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McGreevy, P. D. Development and Resolution of Behavioural Problems with the. In Havemeier Workshop.
Abstract: The ideals of equestrian technique combine art and science. Therefore students of equitation
encounter measurable variables such as rhythm, tempo and impulsion alongside more ethereal ones
such as outline and harmony. This mixture accounts for many of the idiosyncrasies of equestrianism
including the subjective scoring of performance in dressage tests, the elusiveness of perfection even at
an elite level of competition and the difficulty of expressing equestrian technique in empirical terms
(Roberts, 1992).
This chapter will describe and offer examples of the unwelcome behavioural responses horses
produce under saddle. Two broad sections are then proposed to allow the reader to consider
unwelcome behavioural responses caused directly by humans as distinct from those attributable more
to the horse than the rider. Ultimately the responsibility for problems in the ridden horse lies with
humans since we have undertaken the domestication and exploitation of equids. Therefore it is
accepted that the dichotomy is not absolute. The chapter closes with a
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Feh, C. (2005). Relationships and Communication in Socially Natural Horse Herds. In D. S. Mills, & S. M. McDonnell (Eds.), The domestic horse : the origins, development, and management of its behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Abstract: Horses are quite unique. In most mammals, sexes segregate and maintain bonds only during the breeding season (Clutton-Brock, 1989). Some canids, a few rodents and primate species such as gorillas, hamadryas baboons and red howler monkeys are the exception, where the same males stay with the same females all year round and over many breeding seasons. Typically, both sexes disperse at puberty in these species. In horses, it was clearly shown that the causes for female dispersal were incest avoidance and not intra-specific competition (Monard, 1996). As a rule, this is confirmed for mammal species where tenure length by males exceeds the age at first reproduction in females (Clutton-Brock, 1989). When horses are allowed to choose their mating partner freely, the inbreeding coefficient of the offspring is lower than expected should they mate randomly (Duncan et al, 1984).
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Klingel, H. (). Das Verhalten der Pferde (Equidae). Handb. o. Zool., 8(10), 1–68.
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Zeeb, K. (1959). Das Verhalten des Pferdes bei der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Menschen. Z. Säugetierkunde, 7, 139–193.
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Wilson, D. S., & Dugatkin, L. A. (1996). A reply to Lombardi & Hurlbert. Anim. Behav., 52(2), 423–425.
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R. A. Hopkins. CALIFORNIA WILDLIFE HABITAT RELATIONSHIPS SYSTEM (Vol. M174). Retrieved June 1, 2024, from http://www.dfg.ca.gov/bdb/cwhr/lha/lha_M174.pdf
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Nicol, C. J. (2000). Equine Stereotypies. In: Houpt K.A. (Ed.),. In Recent Advances in Companion Animal Behavior Problems. International Veterinary Information Service.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Wilson, D. S. (1994). Choice experiments and cognition: a reply to Lamprecht & Hofer. Anim. Behav., 47(6), 1459–1461.
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Mesterton-Gibbons, M., & Dugatkin, L. A. (1997). Cooperation and the Prisoner's Dilemma: towards testable models of mutualism versus reciprocity. Anim. Behav., 54(3), 551–557.
Abstract: For the purpose of distinguishing between mutualism and reciprocity in nature, recent work on the evolution of cooperation has both oversimplifed and undersimplified the distinction between these two categories of cooperation. This article addresses the resulting issues of model testability, clarifies the role of time and argues that the category of `pseudo-reciprocity' is an unnecessary complication.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Mesterton-Gibbons, M. (1996). Cooperation among unrelated individuals: reciprocal altruism, by-product mutualism and group selection in fishes. Biosystems, 37(1-2), 19–30.
Abstract: Cooperation among unrelated individuals can evolve not only via reciprocal altruism but also via trait-group selection or by-product mutualism (or some combination of all three categories). Therefore the (iterated) prisoner's dilemma is an insufficient paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation. We replace this game by the cooperator's dilemma, which is more versatile because it enables all three categories of cooperative behavior to be examined within the framework of a single theory. Controlled studies of cooperation among fish provide examples of each category of cooperation. Specifically, we describe reciprocal altruism among simultaneous hermaphrodites that swap egg parcels, group-selected cooperation among fish that inspect dangerous predators and by-product mutualism in the cooperative foraging of coral-reef fish.
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