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Hobaiter, C., & Byrne, R. (2011). The gestural repertoire of the wild chimpanzee. Anim. Cogn., 14(5), 745–767.
Abstract: Great ape gestural communication is known to be intentional, elaborate and flexible; yet there is controversy over the best interpretation of the system and how gestures are acquired, perhaps because most studies have been made in restricted, captive settings. Here, we report the first systematic analysis of gesture in a population of wild chimpanzees. Over 266 days of observation, we recorded 4,397 cases of intentional gesture use in the Sonso community, Budongo, Uganda. We describe 66 distinct gesture types: this estimate appears close to asymptote, and the Sonso repertoire includes most gestures described informally at other sites. Differences in repertoire were noted between individuals and age classes, but in both cases, the measured repertoire size was predicted by the time subjects were observed gesturing. No idiosyncratic usages were found, i.e. no gesture type was used only by one individual. No support was found for the idea that gestures are acquired by ‘ontogenetic ritualization’ from originally effective actions; moreover, in detailed analyses of two gestures, action elements composing the gestures did not closely match those of the presumed original actions. Rather, chimpanzee gestures are species-typical; indeed, many are ‘family-typical’, because gesture types recorded in gorillas, orangutans and chimpanzee overlap extensively, with 24 gestures recorded in all three genera. Nevertheless, chimpanzee gestures are used flexibly across a range of contexts and show clear adjustment to audience (e.g. silent gestures for attentive targets, contact gestures for inattentive ones). Such highly intentional use of a species-typical repertoire raises intriguing questions for the evolution of advanced communication.
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Byrne, R. W., & Bates, L. A. (2006). Why are animals cognitive? Curr Biol, 16(12), R445–8.
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Topál, J., Byrne, R. W., Miklósi, Á., & Csányi, V. (2006). Reproducing human actions and action sequences: “Do as I Do!” in a dog. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 355–367.
Abstract: We present evidence that a dog (Philip, a 4-year-old tervueren) was able to use different human actions as samples against which to match his own behaviour. First, Philip was trained to repeat nine human-demonstrated actions on command ('Do it!'). When his performance was markedly over chance in response to demonstration by one person, testing with untrained action sequences and other demonstrators showed some ability to generalise his understanding of copying. In a second study, we presented Philip with a sequence of human actions, again using the 'Do as I do' paradigm. All demonstrated actions had basically the same structure: the owner picked up a bottle from one of six places; transferred it to one of the five other places and then commanded the dog ('Do it!'). We found that Philip duplicated the entire sequence of moving a specific object from one particular place to another more often than expected by chance. Although results point to significant limitations in his imitative abilities, it seems that the dog could have recognized the action sequence, on the basis of observation alone, in terms of the initial state, the means, and the goal. This suggests that dogs might acquire abilities by observation that enhance their success in complex socio-behavioural situations.
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Held, S., Baumgartner, J., Kilbride, A., Byrne, R. W., & Mendl, M. (2005). Foraging behaviour in domestic pigs (Sus scrofa): remembering and prioritizing food sites of different value. Anim. Cogn., 8(2), 114–121.
Abstract: This experiment investigated whether domestic pigs can remember the locations of food sites of different relative value, and how a restricted retrieval choice affects their foraging behaviour. Nine juvenile female pigs were trained to relocate two food sites out of a possible eight in a spatial memory task. The two baited sites contained different amounts of food and an obstacle was added to the smaller amount to increase handling time. On each trial, a pig searched for the two baited sites (search visit). Once it had found and eaten the bait, it returned for a second (relocation) visit, in which the two same sites were baited. Baited sites were changed between trials. All subjects learnt the task. When allowed to retrieve both baits, the subjects showed no preference for retrieving a particular one first (experiment 1). When they were allowed to retrieve only one bait, a significant overall preference for retrieving the larger amount emerged across subjects (experiment 2). To test whether this preference reflected an avoidance of the obstacle with the smaller bait, 15 choice-restricted control trials were conducted. In control trials obstacles were present with both baits. Pigs continued to retrieve the larger bait, indicating they had discriminated between the two food sites on the basis of quantity or profitability and adjusted their behaviour accordingly when the relocation choice was restricted. This suggests for the first time that domestic pigs have the ability to discriminate between food sites of different relative value and to remember their respective locations.
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Bates, L. A., & Byrne, R. W. (2007). Creative or created: Using anecdotes to investigate animal cognition. Methods, 42(1), 12–21.
Abstract: In non-human animals, creative behaviour occurs spontaneously only at low frequencies, so is typically missed by standardised observational methods. Experimental approaches have tended to rely overly on paradigms from child development or adult human cognition, which may be inappropriate for species that inhabit very different perceptual worlds and possess quite different motor capacities than humans. The analysis of anecdotes offers a solution to this impasse, provided certain conditions are met. To be reliable, anecdotes must be recorded immediately after observation, and only the records of scientists experienced with the species and the individuals concerned should be used. Even then, interpretation of a single record is always ambiguous, and analysis is feasible only when collation of multiple records shows that a behaviour pattern occurs repeatedly under similar circumstances. This approach has been used successfully to study a number of creative capacities of animals: the distribution, nature and neural correlates of deception across the primate order; the occurrence of teaching in animals; and the neural correlates of several aptitudes--in birds, foraging innovation, and in primates, innovation, social learning and tool-use. Drawing on these approaches, we describe the use of this method to investigate a new problem, the cognition of the African elephant, a species whose sheer size and evolutionary distance from humans renders the conventional methods of comparative psychology of little use. The aim is both to chart the creative cognitive capacities of this species, and to devise appropriate experimental methods to confirm and extend previous findings.
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Byrne, R. W. (2002). Imitation of novel complex actions: What does the evidence from animals mean? In C. T. Snowdon, T. J. Roper, & J. S. Rosenblatt (Eds.), Advances in the Study of Behavior (Vol. 31, pp. 77–105). San Diego: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary Underlying the various behaviors that are classified as imitation, there may be several distinct mechanisms, differing in adaptive function, cognitive basis, and computational power. Experiments reporting “true motor imitation” in animals do not as yet give evidence of production learning by imitation; instead, contextual imitation can explain their data, and this can be explained by a simple mechanism (response facilitation) which matches known neural findings. When imitation serves a function in social mimicry, which applies to a wide range of phenomena from neonatal imitation in humans and great apes to pair-bonding in some bird species, the fidelity of the behavioral match is crucial. Learning of novel behavior can potentially be achieved by matching the outcome of a model's action, and it is argued that vocal imitation by birds is a clear example of this method (which is sometimes called emulation). Alternatively, the behavior itself may be perceived in terms of actions that the observer can perform, and thus it may be copied. If the imitation is linear and stringlike (action level), following the surface form rather than the underlying plan, then its utility for learning new instrumental methods is limited. However, the underlying plan of hierarchically organized behavior is visible in output behavior, in subtle but detectable ways, and imitation could instead be based on this organization (program level), extracted automatically by string parsing. Currently, the most likely candidates for such capacities are all great apes. It is argued that this ability to perceive the underlying plan of action, in addition to allowing highly flexible imitation of novel instrumental methods, may have resulted in the competence to understand the intentions (theory of mind) of others.
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Byrne, R. W. (2009). Animal imitation. Current Biology, 19(3), R111–R114.
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Ruiz, A., Gómez, J., Roeder, J., & Byrne, R. (2009). Gaze following and gaze priming in lemurs. Anim. Cogn., 12(3), 427–434.
Abstract: Abstract  Although primates have often been found to co-orient visually with other individuals, members of these same species have usually failed to use co-orientation to find hidden food in object-choice experiments. This presents an evolutionary puzzle: what is the function of co-orientation if it is not used for a function as basic as locating resources? Co-orientation responses have not been systematically investigated in object-choice experiments, and requiring co-orientation with humans (as is typical in object-choice tasks) may underestimate other species’ abilities. Using an object-choice task with conspecific models depicted in photographs, we provide experimental evidence that two lemur species (Eulemur fulvus, n = 4, and Eulemur macaco, n = 2) co-orient with conspecifics. Secondly, by analysing together two measures that have traditionally been examined separately, we show that lemurs’ gaze following behaviour and ultimate choice are closely linked. Individuals were more likely to choose correctly after having looked in the same direction as the model, and thus chose objects correctly more often than chance. We propose a candidate system for the evolutionary origins of more complex gaze following: ‘gaze priming.’
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Bates, L. A., Lee, P. C., Njiraini, N., Poole, J. H., Sayialel, K., Sayialel, S., et al. (2008). Do Elephants Show Empathy? J Conscious Stud, 15(10-11), 204–225.
Abstract: Elephants show a rich social organization and display a number of unusual traits. In this paper, we analyse reports collected over a thirty-five year period, describing behaviour that has the potential to reveal signs of empathic understanding. These include coalition formation, the offering of protection and comfort to others, retrieving and 'babysitting' calves, aiding individuals that would otherwise have difficulty in moving, and removing foreign objects attached to others. These records demonstrate that an elephant is capable of diagnosing animacy and goal directedness, and is able to understand the physical competence, emotional state and intentions of others, when they differ from its own. We argue that an empathic understanding of others is the simplest explanation of these abilities, and discuss reasons why elephants appear to show empathy more than other non-primate species.
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Byrne, R. W. (2000). How monkeys find their way: leadership, coordination, and cognitive maps of African baboons. In S. Boinski, & P. A. Garber (Eds.), On the Move: How and Why Animals Travel in Groups (pp. 491–518). Chicago: Chicago University Press.
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