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Epstein H,. (1984). Ass, mule and onager. In In Manson: Evolution of domesticatd animals. (pp. 174–184).
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Clutton-Brock, J. (1995). Origins of the dog: domestication and early history. In J. A. Serpell (Ed.), The Domestic Dog: Its Evolution, Behaviour and Interactions with People. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Zeder, M. A. (2011). Pathways to animal domestication. In A. Damania, & P. Gepts (Eds.), Harlan II: Biodiversity in Agriculture: Domestication, Evolution, and Sustainability. Davis: University of California.
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Czaran, T. (1999). Game theory and evolutionary ecology: Evolutionary Games & Population Dynamics by J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, and Game Theory & Animal Behaviour, edited by L.A. Dugatkin and H.K. Reeve. Trends. Ecol. Evol, 14(6), 246–247.
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Rubenstein, D. I., & Hack, M. A. (1992). Horse signals: The sounds and scents of fury. Evol. Ecol., 6(3), 254–260.
Abstract: During contests animals typically exchange information about fighting ability. Among feral horses these signals involve olfactory or acoustical elements and each type can effectively terminate contests before physical contact becomes necessary. Dung transplant experiments show that for stallions, irrespective of rank, olfactory signals such as dung sniffing encode information about familiarity suggesting that such signals can be used as signatures. As such they can provide indirect information about fighting ability as long as opponents associate identity with past performance. Play-back experiments, however, show that vocalizations, such as squeals, directly provide information about status regardless of stallion familiarity. Sonographs reveal that squeals of dominants are longer than those of subordinates and that only those of dominants have at their onset high-frequency components.
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Houston, A. I., & McNamara, J. M. (1988). Fighting for food: a dynamic version of the Hawk-Dove game. Evol. Ecol., 2(1), 51–64.
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Packer, C., & Pusey, A. E. (1985). Asymmetric contests in social mammals: respect, manipulation and age-specific aspects. In P. J. Greenwood, M. Slatkin, & (Ed.), Evolution: Essays in Honour of John Maynard Smith (pp. 173–86). Camebridge: Camebridge University Press.
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Bökönyi, S. (1984). Horse. In Manson (Ed.), Evolution of domesticated animals (Vol. 18, pp. 162–173). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
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Rubenstein, D. I.,. (1986). Ecology and sociality in horses and zebras. In D. I. Rubenstein, & R. W. Wrangham (Eds.), Ecological Aspects of Social Evolution (pp. 282–302). Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.
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Dugatkin, L., & Alfieri, M. (1991). Tit-For-Tat in guppies (Poecilia reticulata): the relative nature of cooperation and defection during predator inspection. Evol. Ecol., 5(3), 300–309.
Abstract: Summary The introduction of game-theoretical thinking into evolutionary biology has laid the groundwork for a heuristic view of animal behaviour in which individuals employ “strategies” – rules that instruct them how to behave in a given circumstance to maximize relative fitness. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) found that a strategy called Tit-For-Tat (TFT) is one robust cooperative solution to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. There exists, however, little empirical evidence that animals employ TFT. Predator inspection in fish provides one ecological context in which to examine the use of the TFT strategy.
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