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A. Wiggins, & K. Crowston. (2011). From Conservation to Crowdsourcing: A Typology of Citizen Science. In 2011 44th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (pp. 1–10). 2011 44th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences.
Abstract: Citizen science is a form of research collaboration involving members of the public in scientific research projects to address real-world problems. Often organized as a virtual collaboration, these projects are a type of open movement, with collective goals addressed through open participation in research tasks. Existing typologies of citizen science projects focus primarily on the structure of participation, paying little attention to the organizational and macrostructural properties that are important to designing and managing effective projects and technologies. By examining a variety of project characteristics, we identified five types-Action, Conservation, Investigation, Virtual, and Education- that differ in primary project goals and the importance of physical environment to participation.
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2015). Social cognition. Animal Behaviour, 103, 191–202.
Abstract: The social intelligence hypothesis argues that competition and cooperation among individuals have shaped the evolution of cognition in animals. What do we mean by social cognition? Here we suggest that the building blocks of social cognition are a suite of skills, ordered roughly according to the cognitive demands they place upon individuals. These skills allow an animal to recognize others by various means; to recognize and remember other animals' relationships; and, perhaps, to attribute mental states to them. Some skills are elementary and virtually ubiquitous in the animal kingdom; others are more limited in their taxonomic distribution. We treat these skills as the targets of selection, and assume that more complex levels of social cognition evolve only when simpler methods are inadequate. As a result, more complex levels of social cognition indicate greater selective pressures in the past. The presence of each skill can be tested directly through field observations and experiments. In addition, the same methods that have been used to compare social cognition across species can also be used to measure individual differences within species and to test the hypothesis that individual differences in social cognition are linked to differences in reproductive success.
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Duncan, I. J. H. (1995). D.G.M. Wood-Gush Memorial Lecture: An applied ethologist looks at the question “Why?”. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 44(2-4), 205–217.
Abstract: The question “Why does an animal behave as it does?” can be answered in terms of ontogeny, function, phylogeny and causation. The achievements of applied ethology relative to those four approaches are reviewed, gaps in our knowledge are identified and predictions for fruitful avenues of future research are made. Ontogenic studies have been useful in the past and it is suggested that studies of the effects of early experience on the sexual behaviour of animals used in artificial breeding schemes might pay dividends. It is proposed that functional studies should be approached cautiously. More information is required on the process of domestication in order to increase the chances of success in the trend to farm exotic species. Studies on causation are likely to continue to be the mainstay of applied ethological research. It is suggested that within this category, studies on states of suffering, motivation and cognition are urgently required to answer the most pressing questions on animal welfare.
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Massen, J., Sterck, E., & de Vos, H. (2010). Close social associations in animals and humans: functions and mechanisms of friendship (Vol. 147).
Abstract: Both humans and group-living animals associate and behave affiliatively more with some individuals than others. Human friendship has long been acknowledged, and recently scientists studying animal behaviour have started using the term friendship for close social associates in animals. Yet, while biologists describe friends as social tools to enhance fitness, social scientists describe human friendship as unconditional. We investigate whether these different descriptions reflect true differences in human friendship and animal close social associations or are a by-product of different research approaches: namely social scientists focussing on proximate and biologists on ultimate explanations. We first stress the importance of similar measures to determine close social associations, thereafter examine their ultimate benefits and proximate motivations, and discuss the latest findings on the central-neural regulation of social bonds. We conclude that both human friendship and animal close social associations are ultimately beneficial. On the proximate level, motivations for friendship in humans and for close social associations in animals are not necessarily based on benefits and are often unconditional. Moreover, humans share with many animals a similar physiological basis of sociality. Therefore, biologists and social scientist describe the same phenomenon, and the use of the term friendship for animals seems justified.
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Mateo, J. M., & Johnston, R. E. (2003). Kin recognition by self-referent phenotype matching: weighing the evidence. Anim. Cogn., 6(1), 73–76.
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Hauber, M. E., & Sherman, P. W. (2003). Designing and interpreting experimental tests of self-referent phenotype matching. Anim. Cogn., 6(1), 69–71.
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Watanabe, S., & Troje, N. F. (2006). Towards a “virtual pigeon”: a new technique for investigating avian social perception. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 271–279.
Abstract: The purpose of the present study is to examine the applicability of a computer-generated, virtual animal to study animal cognition. Pigeons were trained to discriminate between movies of a real pigeon and a rat. Then, they were tested with movies of the computer-generated (CG) pigeon. Subjects showed generalization to the CG pigeon, however, they also responded to modified versions in which the CG pigeon was showing impossible movement, namely hopping and walking without its head bobbing. Hence, the pigeons did not attend to these particular details of the display. When they were trained to discriminate between the normal and the modified version of the CG pigeon, they were able to learn the discrimination. The results of an additional partial occlusion test suggest that the subjects used head movement as a cue for the usual vs. unusual CG pigeon discrimination.
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de Waal, F. B. M. (2004). Peace lessons from an unlikely source. PLoS. Biol., 2(4), E101.
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de Waal, F. B. M. (2003). Silent invasion: Imanishi's primatology and cultural bias in science. Anim. Cogn., 6(4), 293–299.
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Hauser, M. D., Kralik, J., Botto-Mahan, C., Garrett, M., & Oser, J. (1995). Self-recognition in primates: phylogeny and the salience of species-typical features. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 92(23), 10811–10814.
Abstract: Self-recognition has been explored in nonlinguistic organisms by recording whether individuals touch a dye-marked area on visually inaccessible parts of their face while looking in a mirror or inspect parts of their body while using the mirror's reflection. Only chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and humans over the age of approximately 2 years consistently evidence self-directed mirror-guided behavior without experimenter training. To evaluate the inferred phylogenetic gap between hominoids and other animals, a modified dye-mark test was conducted with cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), a New World monkey species. The white hair on the tamarins' head was color-dyed, thereby significantly altering a visually distinctive species-typical feature. Only individuals with dyed hair and prior mirror exposure touched their head while looking in the mirror. They looked longer in the mirror than controls, and some individuals used the mirror to observe visually inaccessible body parts. Prior failures to pass the mirror test may have been due to methodological problems, rather than to phylogenetic differences in the capacity for self-recognition. Specifically, an individual's sensitivity to experimentally modified parts of its body may depend crucially on the relative saliency of the modified part (e.g., face versus hair). Moreover, and in contrast to previous claims, we suggest that the mirror test may not be sufficient for assessing the concept of self or mental state attribution in nonlinguistic organisms.
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