Abstract: In the wake of telling critiques of the foundations on which earlier conclusions were based, the last 15 years have witnessed a renaissance in the study of social learning in apes. As a result, we are able to review 31 experimental studies from this period in which social learning in chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans has been investigated. The principal question framed at the beginning of this era, Do apes ape? has been answered in the affirmative, at least in certain conditions. The more interesting question now is, thus, How do apes ape? Answering this question has engendered richer taxonomies of the range of social-learning processes at work and new methodologies to uncover them. Together, these studies suggest that apes ape by employing a portfolio of alternative social-learning processes in flexibly adaptive ways, in conjunction with nonsocial learning. We conclude by sketching the kind of decision tree that appears to underlie the deployment of these alternatives.

Abstract: The maze learning ability of six pony foals that had been weaned at birth was compared to that of six foals reared normally. The foals' learning ability was also compared to their mothers' learning ability at the same task; the correct turn in a single choice point maze. The maze learning test was conducted when the foals were 6 to 8 mo old and after the mothered foals had been weaned. There was no significant difference between the ability of orphaned (weaned at birth) and mothered foals in their ability to learn to turn left (6 +/- .7 and 5.1 +/- .1 trials, respectively) or to learn the reversal, to turn right (6.7 +/- .6 and 6.2 +/- .6 trials, respectively). The orphan foals spent significantly more time in the maze in their first exposure to it than the mothered foals (184 +/- 42 vs 55 +/- 15 s. Mann Whitney U = 7, P less than .05). The mothers of the foals (n = 11) learned to turn left as rapidly as the foals (5.9 +/- .7 trials), but they were slower to learn to turn right (9.8 +/- 1.4 vs 6.4 +/- .4 trials, Mann Whitney U = 33, P less than .05), indicating that the younger horses learned more rapidly. There was no correlation between the trials to criteria of the mare and those of her foal, but there was a significant negative correlation between rank in trials to criteria and age (r = -65, P less than .05) when data from the mare and foal trials were combined. The dominance hierarchy of the mares was determined using a paired feeding test in which two horses competed for one bucket of feed. Although there was no correlation between rank in the hierarchy and maze learning ability, there was a correlation between body weight and rank in the hierarchy (r = .7, P less than .05). This may indicate either that heavier horses are likely to be dominant or that horses high in dominance gain more weight. Maternal deprivation did not appear to seriously retard learning of a simple maze by foals, although the orphans moved more slowly initially. The lack of maternal influence on learning is also reflected in the lack of correlation between the mare's learning ability and that of her foal. Young horses appear to learn more rapidly than older horses.

Abstract: Despite the obvious benefits of directed mechanisms that facilitate the efficient transfer of skills, there is little critical evidence for teaching in nonhuman animals. Using observational and experimental data, we show that wild meerkats (Suricata suricatta) teach pups prey-handling skills by providing them with opportunities to interact with live prey. In response to changing pup begging calls, helpers alter their prey-provisioning methods as pups grow older, thus accelerating learning without the use of complex cognition. The lack of evidence for teaching in species other than humans may reflect problems in producing unequivocal support for the occurrence of teaching, rather than the absence of teaching.

Abstract: Rossano (Cognition 89:207, 2003) proposes expertise as an indicator of consciousness in humans and other animals. Since there is strong evidence that the development of expertise requires deliberate practice (Ericsson in The road to excellence: the acquisition of expert performance in the arts and sciences, sports and games 1996), and deliberate practice appears to be outside of the bounds of unconscious processing, then any signs of expertise development in an animal are indicators of consciousness. Rossano's argument may lead to an unsolvable debate about animal consciousness while causing researchers to overlook the underlying reality of animal expertise. This article provides evidence indicative of animals meeting each of the three definitions of expertise established in the scientific literature: expertise as a social construction, expertise as exceptional performance, and expertise as knowledge. In addition, cases of deliberate practice by non-human animals are offered. Acknowledging some animals as experts, regardless of consciousness, is warranted by the research findings and would prove useful in solving many issues remaining in the human expertise literature.

Abstract: The 2-action method was used to examine whether imitative learning in Japanese quail (Coturnix japonica) depends on the motivational state of the observer quail at the time of observation of the demonstrated behavior. Two groups of observers were fed before observation (satiated groups), whereas 2 other groups of observers were deprived of food before observation (hungry groups). Quail were tested either immediately following observation or after a 30-min delay. Results indicated that quail in the hungry groups imitated, whereas those in the satiated groups did not, regardless of whether their test was immediate or delayed. The results suggest that observer quail may not learn (through observation) behavior that leads to a reinforcer for which they are unmotivated at the time of test. In addition, the results show that quail are able to delay the performance of a response acquired through observation (i.e., they show deferred imitation).