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Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (2006). Do chimpanzees know what others see ? or only what they are looking at? In M. Nudds, & S. Hurley (Eds.), Rational Animals? (pp. 371–384). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Bräuer, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Chimpanzees do not take into account what others can hear in a competitive situation. Anim. Cogn., 11(1), 1435–9448.
Abstract: Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) know what others can and cannot see in a competitive situation. Does this reflect a general understanding the perceptions of others` In a study by Hare et al. (2000) pairs of chimpanzees competed over two pieces of food. Subordinate individuals preferred to approach food that was behind a barrier that the dominant could not see, suggesting that chimpanzees can take the visual perspective of others. We extended this paradigm to the auditory modality to investigate whether chimpanzees are sensitive to whether a competitor can hear food rewards being hidden. Results suggested that the chimpanzees did not take what the competitor had heard into account, despite being able to locate the hiding place themselves by the noise.
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Herrmann, E., Call, J., Hernandez-Lloreda, M. V., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2007). online material. Science, 317(5843), 1360–1366.
Abstract: Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the hypothesis that humans simply have more “general intelligence,” we found that the children and chimpanzees had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world but that the children had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing with the social world.
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Herrmann, E., Call, J., Hernandez-Lloreda, M. V., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis. Science, 317(5843), 1360–1366.
Abstract: Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the hypothesis that humans simply have more “general intelligence,” we found that the children and chimpanzees had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world but that the children had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing with the social world.
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Uher, J., Asendorpf, J. B., & Call, J. (2008). Personality in the behaviour of great apes: temporal stability, cross-situational consistency and coherence in response. Anim. Behav., 75(1), 99–112.
Abstract: Using a multidisciplinary approach, the present study complements ethological behaviour measurements with basic theoretical concepts, methods and approaches of the personality psychological trait paradigm. Its adoptability and usefulness for animal studies are tested exemplarily on a sample of 20 zoo-housed great apes (five of each of the following species): bonobos, Pan paniscus; chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes verus; gorillas, Gorilla gorilla gorilla; and orang-utans, Pongo pygmaeus abelii. Data on 76 single trait-relevant behaviours were recorded in a series of 14 laboratory-based situations and in two different group situations. Data collection was repeated completely after a break of 2 weeks within a 60-day period. All behaviour records were sufficiently reliable. Individual- and variable-oriented analyses showed high/substantial temporal stability on different levels of aggregation. Distinctive and stable individual situational and response profiles clarified the importance of situations and of multiple trait-relevant behaviours. The present study calls for a closer collaboration between behavioural biologists and personality psychologists to tap the full potential of animal personality research.
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Kaminski, J., Call, J., & Fischer, J. (2004). Word Learning in a Domestic Dog: Evidence for “Fast Mapping”. Science, 304(5677), 1682–1683.
Abstract: During speech acquisition, children form quick and rough hypotheses about the meaning of a new word after only a single exposure--a process dubbed “fast mapping.” Here we provide evidence that a border collie, Rico, is able to fast map. Rico knew the labels of over 200 different items. He inferred the names of novel items by exclusion learning and correctly retrieved those items right away as well as 4 weeks after the initial exposure. Fast mapping thus appears to be mediated by general learning and memory mechanisms also found in other animals and not by a language acquisition device that is special to humans.
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Bräuer, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2004). Visual perspective taking in dogs (Canis familiaris) in the presence of barriers. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 88(3-4), 299–317.
Abstract: Previous studies have shown that dogs have developed a special sensitivity to the communicative signals and attentional states of humans. The aim of the current study was to further investigate what dogs know about the visual perception of humans and themselves. In the first two experiments we investigated whether dogs were sensitive to the properties of barriers as blocking the visual access of humans. We presented dogs with a situation in which a human forbade them to take a piece of food, but the type and orientation of the barrier allowed the dog to take the food undetected in some conditions. Dogs differentiated between effective and ineffective barriers, based on their orientation or the particular features of the barriers such as size or the presence of window. In the third study we investigated whether dogs know about what they themselves have seen. We presented subjects with two boxes and placed food in one of them. In the Seen condition the location of the food was shown to the dogs while in the Unseen condition dogs were prevented from seeing the destination of the food. Before selecting one of the boxes by pressing a lever, dogs had the opportunity to seek extra information regarding the contents of the boxes, which would be particularly useful in the condition in which they had not seen where the food was hidden. Dogs rarely used the opportunity to seek information about the contents of the box before making their choice in any condition. Therefore, we found no evidence suggesting that dogs have access to what they themselves have seen, which contrasts with the positive evidence about visual perspective taking in others from the first two experiments and previous studies.
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Mersmann, D., Tomasello, M., Call, J., Kaminski, J., & Taborsky, M. (2011). Simple Mechanisms Can Explain Social Learning in Domestic Dogs (Canis familiaris). Ethology, 117(8), 675–690.
Abstract: Abstract Recent studies have suggested that domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) engage in highly complex forms of social learning. Here, we critically assess the potential mechanisms underlying social learning in dogs using two problem-solving tasks. In a classical detour task, the test dogs benefited from observing a demonstrator walking around a fence to obtain a reward. However, even inexperienced dogs did not show a preference for passing the fence at the same end as the demonstrator. Furthermore, dogs did not need to observe a complete demonstration by a human demonstrator to pass the task. Instead, they were just as successful in solving the problem after seeing a partial demonstration by an object passing by at the end of the fence. In contrast to earlier findings, our results suggest that stimulus enhancement (or affordance learning) might be a powerful social learning mechanism used by dogs to solve such detour problems. In the second task, we examined whether naïve dogs copy actions to solve an instrumental problem. After controlling for stimulus enhancement and other forms of social influence (e.g. social facilitation and observational conditioning), we found that dogs’ problem solving was not influenced by witnessing a skilful demonstrator (either an unknown human, a conspecific or the dog’s owner). Together, these results add to evidence suggesting that social learning may often be explained by relatively simple (but powerful) mechanisms.
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Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (1995). Use of social information in the problem solving of orangutans (<em>Pongo pygmaeus</em>) and human children (<em>Homo sapiens</em>). J. Comp. Psychol., 109(3), 308–320.
Abstract: Fourteen juvenile and adult orangutans and 24 3- and 4-yr-old children participated in 4 studies on imitative learning in a problem-solving situation. In all studies a simple to operate apparatus was used, but its internal mechanism was hidden from subjects to prevent individual learning. In the 1st study, orangutans observed a human demonstrator perform 1 of 4 actions on the apparatus and obtain a reward; they subsequently showed no signs of imitative learning. Similar results were obtained in a 2nd study in which orangutan demonstrators were used. Similar results were also obtained in a 3rd study in which a human encouraged imitation from an orangutan that had previously been taught to mimic arbitrary human actions. In a 4th study, human 3- and 4-yr-old children learned the task by means of imitation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
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MacLean, E., Matthews, L., Hare, B., Nunn, C., Anderson, R., Aureli, F., et al. (2012). How does cognition evolve? Phylogenetic comparative psychology. Anim. Cogn., 15(2), 223–238.
Abstract: Now more than ever animal studies have the potential to test hypotheses regarding how cognition evolves. Comparative psychologists have developed new techniques to probe the cognitive mechanisms underlying animal behavior, and they have become increasingly skillful at adapting methodologies to test multiple species. Meanwhile, evolutionary biologists have generated quantitative approaches to investigate the phylogenetic distribution and function of phenotypic traits, including cognition. In particular, phylogenetic methods can quantitatively (1) test whether specific cognitive abilities are correlated with life history (e.g., lifespan), morphology (e.g., brain size), or socio-ecological variables (e.g., social system), (2) measure how strongly phylogenetic relatedness predicts the distribution of cognitive skills across species, and (3) estimate the ancestral state of a given cognitive trait using measures of cognitive performance from extant species. Phylogenetic methods can also be used to guide the selection of species comparisons that offer the strongest tests of a priori predictions of cognitive evolutionary hypotheses (i.e., phylogenetic targeting). Here, we explain how an integration of comparative psychology and evolutionary biology will answer a host of questions regarding the phylogenetic distribution and history of cognitive traits, as well as the evolutionary processes that drove their evolution.
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