Abstract: Recent experimental evidence indicates that females may copy the mate choice of others. Here, we present a model for the evolution of mate copying strategies in lekking species. In the model, all females (copiers and non-copiers) assess male quality, but a copier's assessment of a male's quality increases after males have mated with other females. The model demonstrates that mate copying is favored when breeding late in the season has a relatively high cost. We hope that our results will spur empirical work quantifying the time constraints associated with breeding, thus allowing more direct tests of the model's predictions.

Abstract: When detecting a predator, some prey animals respond in a counterintuitive fashion by approaching, rather than fleeing, that potential threat of extinction. This seemingly paradoxical behaviour, known aspredator inspection, has been reported for a wide variety of taxa--and therefore can be assumed to be adaptive. However, the view of predator inspection as a paradoxical behaviour rests on two implicit assumptions: (a) initial predator detecting is unambiguous, with no uncertainty in discriminating between hunting and non hunting members of predator species, or members of predator species and unrelated phenomena; (b) the costs of flight are negligible relative to the risk of predation. Upon reflection assumption (a) is not really tenable. Whereas assumption (b) is not consistent with experimental evidence [Godin & Crossman (1994)Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol.34,359-366]. Given that predator detection is ambiguous and the costs of flight are not negligible, a prey individual may benefit by a closer approach to the source of the alarming signals, thus improving its assessment of the situation--despite the increased risk of predation. In this paper, the above statement is given rigor by reformulating the problem in game theoretical terms. The results indicate that a prey will minimize its costs by performing predator inspection whenever its degree of certainty regarding predator identification and/or assessment of its intentions is less than a threshold, which is determined by the model's parameters.

Abstract: Single species aggregations are a commonly observed phenomenon. One potential explanation for these aggregations is provided by the selfish herd hypothesis, which states that aggregations result from individual efforts to reduce personnel predation risk at the expense of group-mates. Not all movement rules based on the selfish herd hypothesis are consistent with observed animal behavior. Previous work has shown that herd-like aggregations are not generated by movement rules limited to local interactions between nearest neighbors. Instead, rules generating realistic herds appear to require delocalized interactions. To date, it has been an open question whether or not the necessary delocalization can emerge from local interactions under natural selection. To address this question, we study an individual-based model with a single quantitative genetic trait that controls the influence of neighbors as a function of distance. The results indicate that predation-based selection can increase the influence of distant neighbors relative to near neighbors. Our results lend support for the idea that selfish herd behavior can arise from localized movement rules under natural selection.

Abstract: There is growing evidence that macaque social systems represent sets of coadapted traits in which strength of hierarchies and degree of nepotism covary. A framework is developed to explain the link between dominance and kinship phenomena, assuming that power brought by alliances among non-kin is allometrically related to those involving relatives. This can account for the type of social relationships observed in “despotic” systems vs. “egalitarian” ones. When social bonds are mostly founded on kinship, lineages are closed and social power generated by coalitions among relatives may reach high levels; social power frequently outweighs the fighting abilities of single individuals, and asymmetry of dominance between group members may be marked. When lineages are more open, social bonds and alliances are less kin-biased, social relationships are more equal, and as the influence of coalitions is less important, the individual retains a certain degree of freedom in relation to the power of kin-networks. Acknowledging that the balance between individual and social power is not set at the same level across different species can explain a number of variations in rules of rank inheritance and relative dominance of males and females among macaques. The framework illustrates how epigenetic processes may shape complex features of primate social systems, and offers opportunities for testing.

Abstract: The view is examined that the adaptive value of conventional aspects of fighting behaviour is for assessment of relative RHP (resource holding power) of the combatants. Outcomes of aggressive disputes should be decided by each individual's fitness budget available for expenditure during a fight (determined by the fitness difference between adoption of alternative strategies, escalation or withdrawal without escalation) and on the rate of expenditure of the fitness budget if escalation occurs (determined by the RHPs of the combatants). Thus response thresholds for alternative strategies (“assessments”) will be determined by natural selection on a basis of which opponent is likely to expend its fitness budget first, should escalation occur. This “loser” should retreat (before escalation) and the winner should stay in possession of the resource. Many aggressive decisions depend on whether one is a resource holder, or an attacker. Assuming the RHP of the combatants to be equal, there are many instances of fitness pay-off imbalances between holder and attacker which should weight the dispute outcome in favour of one or other opponent by allowing it a greater expendable fitness budget. Usually the weighting favours the holder; the attacker therefore needs a correspondingly higher RHP before it may be expected to win. This is not invariably the case, and much observed data fits the predictions of this sort of model. If assessments are perfect and budget expenditure rates exactly predictable, then there would never seem to be any case for escalation. Escalation can be explained in terms of injury inflictions (expenditures) occurring as discrete events; i.e. as “bouts” won or lost during fighting. Assessment can give only a probabilistic prediction of the outcome of a bout. A simple model is developed to investigate escalation situations. Each combatant assesses relative RHP; this correlates with an absolute probability of winning the next bout (cabs). The stake played for is infliction of loss of RHP and is determined by the fitness budgets of the opponents. (Each individual plays for the withdrawal of its opponent.) This defines a critical probability of winning (ccrit) for each combatant, above which escalation is the favourable strategy (cabs > ccrit) and below which withdrawal is favourable (cabs < ccrit). Escalation should occur only where cabs-ccrit is positive for both combatants. This model gives predictions compatible with the observations, indicating that RHP loss alone can be adequate to explain withdrawal: escalation behaviour. Withdrawal tendency will be increased by low searching costs. Escalations should be restricted to closely matched RHP opponents if RHP disparity is the major imbalance. Outside the “escalation range” of a given individual, the higher RHP individual wins and the lower one loses (i.e. it should withdraw after conventional display). RHP disparity and holder: attacker imbalance should both interact to shape the observed pattern, though their relative importances will depend on species and situation. In some instances selection may favour immediate withdrawal from an occupied territory even without assessment of RHP.