Wood, J. N., Glynn, D. D., Phillips, B. C., & Hauser, M. D. (2007). online material (Vol. 317).
Abstract: Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences about a human experimenter's goal by attending to the environmental constraints that guide rational action. These findings rule out simple associative accounts of action perception and show that our capacity to infer rational, goal-directed action likely arose at least as far back as the New World monkeys, some 40 million years ago.
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Dunbar, R. I. M., & Shultz, S. (2007). Evolution in the Social Brain. Science, 317(5843), 1344–1347.
Abstract: The evolution of unusually large brains in some groups of animals, notably primates, has long been a puzzle. Although early explanations tended to emphasize the brain's role in sensory or technical competence (foraging skills, innovations, and way-finding), the balance of evidence now clearly favors the suggestion that it was the computational demands of living in large, complex societies that selected for large brains. However, recent analyses suggest that it may have been the particular demands of the more intense forms of pairbonding that was the critical factor that triggered this evolutionary development. This may explain why primate sociality seems to be so different from that found in most other birds and mammals: Primate sociality is based on bonded relationships of a kind that are found only in pairbonds in other taxa.
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Herrmann, E., Call, J., Hernandez-Lloreda, M. V., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2007). online material. Science, 317(5843), 1360–1366.
Abstract: Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the hypothesis that humans simply have more “general intelligence,” we found that the children and chimpanzees had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world but that the children had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing with the social world.
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Ash, C., Chin, G., Pennisi, E., & Sugden, A. (2007). Living in Societies. Science, 317(5843), 1337–.
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Herrmann, E., Call, J., Hernandez-Lloreda, M. V., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis. Science, 317(5843), 1360–1366.
Abstract: Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the hypothesis that humans simply have more “general intelligence,” we found that the children and chimpanzees had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world but that the children had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing with the social world.
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Jolly, A. (2007). BEHAVIOR: The Social Origin of Mind. Science, 317(5843), 1326–1327.
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McElreath, R., Luttbeg, B., Fogarty, S. P., Brodin, T., & Sih, A. (2007). Evolution of animal personalities. Nature, 450(7167), E5.
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Wolf, M., van Doorn, G. S., Leimar, O., & Weissing, F. J. (2007). Wolf et al. reply. Nature, 450(7167), E5–E6.
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Austin, N. P., & Rogers, L. J. (2007). Asymmetry of flight and escape turning responses in horses. Laterality, 12(5), 464–474.
Abstract: We investigated whether horses display greater reactivity to a novel stimulus presented in the left compared to the right monocular visual field, and whether a population bias exists for escape turning when the same stimulus was presented binocularly. Domestic horses (N=30) were tested on three occasions by a person opening an umbrella five metres away and then approaching. The distance each horse moved away before stopping was measured. Distance was greatest for approach on the left side, indicating right hemisphere control of flight behaviour, and thus followed the same pattern found previously in other species. When order of monocular presentation was considered, an asymmetry was detected. Horses tested initially on the left side exhibited greater reactivity for left approach, whereas horses tested on the right side first displayed no side difference in reactivity. Perhaps left hemisphere inhibition of flight response allowed horses to learn that the stimulus posed no threat and this information was transferred to the right hemisphere. No population bias existed for the direction of escape turning, but horses that turned to the right when approached from the front were found to exhibit longer flight distances than those that turned to the left.
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Ceacero, F., Landete-Castillejos, T., Garcia, A. J., Estevez, J. A., & Gallego, L. (2007). Kinship Discrimination and Effects on Social Rank and Aggressiveness Levels in Iberian Red Deer Hinds. Ethology, 113(12), 1133–1140.
Abstract: Abstract Kin recognition is a widespread phenomenon that allows individuals to benefit by enhancing their inclusive fitness, and one of its most common forms is reducing aggressiveness towards relatives. We carried out an experiment with Iberian red deer hinds (Cervus elaphus hispanicus) in order to examine kin biases in dominance behaviour and its consequences on social rank. Three enclosed groups (n = 36, 23 and 21, respectively) were monitored during two lactation seasons and social rank hierarchies were assessed by analysing aggressive interactions matrices with Matman 1.1 software. Aggressive interactions between related hinds was significantly smaller than expected (chi2 = 5.02, df = 1, p = 0.025), not only between mother and daughter but also in second and third kinship degrees. Although rates of aggressiveness were similar to data published relating free-ranging C. e. scoticus, aggressive interactions with relatives were significantly smaller (chi2 = 39.0, df = 1, p < 0.001). This reduction of aggressiveness between related hinds was not the result of these hinds having a lower social rank: social rank was only related to age and weight, but not to kinship degree, calf sex or calving date. The decrease of aggressiveness towards first-, second- and third-degree relatives shows a complex kin recognition system in deer. Possible nepotistic roles in lactation include preventing milk thefts by non-kin and disturbing feeding of unrelated hinds.
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