Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.

Abstract: Recent evidence in natural and semi-natural settings has revealed a variety of left-right perceptual asymmetries among vertebrates. These include preferential use of the left or right visual hemifield during activities such as searching for food, agonistic responses, or escape from predators in animals as different as fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals. There are obvious disadvantages in showing such directional asymmetries because relevant stimuli may be located to the animal's left or right at random; there is no a priori association between the meaning of a stimulus (e.g., its being a predator or a food item) and its being located to the animal's left or right. Moreover, other organisms (e.g., predators) could exploit the predictability of behavior that arises from population-level lateral biases. It might be argued that lateralization of function enhances cognitive capacity and efficiency of the brain, thus counteracting the ecological disadvantages of lateral biases in behavior. However, such an increase in brain efficiency could be obtained by each individual being lateralized without any need to align the direction of the asymmetry in the majority of the individuals of the population. Here we argue that the alignment of the direction of behavioral asymmetries at the population level arises as an “evolutionarily stable strategy” under “social” pressures occurring when individually asymmetrical organisms must coordinate their behavior with the behavior of other asymmetrical organisms of the same or different species.

Abstract: Gene expression affects social behavior only through changes in the excitabilities of neural circuits that govern the release of the relevant motor programs. In turn, social behavior affects gene expression only through patterns of sensory stimulation that produce significant activation of relevant portions of the nervous system. In crayfish, social interactions between pairs of animals lead to changes in behavior that mark the formation of a dominance hierarchy. Those changes in behavior result from changes in the excitability of specific neural circuits. In the new subordinate, circuits for offensive behavior become less excitable and those for defensive behavior become more excitable. Serotonin, which is implicated in mechanisms for social dominance in many animals, modulates circuits for escape and avoidance responses in crayfish. The modulatory effects of serotonin on the escape circuits have been found to change with social dominance, becoming excitatory in dominant crayfish and inhibitory in subordinates. These changes in serotonin's effects on escape affect the synaptic response to sensory input of a single cell, the lateral giant (LG) command neuron for escape. Moreover, these changes occur over a 2-week period and for the subordinate are reversible at any time following a reversal of the animal's status. The results have suggested that a persistent change in social status leads to a gradual change in the expression of serotonin receptors to a pattern that is more appropriate for the new status. To test that hypothesis, the expression patterns of crayfish serotonin receptors must be compared in dominant and subordinate animals. Two of potentially five serotonin receptors in crayfish have been cloned, sequenced, and pharmacologically characterized. Measurements of receptor expression in the whole CNS of dominant and subordinate crayfish have produced inconclusive results, probably because each receptor is widespread in the nervous system and is likely to experience opposite expression changes in different areas of the CNS. Both receptors have recently been found in identified neurons that mediate escape responses, and so the next step will be to measure their expression in these identified cells in dominant and subordinate animals.

Abstract: Squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were tested using an expectancy violation procedure to assess whether they use an actor's gaze direction, signaled by congruent head and eye orientation, to predict subsequent behavior. The monkeys visually habituated to a repeated sequence in which the actor (a familiar human or a puppet) looked at an object and then picked it up, but they did not react strongly when the actor looked at an object but then picked up another object. Capuchin monkeys' responses in the puppet condition were slightly more suggestive of expectancy. There was no differential responding to congruent versus incongruent look-touch sequences when familiarization trials were omitted. The weak findings contrast with a strongly positive result previously reported for tamarin monkeys. Additional evidence is required before concluding that behavior prediction based on gaze cues typifies primates; other approaches for studying how they process attention cues are indicated.