Abstract: Imitation can be defined as the copying of behavior. To a biologist, interest in imitation is focused on its adaptive value for the survival of the organism, but to a psychologist, the mechanisms responsible for imitation are the most interesting. For psychologists, the most important cases of imitation are those that involve demonstrated behavior that the imitator cannot see when it performs the behavior (e.g., scratching one's head). Such examples of imitation are sometimes referred to as opaque imitation because they are difficult to account for without positing cognitive mechanisms, such as perspective taking, that most animals have not been acknowledged to have. The present review first identifies various forms of social influence and social learning that do not qualify as opaque imitation, including species-typical mechanisms (e.g., mimicry and contagion), motivational mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, incentive motivation, transfer of fear), attentional mechanisms (e.g., local enhancement, stimulus enhancement), imprinting, following, observational conditioning, and learning how the environment works (affordance learning). It then presents evidence for different forms of opaque imitation in animals, and identifies characteristics of human imitation that have been proposed to distinguish it from animal imitation. Finally, it examines the role played in opaque imitation by demonstrator reinforcement and observer motivation. Although accounts of imitation have been proposed that vary in their level of analysis from neural to cognitive, at present no theory of imitation appears to be adequate to account for the varied results that have been found.

Abstract: Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have learned, like humans, to use an uncertain response adaptively under test conditions that create uncertainty, suggesting a metacognitive process by which human and nonhuman primates may monitor their confidence and alter their behavior accordingly. In this study, 4 rhesus monkeys generalized their use of the uncertain response, without additional training, to 2 familiar tasks (2-choice discrimination learning and mirror-image matching to sample) that predictably and demonstrably produce uncertainty. The monkeys were significantly less likely to use the uncertain response on trials in which the answer might be known. These results indicate that monkeys, like humans, know when they do not know and that they can learn to use a symbol as a generalized means for indicating their uncertainty.

Abstract: Investigation of tool use is an effective way to determine cognitive abilities of animals. This approach raises hypotheses, which delineate limits of animal's competence in understanding of objects properties and interrelations and the influence of individual and social experience on their behaviour. On the basis of brief review of different models of manipulation with objects and tools manufacturing (detaching, subtracting and reshaping) by various animals (from elephants to ants) in natural conditions the experimental data concerning tool usage was considered. Tool behaviour of anumals could be observed rarely and its distribution among different taxons is rather odd. Recent studies have revealed that some species (for instance, bonobos and tamarins) which didn't manipulate tools in wild life appears to be an advanced tool users and even manufacturers in laboratory. Experimental studies of animals tool use include investigation of their ability to use objects physical properties, to categorize objects involved in tool activity by its functional properties, to take forces affecting objects into account, as well as their capacity of planning their actions. The crucial question is whether animals can abstract general principles of relations between objects regardless of the exact circumstances, or they develop specific associations between concerete things and situations. Effectiveness of laboratory methods is estimated in the review basing on comparative studies of tool behaviour, such as “support problem”, “stick problem”, “tube- and tube-trap problem”, and “reserve tube problem”. Levels of social learning, the role of imprinting, and species-specific predisposition to formation of specific domains are discussed. Experimental investigation of tool use allows estimation of the individuals' intelligence in populations. A hypothesis suggesting that strong predisposition to formation of specific associations can serve as a driving force and at the same time as obstacle to animals' activity is discussed. In several “technically gifted” species (such as woodpecker finches, New Caledonian crows, and chimpanzees) tool use seems to be guided by a rapid process of trial and error learning. Individuals that are predisposed to learn specific connections do this too quickly and thus become enslaved by stereotypic solutions of raising problems.

Abstract: We investigated the potential relationships between foraging strategies and relative brain and brain region volumes in predatory (animal-eating) echolocating bats. The species we considered represent the ancestral state for the order and approximately 70% of living bat species. The two dominant foraging strategies used by echolocating predatory bats are substrate-gleaning (taking prey from surfaces) and aerial hawking (taking airborne prey). We used species-specific behavioral, morphological, and ecological data to classify each of 59 predatory species as one of the following: (1) ground gleaning, (2) behaviorally flexible (i.e., known to both glean and hawk prey), (3) clutter tolerant aerial hawking, or (4) open-space aerial hawking. In analyses using both species level data and phylogenetically independent contrasts, relative brain size was larger in behaviorally flexible species. Further, relative neocortex volume was significantly reduced in bats that aerially hawk prey primarily in open spaces. Conversely, our foraging behavior index did not account for variability in hippocampus and inferior colliculus volume and we discuss these results in the context of past research.

Abstract: In a previous study, Kuroshima and colleagues demonstrated that capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) learned to discriminate between a “knower” who inspected a box for food, and a “guesser” who did not. The aim of the present study was to specify whether the subjects learned a simple conditional discrimination or a causal relationship that seeing leads to knowing. In experiment 1, we introduced five types of novel containers to two subjects. Each container was of different shape and color. The subjects gradually learned to reach toward the container the knower suggested. In experiment 2, we diversified the behavior of the knower and the guesser. In experiment 3, in order to eliminate the possibility of discrimination based on differences in the magnitude and the complexity of two trainers, we equated their behaviors. One subject adapted to the novel behaviors of the knower and the guesser, successfully discriminating the two trainers. Thus this monkey clearly learned to use the inspecting action of the knower and the non-inspecting action of the guesser as a discriminative cue to recognize the baited container. This result suggests that one capuchin monkey learned to recognize the relationship between seeing and knowing.