Abstract: Numerous investigators have argued that early ontogenetic immersion in sociocultural environments facilitates cognitive developmental change in human-reared great apes more characteristic of Homo sapiens than of their own species. Such revamping of core, species-typical psychological systems might be manifest, according to this argument, in the emergence of mental representational competencies, a set of social cognitive skills theoretically consigned to humans alone. Human-reared great apes' capacity to engage in “true imitation,” in which both the means and ends of demonstrated actions are reproduced with fairly high rates of fidelity, and laboratory great apes' failure to do so, has frequently been interpreted as reflecting an emergent understanding of intentionality in the former. Although this epigenetic model of the effects of enculturation on social cognitive systems may be well-founded and theoretically justified in the biological literature, alternative models stressing behavioral as opposed to representational change have been largely overlooked. Here I review some of the controversy surrounding enculturation in great apes, and present an alternative nonmentalistic version of the enculturation hypothesis that can also account for enhanced imitative performance on object-oriented problem-solving tasks in human-reared animals.

Abstract: The idea that consistencies in behavior exist over time and across situations underlies human personality research. Although several studies have examined personality in nonhuman primates, there are very few data showing the predictive power of personality factors. The goal of the present study was to determine whether personality dimensions, identified in adult male rhesus monkeys living in half-acre cages, predicted behavior in situations different from the one from which the dimensions were originally derived and at time points of up to 4.5 years after the original assessments. Four personality dimensions (Sociability, Confidence, Excitability, and Equability) were identified using psychometric procedures and were correlated with behaviors recorded in several situations: the animals' natal groups, during tests of behavioral responsiveness while in individual cages, in small stable and unstable social groups, while viewing stimulus videotapes, and during stable social dyads. Results indicated substantial predictability. Sociability reflected a greater tendency to engage in affiliative interactions. Confidence correlated with more aggressive behaviors and with behaviors that suggest less attractiveness. Animals high in Excitability were somewhat inconsistent in their social behavior, perhaps reflecting hyper-responsiveness to novel circumstances and thwarted opportunities for escape. Equability appeared to be related to a less aggressive, more passive, style of interaction. Excitability and Equability appear to reflect more stylistic components of social behavior, whereas Sociability and Confidence may be more content-based dimensions. Sociability was strongly related to size of kin network in the animals' natal groups, suggesting an important role for ontogeny in this dimension. These data suggest that a limited number of personality dimensions exist in adult male rhesus macaques, and that these dimensions have predictive power that is both long-term and cross situational.

Abstract: There has been relatively little research on the psychological mechanisms of social learning. This may be due, in part, to the practice of distinguishing categories of social learning in relation to ill-defined mechanisms (Davis, 1973; Galef, 1988). This practice both makes it difficult to identify empirically examples of different types of social learning, and gives the false impression that the mechanisms responsible for social learning are clearly understood. It has been proposed that social learning phenomena be subsumed within the categorization scheme currently used by investigators of asocial learning. This scheme distinguishes categories of learning according to observable conditions, namely, the type of experience that gives rise to a change in an animal (single stimulus vs. stimulus-stimulus relationship vs. response-reinforcer relationship), and the type of behaviour in which this change is detected (response evocation vs. learnability) (Rescorla, 1988). Specifically, three alignments have been proposed: (i) stimulus enhancement with single stimulus learning, (ii) observational conditioning with stimulus-stimulus learning, or Pavlovian conditioning, and (iii) observational learning with response-reinforcer learning, or instrumental conditioning. If, as the proposed alignments suggest, the conditions of social and asocial learning are the same, there is some reason to believe that the mechanisms underlying the two sets of phenomena are also the same. This is so if one makes the relatively uncontroversial assumption that phenomena which occur under similar conditions tend to be controlled by similar mechanisms. However, the proposed alignments are intended to be a set of hypotheses, rather than conclusions, about the mechanisms of social learning; as a basis for further research in which animal learning theory is applied to social learning. A concerted attempt to apply animal learning theory to social learning, to find out whether the same mechanisms are responsible for social and asocial learning, could lead both to refinements of the general theory, and to a better understanding of the mechanisms of social learning. There are precedents for these positive developments in research applying animal learning theory to food aversion learning (e.g. Domjan, 1983; Rozin & Schull, 1988) and imprinting (e.g. Bolhuis, de Vox & Kruit, 1990; Hollis, ten Cate & Bateson, 1991). Like social learning, these phenomena almost certainly play distinctive roles in the antogeny of adaptive behaviour, and they are customarily regarded as 'special kinds' of learning (Shettleworth, 1993).(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)