption holds, signallers with high values of the attribute benefit more from a given receiver assessment than signallers with low values (e.g. begging chicks that are hungrier benefit more from being fed). In stable systems of signalling among kin, it is also shown to be generally true that (i) levels of signalling and thus observed signal costs will decline as relatedness increases or as the receiver's reproductive penalty for erroneous assessment increases, and (ii) receivers will consistently, altruistically overestimate the true value of the signalled attribute. |
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557 |
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Brilot, B.O.; Johnstone, R.A. |
| Title |
The limits to cost-free signalling of need between relatives |
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Journal Article |
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2003 |
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Proceedings. Biological sciences / The Royal Society |
Abbreviated Journal |
Proc Biol Sci |
| Volume |
270 |
Issue |
1519 |
Pages |
1055-1060 |
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*Animal Communication; Animals; Birds/physiology; Models, Biological; *Social Behavior |
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Theoretical models have demonstrated the possibility of stable cost-free signalling of need between relatives. The stability of these cost-free equilibria depends on the indirect fitness cost of cheating and deceiving a donor into giving away resources. We show that this stability is highly sensitive to the distribution of need among signallers and receivers. In particular, cost-free signalling is likely to prove stable only if there is very large variation in need (such that the least-needy individuals stand to gain much less than the most-needy individuals from additional resources). We discuss whether these conditions are likely to be found in altricial avian breeding systems--the most intensively studied instance of signalling of need between relatives. We suggest that cost-free signalling is more likely to prove stable and will provide parents with more information during the earlier phases of chick growth, when parents can more easily meet the demands of a brood (and chicks are more likely to reach satiation). Later, informative yet cost-free signalling is unlikely to persist. |
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Department of Zoology, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3EJ, UK. bob21@cam.ac.uk |
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0962-8452 |
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PMID:12803895 |
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558 |
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Bergstrom,C. T.; Lachmann, M. |
| Title |
Signalling among relatives. I. Is costly signalling too costly? |
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Journal Article |
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1997 |
Publication |
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America |
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Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. |
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352(1353) |
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609-617 |
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Signalling |
| Abstract |
ahavi's handicap principle,originally proposed as an explanation for sexual selection ofelaborate male traits, suggests that a sufficient cost to dishonest signals can outweigh the rewards of deception and allow individuals to communicate honestly. Maynard Smith (1991) and Johnstone and Grafen (1992) introduce the Sir Philip Sidney game in order to extend the handicap principle to interactions among related individuals, and to demonstrate that stable costly signalling systems can exist among relatives.
In this paper we demonstrate that despite the benefits associated with honest information transfer, the costs incurred in a stable costly signalling system may leave all participants worse off than they would be in a system with no signalling at all. In both the discrete and continuous forms of the Sir Philip Sidney game, there exist conditions under which costly signalling among relatives, while stable, is so costly that it is disadvantageous compared with no signalling at all. We determine the factors which dictate signal cost and signal benefit in a generalized version of this game, and explain how signal cost can exceed signal value. Such results raise concerns about theevolutionary pathways which could have led to the existence of signalling equilibria in nature. The paper stresses the importance of comparing signalling equilibria with other possible strategies, beforedrawing conclusions regarding the optimality of signalling. |
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559 |
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Lachmann M.; Bergstrom C.T. |
| Title |
Signalling among Relatives II. Beyond the Tower of Babel |
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Journal Article |
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1998 |
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Theoretical Population Biology |
Abbreviated Journal |
Theor. Pop. Biol. |
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54 |
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2 |
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146-160 |
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Models of costly signalling are commonly employed in evolutionary biology in order to explain how honest communication between individuals with conflicting interests can be stable. These models have focused primarily on a single type of honest signalling equilibrium, the separating equilibrium in which any two different signallers send distinct signals, thereby providing signal receivers with complete information. In this paper, we demonstrate that in signalling among relatives (modelled using the Sir Philip Sidney game), there is not one but a large number of possible signalling equilibria, most of which are pooling equilibria in which different types of signallers may share a common signal. We prove that in a general Sir Philip Sidney game, any partition of signallers into equi-signalling classes can have a stable signalling equilibrium if and only if it is a contiguous partition, and provide examples of such partitions. A similar (but slightly stricter) condition is shown to hold when signals are transmitted through a medium with signalling error. These results suggest a solution to a problem faced by previous signalling theory models: when we consider the separating equilibrium, signal cost is independent of the frequency of individuals sending that signal and, consequently, even very rare signaller types can drastically affect signal cost. Here, we show that by allowing these rare signallers to pool with more common signallers, signal cost can be greatly reduced. Copyright 1998 Academic Press. |
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560 |
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Bergstrom, C.T.; Lachmann, M. |
| Title |
Signaling among relatives. III. Talk is cheap |
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Journal Article |
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1998 |
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Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America |
Abbreviated Journal |
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. |
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95 |
Issue |
9 |
Pages |
5100-5105 |
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Animal Communication; Animals; Costs and Cost Analysis; *Evolution; Interpersonal Relations; Models, Biological |
| Abstract |
The Sir Philip Sidney game has been used by numerous authors to show how signal cost can facilitate honest signaling among relatives. Here, we demonstrate that, in this game, honest cost-free signals are possible as well, under very general conditions. Moreover, these cost-free signals are better for all participants than the previously explored alternatives. Recent empirical evidence suggests that begging is energetically inexpensive for nestling birds; this finding led some researchers to question the applicability of the costly signaling framework to nestling begging. Our results show that cost-free or inexpensive signals, as observed empirically, fall within the framework of signaling theory. |
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Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. carl@charles.stanford.edu |
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0027-8424 |
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PMID:9560235 |
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