Abstract: Domestic dogs, Canis familiaris, have been shown capable of finding hidden food by following pointing gestures made with different parts of the human body. However, previous studies have reported that hand-reared wolves, C. lupus, fail to locate hidden food in response to similar points in the absence of extensive training. The failure of wolves to perform this task has led to the proposal that the ability to understand others' intentions is a derived character in dogs, not present in the ancestral population (wolves). Here we show that wolves, given the right rearing environment and daily interaction with humans, can use momentary distal human pointing cues to find food without training, whereas dogs tested outdoors and dogs at an animal shelter do not follow the same human points. In line with past studies, pet dogs tested indoors were successful in following these points. We also show that the reported failure of wolves in some past studies may be due to differences in the testing environment. Our findings indicate that domestication is not a prerequisite for human-like social cognition in canids, and show the need for additional research on the role of rearing conditions and environmental factors in the development of higher-level cognitive abilities.

Abstract: The question “Why does an animal behave as it does?” can be answered in terms of ontogeny, function, phylogeny and causation. The achievements of applied ethology relative to those four approaches are reviewed, gaps in our knowledge are identified and predictions for fruitful avenues of future research are made. Ontogenic studies have been useful in the past and it is suggested that studies of the effects of early experience on the sexual behaviour of animals used in artificial breeding schemes might pay dividends. It is proposed that functional studies should be approached cautiously. More information is required on the process of domestication in order to increase the chances of success in the trend to farm exotic species. Studies on causation are likely to continue to be the mainstay of applied ethological research. It is suggested that within this category, studies on states of suffering, motivation and cognition are urgently required to answer the most pressing questions on animal welfare.

Abstract: The complex housing environment and the close contact between humans and horses in equine sports place high demands on the learning capacity of horses. To date only limited information is available on the learning ability of the horse including higher order cognition. A type of higher order cognition is to perceive and discriminate quantities. Several mammals and birds have shown to be capable of discriminating objects due to their quantity (Brannon and Roitman, 2003). With regard to horses, there are only few studies available concerning their numerosity judgment (Uller and Lewis, 2009) and this ability is discussed controversially (Henselek et al, 2012). Possibly, the legacy of ‘‘Clever Hans’’ overshadowed further research on numerical capacity in horses, a horse to whom several psychologists incorrectly attributed the capacity of symbolic calculation (Pfungst, 1907; Rosenthal, 1965). In the present study we wanted to show whether Shetland ponies are able to transfer a previously learned concept of sameness to a numerosity judgment. The base of the test design was a “matching to sample” task, where the ponies had learned to relate abstract symbols to another which were presented on a LCD screen. Three Shetland ponies, which previously solved the matching to sample task, were tested in two test phases. In the first test phase different quantities of dots were presented (1 vs. 2; 2 vs. 3; 3 vs. 4; 4 vs. 5). To exclude discrimination due to the shape of the stimuli, the dots were varied in size and arrangement. The stimuli were presented in a triangular arrangement on the LCD screen; the sample stimulus was presented in the middle above and the discrimination stimuli in the two lower corners (S+ and S-). The pony received a food reward, by choosing the positive stimulus (S+). When the negative stimulus (S-) was chosen, the pony entered the next trial. Each learning session consisted of 20 decision trials. To investigate whether the numerosity judgment was transferable to mixed geometrical symbols (tri-, rectangle, rhomb, dot and cross) a second test phase was designed. All of the three Shetland ponies met the learning criterion of the first test phase (80% correct responses in two consecutive sessions) within the first eight sessions. One pony could transfer all judgments to the mixed symbols (up to 4 vs. 5), another pony up to 3 vs. 5 and the third on the level 2 vs. 3. These are the first reported findings that ponies are able to discriminate up to five objects. The numerosity judgment seemed to be easier for the ponies when homogenous objects were presented, than in the case of heterogeneous symbols. The reaction of the ponies occurred within few seconds, suggesting that the animals used subitizing for their numerosity judgment.
Keywords:
Cognition, numerical capacity, numerosity judgment, Shetland ponys
References:
Brannon E, Roitman J (2003) Nonverbal representations of time and number in animals and human infants. In: Meck WH (ed) Functional and neural mechanisms of interval timing. CRC Press, Boca Raton, pp 143–182
Henselek Y, Fischer J, Schloegl C (2012) Does the stimulus type influence horses’ performance in a quantity discrimination task? Front Psychol 3:504
Pfungst O (1907) Der Kluge Hans. Ein Beitrag zur nicht-verbalen Kommunikation. 3rd edn. (reprint of the original 1983) Frankfurter Fachbuchhandlung für Psychologie, Frankfurt
Rosenthal R (1965) Clever Hans: the horse of Mr. Von Osten. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York
Uller C, Lewis J (2009) Horses (Equus caballus) select the greater of two quantities in small numerical sets. Anim Cogn 12:733–738

Abstract: Concerning hunting in chimpanzees, cooperation has generally been attributed to the behaviour of two or more individuals acting together to achieve a common goal (Boesch and Boesch, 1989). The common goal is often considered as the concrete result of a common action by two or several individuals. Although this result could be used as a criterion for cooperation, it could also be an outcome due to chance. We suggest that the goal, viewed as a concrete benefit shared by the partners, is not a requisite of cooperation but rather a possible consequence of a common action largely submitted to social constraints. Individuals engaged in a cooperative task in order to solve a problem have to exchange information to adjust to each other's behaviour. However, evidence of communication between partners during simultaneous cooperation is rare. An experiment in which two chimpanzees each had to simultaneously pull a handle to get a fruit was performed. We analysed not only the concrete result of the partners' activity but also what the individuals took into account before pulling a handle. We tried to specify what the chimpanzees learned by means of a series of logical propositions which we were able to confront the experimental results.

Abstract: We are an intensely social species--it has been argued that our social nature defines what makes us human, what makes us conscious or what gave us our large brains. As a new field, the social brain sciences are probing the neural underpinnings of social behaviour and have produced a banquet of data that are both tantalizing and deeply puzzling. We are finding new links between emotion and reason, between action and perception, and between representations of other people and ourselves. No less important are the links that are also being established across disciplines to understand social behaviour, as neuroscientists, social psychologists, anthropologists, ethologists and philosophers forge new collaborations.