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de Waal, F. B., Uno, H., Luttrell, L. M., Meisner, L. F., & Jeannotte, L. A. (1996). Behavioral retardation in a macaque with autosomal trisomy and aging mother. Am J Ment Retard, 100(4), 378–390.
Abstract: The social development of a female rhesus monkey (Macaca mulatta) was followed from the day of birth until her death, at age 32 months. The subject, born to an older mother, had an extra autosome (karyotype: 43, XX, +18), an affliction that came about spontaneously. MRI scans revealed that she was also hydrocephalic. Compared to 23 female monkeys growing up under identical conditions, the subject showed serious motor deficiencies, a dramatic delay in the development of social behavior, poorly established dominance relationships, and greater than usual dependency on mother and kin. The subject was well-integrated into the social group, however.
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Pell, S. M., & McGreevy, P. D. (1999). Prevalence of stereotypic and other problem behaviours in thoroughbred horses. Aust Vet J, 77(10), 678–679.
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Momozawa, Y., Takeuchi, Y., Tozaki, T., Kikusui, T., Hasegawa, T., Raudsepp, T., et al. (2007). SNP detection and radiation hybrid mapping in horses of nine candidate genes for temperament. Anim Genet, 38(1), 81–83.
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Heschl, A., & Burkart, J. (2006). A new mark test for mirror self-recognition in non-human primates. Primates, 47(3), 187–198.
Abstract: For 30 years Gallup's (Science 167:86-87, 1970) mark test, which consists of confronting a mirror-experienced test animal with its own previously altered mirror image, usually a color mark on forehead, eyebrow or ear, has delivered valuable results about the distribution of visual self-recognition in non-human primates. Chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans and, less frequently, gorillas can learn to correctly understand the reflection of their body in a mirror. However, the standard version of the mark test is good only for positively proving the existence of self-recognition. Conclusive statements about the lack of self-recognition are more difficult because of the methodological constraints of the test. This situation has led to a persistent controversy about the power of Gallup's original technique. We devised a new variant of the test which permits more unequivocal decisions about both the presence and absence of self-recognition. This new procedure was tested with marmoset monkeys (Callithrix jacchus), following extensive training with mirror-related tasks to facilitate performance in the standard mark test. The results show that a slightly altered mark test with a new marking substance (chocolate cream) can help to reliably discriminate between true negative results, indicating a real lack of ability to recognize oneself in a mirror, from false negative results that are due to methodological particularities of the standard test. Finally, an evolutionary hypothesis is put forward as to why many primates can use a mirror instrumentally – i.e. know how to use it for grasping at hidden objects – while failing in the decisive mark test.
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Marchal, P., & Anderson, J. R. (1993). Mirror-image responses in capuchin monkeys (Cebus capucinus): social responses and use of reflected environmental information. Folia Primatol (Basel), 61(3), 165–173.
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Pennisi, E. (1999). Are out primate cousins 'conscious'? (Vol. 284).
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Soproni, K., Miklósi, A., Topál, J., & Csányi, V. (2001). Comprehension of human communicative signs in pet dogs (Canis familiaris). J Comp Psychol, 115(2), 122–126.
Abstract: On the basis of a study by D. J. Povinelli, D. T. Bierschwale, and C. G. Cech (1999), the performance of family dogs (Canis familiaris) was examined in a 2-way food choice task in which 4 types of directional cues were given by the experimenter: pointing and gazing, head-nodding (“at target”), head turning above the correct container (“above target”), and glancing only (“eyes only”). The results showed that the performance of the dogs resembled more closely that of the children in D. J. Povinelli et al.'s study, in contrast to the chimpanzees' performance in the same study. It seems that dogs, like children, interpret the test situation as being a form of communication. The hypothesis is that this similarity is attributable to the social experience and acquired social routines in dogs because they spend more time in close contact with humans than apes do, and as a result dogs are probably more experienced in the recognition of human gestures.
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Crook, J. H. (1983). On attributing consciousness to animals. Nature, 303(5912), 11–14.
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Whiten, A., Goodall, J., McGrew, W. C., Nishida, T., Reynolds, V., Sugiyama, Y., et al. (1999). Cultures in chimpanzees. Nature, 399(6737), 682–685.
Abstract: As an increasing number of field studies of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have achieved long-term status across Africa, differences in the behavioural repertoires described have become apparent that suggest there is significant cultural variation. Here we present a systematic synthesis of this information from the seven most long-term studies, which together have accumulated 151 years of chimpanzee observation. This comprehensive analysis reveals patterns of variation that are far more extensive than have previously been documented for any animal species except humans. We find that 39 different behaviour patterns, including tool usage, grooming and courtship behaviours, are customary or habitual in some communities but are absent in others where ecological explanations have been discounted. Among mammalian and avian species, cultural variation has previously been identified only for single behaviour patterns, such as the local dialects of song-birds. The extensive, multiple variations now documented for chimpanzees are thus without parallel. Moreover, the combined repertoire of these behaviour patterns in each chimpanzee community is itself highly distinctive, a phenomenon characteristic of human cultures but previously unrecognised in non-human species.
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Fetterman, J. G. (1996). Dimensions of stimulus complexity. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 22(1), 3–18.
Abstract: Animal learning research has increasingly used complex stimuli that approximate natural objects, events, and locations, a trend that has accompanied a resurgence of interest in the role of cognitive factors in learning. Accounts of complex stimulus control have focused mainly on cognitive mechanisms and largely ignored the contribution of stimulus information to perception and memory for complex events. It is argued here that research on animal learning stands to benefit from a more detailed consideration of the stimulus and that James Gibson's stimulus-centered theory of perception serves as a useful framework for analyses of complex stimuli. Several issues in the field of animal learning and cognition are considered from the Gibsonian perspective on stimuli, including the fundamental problem of defining the effective stimulus.
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