Ronald J. Schusterman, Colleen J. Reichmuth, & David Kastak. (2000). How Animals Classify Friends and Foes. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci., 9, 1–6.
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Thomas R. Zentall. (1999). Animal Cognition: The Bridge BetweenAnimal Learning and Human Cognition. Psychological Science, 10, 206–208.
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Appleby M. (2002). Consciousness, Cognition and Animal Welfare – J.K. Kirkwood, R.C. Hubrecht, S. Wickens, H. O'Leary, S. Oakley (Eds.), Universities Federation for Animal Welfare, 2001, 251 pp., Paperback, Supplement to Volume 10 of Animal Welfare, 15/US$ 30, ISSN 0962-7286. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 77, 239–241.
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Tomasello M., Call J., & Hare B. (2003). Chimpanzees understand psychological states – the question is which ones and to what extent. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 7, 153–156.
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J. David Smith, & David A. Washburn. (2005). Uncertainty Monitoring and Metacognition by Animals. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci., 14, 19–24.
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Josep Call, Brian Hare, Malinda Carpenter, & Michael Tomasello. (2004). `Unwilling' versus `unable': chimpanzees' understanding of human intentional action. Developmental Science, 7, 488–498.
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Gerber, B., & Hendel, T. (2006). Outcome expectations drive learned behaviour in larval Drosophila. Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci., 273(1604), 2965–2968.
Abstract: Why does Pavlov's dog salivate? In response to the tone, or in expectation of food? While in vertebrates behaviour can be driven by expected outcomes, it is unknown whether this is true for non-vertebrates as well. We find that, in the Drosophila larva, odour memories are expressed behaviourally only if animals can expect a positive outcome from doing so. The expected outcome of tracking down an odour is determined by comparing the value of the current situation with the value of the memory for that odour. Memory is expressed behaviourally only if the expected outcome is positive. This uncovers a hitherto unrecognized evaluative processing step between an activated memory trace and behaviour control, and argues that learned behaviour reflects the pursuit of its expected outcome. Shown in a system with a simple brain, an apparently cognitive process like representing the expected outcome of behaviour seems to be a basic feature of behaviour control.
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Hunt, G. R., & Gray, R. D. (2004). The crafting of hook tools by wild New Caledonian crows. Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci., 271, S88–S90.
Abstract: The 'crafting' of tools involves (i) selection of appropriate raw material, (ii) preparatory trimming and (iii) fine, three-dimensional sculpting. Its evolution is technologically important because it allows the open-ended development of tools. New Caledonian crows manufacture an impressive range of stick and leaf tools. We previously reported that their toolkit included hooked implements made from leafy twigs, although their manufacture had never been closely observed. We describe the manufacture of 10 hooked-twig tools by an adult crow and its dependent juvenile. To make all 10 tools, the crows carried out a relatively invariant three-step sequence of complex manipulations that involved (i) the selection of raw material, (ii) trimming and (iii) a lengthy sculpting of the hook. Hooked-twig manufacture contrasts with the lack of sculpting in the making of wooden tools by other non-humans such as chimpanzees and woodpecker finches. This fine, three-stage crafting process removes another alleged difference between humans and other animals.
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Byrne, R. W. (2007). Culture in great apes: using intricate complexity in feeding skills to trace the evolutionary origin of human technical prowess. Phil. Trans. Biol. Sci., 362(1480), 577–585.
Abstract: Geographical cataloguing of traits, as used in human ethnography, has led to the description of “culture” in some non-human great apes. Culture, in these terms, is detected as a pattern of local ignorance resulting from environmental constraints on knowledge transmission. However, in many cases, the geographical variations may alternatively be explained by ecology. Social transmission of information can reliably be identified in many other animal species, by experiment or distinctive patterns in distribution; but the excitement of detecting culture in great apes derives from the possibility of understanding the evolution of cumulative technological culture in humans. Given this interest, I argue that great ape research should concentrate on technically complex behaviour patterns that are ubiquitous within a local population; in these cases, a wholly non-social ontogeny is highly unlikely. From this perspective, cultural transmission has an important role in the elaborate feeding skills of all species of great ape, in conveying the “gist” or organization of skills. In contrast, social learning is unlikely to be responsible for local stylistic differences, which are apt to reflect sensitive adaptations to ecology.
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Emery, N. J., Seed, A. M., von Bayern, A. M. P., & Clayton, N. S. (2007). Cognitive adaptations of social bonding in birds. Phil. Trans. Biol. Sci., 362(1480), 489–505.
Abstract: The “social intelligence hypothesis” was originally conceived to explain how primates may have evolved their superior intellect and large brains when compared with other animals. Although some birds such as corvids may be intellectually comparable to apes, the same relationship between sociality and brain size seen in primates has not been found for birds, possibly suggesting a role for other non-social factors. But bird sociality is different from primate sociality. Most monkeys and apes form stable groups, whereas most birds are monogamous, and only form large flocks outside of the breeding season. Some birds form lifelong pair bonds and these species tend to have the largest brains relative to body size. Some of these species are known for their intellectual abilities (e.g. corvids and parrots), while others are not (e.g. geese and albatrosses). Although socio-ecological factors may explain some of the differences in brain size and intelligence between corvids/parrots and geese/albatrosses, we predict that the type and quality of the bonded relationship is also critical. Indeed, we present empirical evidence that rook and jackdaw partnerships resemble primate and dolphin alliances. Although social interactions within a pair may seem simple on the surface, we argue that cognition may play an important role in the maintenance of long-term relationships, something we name as “relationship intelligence”.
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