Helton, W. S. (2005). Animal expertise, conscious or not. Anim. Cogn., 8(2), 67–74.
Abstract: Rossano (Cognition 89:207, 2003) proposes expertise as an indicator of consciousness in humans and other animals. Since there is strong evidence that the development of expertise requires deliberate practice (Ericsson in The road to excellence: the acquisition of expert performance in the arts and sciences, sports and games 1996), and deliberate practice appears to be outside of the bounds of unconscious processing, then any signs of expertise development in an animal are indicators of consciousness. Rossano's argument may lead to an unsolvable debate about animal consciousness while causing researchers to overlook the underlying reality of animal expertise. This article provides evidence indicative of animals meeting each of the three definitions of expertise established in the scientific literature: expertise as a social construction, expertise as exceptional performance, and expertise as knowledge. In addition, cases of deliberate practice by non-human animals are offered. Acknowledging some animals as experts, regardless of consciousness, is warranted by the research findings and would prove useful in solving many issues remaining in the human expertise literature.
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Straub, A. (2007). An intelligent crow beats a lab. Science, 316(5825), 688.
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Church, R. M. (1997). Quantitative models of animal learning and cognition. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 23(4), 379–389.
Abstract: This article reviews the prerequisites for quantitative models of animal learning and cognition, describes the types of models, provides a rationale for the development of such quantitative models, describes criteria for their evaluation, and makes recommendations for the next generation of quantitative models. A modular approach to the development of models is described in which a procedure is considered as a generator of stimuli and a model is considered as a generator of responses. The goal is to develop models that, in combination with many different procedures, produce sequences of times of occurrence of events (stimuli and responses) that are indistinguishable from those produced by the animal under many experimental procedures and data analysis techniques.
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Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (2004). The role of humans in the cognitive development of apes revisited. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 213–215.
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Hauser, M. D., Kralik, J., Botto-Mahan, C., Garrett, M., & Oser, J. (1995). Self-recognition in primates: phylogeny and the salience of species-typical features. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 92(23), 10811–10814.
Abstract: Self-recognition has been explored in nonlinguistic organisms by recording whether individuals touch a dye-marked area on visually inaccessible parts of their face while looking in a mirror or inspect parts of their body while using the mirror's reflection. Only chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and humans over the age of approximately 2 years consistently evidence self-directed mirror-guided behavior without experimenter training. To evaluate the inferred phylogenetic gap between hominoids and other animals, a modified dye-mark test was conducted with cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), a New World monkey species. The white hair on the tamarins' head was color-dyed, thereby significantly altering a visually distinctive species-typical feature. Only individuals with dyed hair and prior mirror exposure touched their head while looking in the mirror. They looked longer in the mirror than controls, and some individuals used the mirror to observe visually inaccessible body parts. Prior failures to pass the mirror test may have been due to methodological problems, rather than to phylogenetic differences in the capacity for self-recognition. Specifically, an individual's sensitivity to experimentally modified parts of its body may depend crucially on the relative saliency of the modified part (e.g., face versus hair). Moreover, and in contrast to previous claims, we suggest that the mirror test may not be sufficient for assessing the concept of self or mental state attribution in nonlinguistic organisms.
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Pepperberg, I. M. (2002). The value of the Piagetian framework for comparative cognitive studies. Anim. Cogn., 5(3), 177–182.
Abstract: Although the Piagetian framework has been used by numerous researchers to compare cognitive abilities of diverse species, the system is often criticized as implemented. I examine the various criticisms, suggest ways in which the system can be improved, and argue for the need for descriptive systems such as the Piagetian framework to complement programs that look for cellular and molecular bases or mathematical models to explain behavior.
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Morell, V. (2007). Nicola Clayton profile. Nicky and the jays (Vol. 315).
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Weir, A. A. S., Chappell, J., & Kacelnik, A. (2002). Shaping of hooks in New Caledonian crows. Science, 297(5583), 981.
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Mrosovsky, N., & Shettleworth, S. J. (1968). Wavelength preferences and brightness cues in the water finding behaviour of sea turtles. Behaviour, 32(4), 211–257.
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Mallavarapu, S., Stoinski, T. S., Bloomsmith, M. A., & Maple, T. L. (2006). Postconflict behavior in captive western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla). Am. J. Primatol., 68(8), 789–801.
Abstract: Postconflict (PC) behaviors, including reconciliation and consolation, have been observed in many primate and several nonprimate species. Using the PC-matched control (MC) method, PC behavior was examined in two groups (n=13) of captive western lowland gorillas, a species for which no conflict resolution data have been published. Analyses of 223 conflicts showed significantly more affiliation between former opponents after a conflict when compared to control periods, indicating reconciliation. Results also showed significantly more affiliation between the victim and a third-party after a conflict, indicating consolation. Both solicited and unsolicited consolation were observed. The majority of the affiliative interactions observed for both reconciliation and consolation were social proximity, which suggests that unlike most nonhuman primates, proximity, rather than physical contact, may be the main mechanism for resolving conflicts in western lowland gorillas. PC behavior was not uniform throughout the groups, but rather varied according to dyad type.
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