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Pennisi, E. (1999). Are out primate cousins 'conscious'? (Vol. 284).
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Van Schaik, C. (2006). Why are some animals so smart? Sci Am, 294(4), 64–71.
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Heinrich, B., & Bugnyar, T. (2007). Just how smart are ravens? Sci Am, 296(4), 64–71.
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Cowley, J. J., & Griesel, R. D. (1966). The effect on growth and behaviour of rehabilitating first and second generation low protein rats. Anim. Behav., 14(4), 506–517.
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Sterling, E. J., & Povinelli, D. J. (1999). Tool use, aye-ayes, and sensorimotor intelligence. Folia Primatol (Basel), 70(1), 8–16.
Abstract: Humans, chimpanzees, capuchins and aye-ayes all display an unusually high degree of encephalization and diverse omnivorous extractive foraging. It has been suggested that the high degree of encephalization in aye-ayes may be the result of their diverse, omnivorous extractive foraging behaviors. In combination with certain forms of tool use, omnivorous extractive foraging has been hypothesized to be linked to higher levels of sensorimotor intelligence (stages 5 or 6). Although free-ranging aye-ayes have not been observed to use tools directly in the context of their extractive foraging activities, they have recently been reported to use lianas as tools in a manner that independently suggests that they may possess stage 5 or 6 sensorimotor intelligence. Although other primate species which display diverse, omnivorous extractive foraging have been tested for sensorimotor intelligence, aye-ayes have not. We report a test of captive aye-ayes' comprehension of tool use in a situation designed to simulate natural conditions. The results support the view that aye-ayes do not achieve stage 6 comprehension of tool use, but rather may use trial-and-error learning to develop tool-use behaviors. Other theories for aye-aye encephalization are considered.
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Boice, R. (1981). Behavioral comparability of wild and domesticated rats. Behav Genet, 11(5), 545–553.
Abstract: The oft-repeated concern for the lack of behavioral comparability of domestic rats with wild forms of Rattus norvegicus is unfounded. Laboratory rats appear to show the potential for all wild-type behaviors, including the most dramatic social postures. Moreover, domestics are capable of assuming a feral existence without difficulty, one where they readily behave in a fashion indistinguishable from wild rats. The one behavioral difference that is clearly established concerns performance in laboratory learning paradigms. The superiority of domestics in these laboratory tasks speaks more to quieting the concerns of degeneracy theorists than to problems of using domestic Norway rats as subjects representative of their species.
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Morley, K. I., & Montgomery, G. W. (2001). The genetics of cognitive processes: candidate genes in humans and animals. Behav Genet, 31(6), 511–531.
Abstract: It has been hypothesized that numerous genes contribute to individual variation in human cognition. An extensive search of the scientific literature was undertaken to identify candidate genes which might contribute to this complex trait. A list of over 150 candidate genes that may influence some aspect of cognition was compiled. Some genes are particularly strong candidates based on evidence for involvement in cognitive processes in humans, mice, and Drosophila melanogaster. This survey confirms that many genes are associated with cognitive variation and highlights the potential importance of animal models in the study of human cognition.
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Pennisi, E. (2006). Animal cognition. Man's best friend(s) reveal the possible roots of social intelligence (Vol. 312).
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Huber, L., & Gajdon, G. K. (2006). Technical intelligence in animals: the kea model. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 295–305.
Abstract: The ability to act on information flexibly is one of the cornerstones of intelligent behavior. As particularly informative example, tool-oriented behavior has been investigated to determine to which extent nonhuman animals understand means-end relations, object affordances, and have specific motor skills. Even planning with foresight, goal-directed problem solving and immediate causal inference have been a focus of research. However, these cognitive abilities may not be restricted to tool-using animals but may be found also in animals that show high levels of curiosity, object exploration and manipulation, and extractive foraging behavior. The kea, a New Zealand parrot, is a particularly good example. We here review findings from laboratory experiments and field observations of keas revealing surprising cognitive capacities in the physical domain. In an experiment with captive keas, the success rate of individuals that were allowed to observe a trained conspecific was significantly higher than that of naive control subjects due to their acquisition of some functional understanding of the task through observation. In a further experiment using the string-pulling task, a well-probed test for means-end comprehension, we found the keas finding an immediate solution that could not be improved upon in nine further trials. We interpreted their performance as insightful in the sense of being sensitive of the relevant functional properties of the task and thereby producing a new adaptive response without trial-and-error learning. Together, these findings contribute to the ongoing debate on the distribution of higher cognitive skills in the animal kingdom by showing high levels of sensorimotor intelligence in animals that do not use tools. In conclusion, we suggest that the 'Technical intelligence hypothesis' (Byrne, Machiavellian intelligence II: extensions and evaluations, pp 289-211, 1997), which has been proposed to explain the origin of the ape/monkey grade-shift in intelligence by a selection pressure upon an increased efficiency in foraging behavior, should be extended, that is, applied to some birds as well.
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Mulcahy, N. J., & Call, J. (2006). How great apes perform on a modified trap-tube task. Anim. Cogn., 9(3), 193–199.
Abstract: To date, neither primates nor birds have shown clear evidence of causal knowledge when attempting to solve the trap tube task. One factor that may have contributed to mask the knowledge that subjects may have about the task is that subjects were only allowed to push the reward away from them, which is a particularly difficult action for primates in certain problem solving situations. We presented five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), two chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), two bonobos (Pan paniscus), and one gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) with a modified trap tube that allowed subjects to push or rake the reward with the tool. In two additional follow-up tests, we inverted the tube 180 degrees rendering the trap nonfunctional and also presented subjects with the original task in which they were required to push the reward out of the tube. Results showed that all but one of the subjects preferred to rake the reward. Two orangutans and one chimpanzee (all of whom preferred to rake the reward), consistently avoided the trap only when it was functional but failed the original task. These findings suggest that some great apes may have some causal knowledge about the trap-tube task. Their success, however, depended on whether they were allowed to choose certain tool-using actions.
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