Abstract: Two measures are reported of the nature or quality of a mother-offspring (MO) relationship during development using brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) as models. One is a qualitative classification of MO relationships as secure, resistant, or avoidant attachments. The other is an empirical ratio of relative affiliation to agonism called the MO relationship quality, or MORQ, Index. The two methods tapped similar relationship features so relationships high or low of a median split of MORQ values were heuristically labeled secure (n = 22) or insecure (n = 16), respectively. A comparison revealed extensive behavioral differences between secure and insecure MO relationships and suggested MORQ provided an objective, continuous measure of attachment security.

Abstract: Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) frequently participate in social exchange involving multiple goods and services of variable value, yet they have not been tested in a formalized situation to see whether they can barter using multiple tokens and rewards. We set up a simple barter economy with two tokens and two associated rewards and tested chimpanzees on their ability to obtain rewards by returning the matching token in situations in which their access to tokens was unlimited or limited. Chimpanzees easily learned to associate value with the tokens, as expected, and did barter, but followed a simple strategy of favoring the higher-value token, regardless of the reward proffered, instead of a more complex but more effective strategy of returning the token that matched the reward. This response is similar to that shown by capuchin monkeys in our previous study. We speculate that this response, while not ideal, may be sufficient to allow for stability of the social exchange system in these primates, and that the importance of social barter to both species may have led to this convergence of strategies.

Abstract: Conflict management is one of the primary requirements for social complexity. Of the many forms of conflict management, one of the rarest and most interesting is third-party policing, or intervening impartially to control conflict. Third-party policing should be hard to evolve because policers personally pay a cost for intervening, while the benefits are diffused over the whole group. In this study we investigate the incidence and costs of policing in a primate society. We report quantitative evidence of non-kin policing in the nonhuman primate, the pigtailed macaque. We find that policing is effective at reducing the intensity of or terminating conflict when performed by the most powerful individuals. We define a measure, social power consensus, that predicts effective low-cost interventions by powerful individuals and ineffective, relatively costly interventions by low-power individuals. Finally, we develop a simple probabilistic model to explore whether the degree to which policing can effectively reduce the societal cost of conflict is dependent on variance in the distribution of power. Our data and simple model suggest that third-party policing effectiveness and cost are dependent on power structure and might emerge only in societies with high variance in power.

Abstract: Handclasp grooming is a unique social custom, known to occur regularly among some, but not all populations of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). As with other cultural behaviors, it is assumed that this distinctive grooming posture is learned socially by one individual from another. However, statistical comparisons among factors thought to influence how a behavior spreads within a group have never, to our knowledge, been conducted. In the present study, the origination and spread of handclasp grooming in a group of captive chimpanzees was followed throughout more than 1,500 h of observation over a period of 12 years. We report on the frequency, bout duration, and number and demography of performers throughout the study period, and compare these findings to those reported for wild populations. We predicted that dyads with strong affiliative ties, measured by time spent in proximity to and grooming one another, were likely to develop a handclasp grooming partnership during the study period. A quadratic assignment procedure was used to compare correlations among observed frequencies of grooming and proximity with handclasp grooming in all possible dyads within the group. As predicted, the formation of new handclasp grooming dyads was positively correlated with the rate of overall grooming and proximity within a dyad. In addition, in nearly all dyads formed, at least one individual had been previously observed to handclasp groom. We concluded that affiliation and individual experience determines the transmission of handclasp grooming among captive chimpanzees.

Abstract: Stable cooperation requires that each party's pay-offs exceed those available through individual action. The present experimental study on brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) investigated if decisions about cooperation are (a) guided by the amount of competition expected to follow the cooperation, and (b) made instantaneously or only after a period of familiarization. Pairs of adult monkeys were presented with a mutualistic cooperative task with variable opportunities for resource monopolization (clumped versus dispersed rewards), and partner relationships (kin versus nonkin). After pre-training, each pair of monkeys (N=11) was subjected to six tests, consisting of 15 2 min trials each, with rewards available to both parties. Clumped reward distribution had an immediate negative effect on cooperation: this effect was visible right from the start, and remained visible even if clumped trials alternated with dispersed trials. The drop in cooperation was far more dramatic for nonkin than kin, which was explained by the tendency of dominant nonkin to claim more than half of the rewards under the clumped condition. The immediacy of responses suggests a decision-making process based on predicted outcome of cooperation. Decisions about cooperation thus take into account both the opportunity for and the likelihood of subsequent competition over the spoils.