Mushiake H., Saito N., Sakamoto K., Sato Y., & Tanji J. (2001). Visually based path-planning by Japanese monkeys. Cognitive Brain Research, 11, 165–169.
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Hampton, R. R. (2001). Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness. Ethology, 107, 1055–1056.
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Kirkwood, J. K., & Hubrecht, R. (2001). Animal Consciousness, Cognition and Welfare. Animal Welfare, 10, 5–17.
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Dawkins, M. S. (2001). Who Needs Consciousness? Animal Welfare, 10, 19–29.
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Taylor, J. G. (2001). What do Neuronal Network Models of the Mind Indicate about Animal Consciousness? Animal Welfare, 10, 63–75.
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Wemelsfelder, F. (2001). The Inside and Outside Aspects of Consciousness: Complementary Approaches to the Study of Animal Emotion. Animal Welfare, 10, 129–139.
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Lea, S. E. G. (2001). Anticipation and Memory as Criteria for Special Welfare Consideration. Animal Welfare, 10, 195–208.
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Held, S., Mendl, M., Devereux, C., & Byrne, R. W. (2001). Studies in Social Cognition: From Primates to Pigs. Animal Welfare, 10, 209–217.
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Giulotto, E. (2001). Will horse genetics create better champions? Trends Genet., 17, 166.
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Zentall, T. R. (2001). The case for a cognitive approach to animal learning and behavior. Behav Processes, 54(1-3), 65–78.
Abstract: The dangers of hypothesizing about unobservable cognitive mechanisms are well known to behavior analysts. I propose, however, that carefully fashioned cognitive theories that make predictions that are inconsistent with current behavioral theories can provide useful research tools for the understanding of behavior. Furthermore, even if the results of such research may be accommodated by modifying existing behavioral theories, our understanding of behavior is often advanced by the empirical findings because it is unlikely that the research would have been conducted in the absence of such cognitive hypothesizing. Two examples of the development of emergent relations are described: The first deals with the nature of a pigeon's 'representation' of two stimuli both of which are associated with correct responding to a third in a many-to-one matching task (stimulus equivalence or common representations). The second has to do with transitive inference, the emergent relation between two stimuli mediated by their relation to a common stimulus in a simultaneous discrimination.
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