Abstract: Individual recognition has been attributed a crucial role in the evolution of complex social systems such as helping behaviour and cooperation. A classical example for interspecific cooperation is the mutualism between the cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus and its client reef fish species. For stable cooperation to evolve, it is generally assumed that partners interact repeatedly and remember each other's past behaviour. Repeated interactions may be achieved by site fidelity or individual recognition. However, as some cleaner fish have more than 2,300 interactions per day with various individuals per species and various species of clients, basic assumptions of cooperation theory might be violated in this mutualism. We tested the cleaner L. dimidiatus and its herbivorous client, the surgeon fish Ctenochaetus striatus, for their ability to distinguish between a familiar and an unfamiliar partner in a choice experiment. Under natural conditions, cleaners and clients have to build up their relationship, which is probably costly for both. We therefore predicted that both clients and cleaners should prefer the familiar partner in our choice experiment. We found that cleaners spent significantly more time near the familiar than the unfamiliar clients in the first 2 minutes of the experiment. This indicates the ability for individual recognition in cleaners. In contrast, the client C. striatus showed no significant preference. This could be due to a sampling artefact, possibly due to a lack of sufficient motivation. Alternatively, clients may not need to recognise their cleaners but instead remember the defined territories of L. dimidiatus to achieve repeated interactions with the same individual.

Abstract: Action imitation, once thought to be a behavior almost exclusively limited to humans and the great apes, surprisingly also has been found in a number of bird species. Because imitation has been viewed by some psychologists as a form of intelligent behavior, there has been interest in how it is distributed among animal species. Although the mechanisms responsible for action imitation are not clear, we are now at least beginning to understand the conditions under which it occurs. In this article, I try to identify and differentiate the various forms of socially influenced behavior (species-typical social reactions, social effects on motivation, social effects on perception, socially influenced learning, and action imitation) and explain why it is important to differentiate imitation from other forms of social influence. I also examine some of the variables that appear to be involved in the occurrence of imitation. Finally, I speculate about why a number of bird species, but few mammal species, appear to imitate.

Abstract: When animals learn a simultaneous discrimination, some of the value of the positive stimulus (S+) appears to transfer to the negative stimulus (S-). The present experiments demonstrate that such value transfer can also be found in humans. In Experiment 1 humans were trained on 2 simple simultaneous discriminations, the first between a highly positive stimulus, A (1,000 points); and a negative stimulus, B (0 points); and the second between a less positive stimulus, C (100 points); and a negative stimulus, D (0 points). On test trials, most participants preferred B over D. In Experiments 2 and 3 the value of the 2 original discriminations was equated in training (A[100]B[0] and C[100]D[0]). In Experiment 2 the values of the positive stimuli were then altered (A[1,000]C[0]); again, most participants preferred B over D. In Experiment 3, however, when the values of B and D were altered (B[1,000]D[0]), participants were indifferent to A and C. Thus, the mechanism that underlies value transfer in humans appears to be related to Pavlovian second-order conditioning. Similar mechanisms may be involved in assimilation processes in social contexts.

Abstract: Both white-tailed deer, Odocoileus virginianus, and mule deer, O. hemionus, females defend fawns against coyotes, Canis latrans, but only mule deer defend nonoffspring conspecific and heterospecific fawns. During a predator attack, females may have to decide whether to defend a fawn while having imperfect information on its identity obtained from hearing a few distress calls. Although imperfect recognition can influence altruistic behaviour, few empirical studies have considered this point when testing functional explanations for altruism. We designed a series of playback experiments with fawn distress calls to test alternative hypotheses (by-product of parental care, kin selection, reciprocal altruism) for the mule deer's defence of nonoffspring, specifically allowing for the possibility that females mistake these fawns for their own. White-tailed deer females approached the speaker only when distress calls of white-tailed deer fawns were played and when their own fawn was hidden, suggesting that fawn defence was strictly a matter of parental care in this species. In contrast, mule deer females responded similarly and strongly, regardless of the caller's identity, the female's reproductive state (mother or nonmother) or the presence of their own offspring. The failure of mule deer females to adjust their responses to these conditions suggests that they do not defend nonoffspring because they mistake them for their own fawns. The lack of behavioural discrimination also suggests that kin selection, reciprocal altruism and defence of the offspring's area are unlikely to explain the mule deer's defence of nonoffspring. We identify causal and functional questions that still need to be addressed to understand why mule deer defend fawns so indiscriminately.

Abstract: Pigeons were trained on operant schedules simulating successive encounters with prey items. When items were encountered on variable-interval schedules, birds were more likely to accept a poor item (long delay to food) the longer they had just searched, as if they were averaging prey density over a short memory window (Experiment 1). Responding as if the immediate future would be like the immediate past was reversed when a short search predicted a long search next time (Experiment 2). Experience with different degrees of environmental predictability appeared to change the length of the memory window (Experiment 3). The results may reflect linear waiting (Higa, Wynne, & Staddon, 1991), but they differ in some respects. The findings have implications for possible mechanisms of adjusting behavior to current reinforcement conditions.