Abstract: The concept of personality implies individual differences in behavior and physiology that show some degree of repeatability/consistency over time and across contexts. Most studies of animal personality, particularly studies of individuals' variation in physiological mechanisms, have been conducted on selected individuals in controlled conditions. We attempted to detect consistent behaviors as well as physiological patterns in greylag ganders (Anser anser) from a free-roaming flock living in semi-natural conditions. We tested 10 individuals repeatedly, in a handling trial, resembling tests for characterization of “temperaments” in captive animals. We recorded the behavior of the same 10 individuals during four situations in the socially intact flock: (1) a “low density feeding condition”, (2) a “high density feeding condition”, (3) a “low density post-feeding situation” and (4) while the geese rested. We collected fecal samples for determination of excreted immuno-reactive corticosterone (BM) and testosterone metabolites (TM) after handling trials, as well as the “low density feeding” and the “high density feeding” conditions. BM levels were very highly consistent over the repeats of handling trials, and the “low density feeding condition” and tended to be consistent over the first two repeats of the “high density feeding condition”. Also, BM responses tended to be consistent across contexts. Despite seasonal variation, there tended to be inter-test consistency of TM, which pointed to some individual differences in TM as well. Aggressiveness turned out to be a highly repeatable trait, which was consistent across social situations, and tended to correlate with an individual's resistance during handling trials. Also, “proximity to the female partner” and “sociability” – the average number of neighboring geese in a close distance while resting – were consistent. We conclude that aggressiveness, “affiliative tendencies” and levels of excreted corticosterone and testosterone metabolites may be crucial factors of personality in geese.

Abstract: Social learning is assumed to underlie traditions, yet evidence indicating social learning in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), which exhibit traditions, is sparse. The authors tested capuchins for their ability to learn the value of novel tokens using a previously familiar token-exchange economy. Capuchins change their preferences in favor of a token worth a high-value food reward after watching a conspecific model exchange 2 differentially rewarded tokens, yet they fail to develop a similar preference after watching tokens paired with foods in the absence of a conspecific model. They also fail to learn that the value of familiar tokens has changed. Information about token value is available in all situations, but capuchins seem to pay more attention in a social situation involving novel tokens.

Abstract: The purpose of the present study is to examine the applicability of a computer-generated, virtual animal to study animal cognition. Pigeons were trained to discriminate between movies of a real pigeon and a rat. Then, they were tested with movies of the computer-generated (CG) pigeon. Subjects showed generalization to the CG pigeon, however, they also responded to modified versions in which the CG pigeon was showing impossible movement, namely hopping and walking without its head bobbing. Hence, the pigeons did not attend to these particular details of the display. When they were trained to discriminate between the normal and the modified version of the CG pigeon, they were able to learn the discrimination. The results of an additional partial occlusion test suggest that the subjects used head movement as a cue for the usual vs. unusual CG pigeon discrimination.

Abstract: The hypothesis that the enlarged brain size of the primates was selected for by social, rather than purely ecological, factors has been strongly influential in studies of primate cognition and behaviour over the past two decades. However, the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, also known as the social brain hypothesis, tends to emphasize certain traits and behaviours, like exploitation and deception, at the expense of others, such as tolerance and behavioural coordination, and therefore presents only one view of how social life may shape cognition. This review outlines work from other relevant disciplines, including evolutionary economics, cognitive science and neurophysiology, to illustrate how these can be used to build a more general theoretical framework, incorporating notions of embodied and distributed cognition, in which to situate questions concerning the evolution of primate social cognition.

Abstract: When we talk of the 'nature of intelligence', or any other attribute, we may be referring to its essential structure, or to its place in nature, particularly the function it has evolved to serve. Here I examine both, from the perspective of the evolution of intelligence in primates. Over the last 20 years, the Social (or 'Machiavellian') Intelligence Hypothesis has gained empirical support. Its core claim is that the intelligence of primates is primarily an adaptation to the special complexities of primate social life. In addition to this hypothesis about the function of intellect, a secondary claim is that the very structure of intelligence has been moulded to be 'social' in character, an idea that presents a challenge to orthodox views of intelligence as a general-purpose capacity. I shall outline the principal components of social intelligence and the environment of social complexity it engages with. This raises the question of whether domain specificity is an appropriate characterization of social intelligence and its subcomponents, like theory of mind. As a counter-argument to such specificity I consider the hypothesis that great apes exhibit a cluster of advanced cognitive abilities that rest on a shared capacity for second-order mental representation.