Abstract: To describe and then fulfill agricultural animals' needs, we must learn more about their fundamental psychological and behavioral processes. How does this animal feel? Is that animal suffering? Will we ever be able to know these things? Scientists specializing in animal cognition say that there are numerous problems but that they can be overcome. Recognition by scientists of the notion of animal awareness has been increasing in recent years, because of the work of Griffin and others. Feeling, thinking, remembering, and imagining are cognitive processes that are factors in the economic and humane production of agricultural animals. It has been observed that the animal welfare debate depends on two controversial questions: Do animals have subjective feelings? If they do, can we find indicators that reveal them? Here, indirect behavioral analysis approaches must be taken. Moreover, the linear additivity of several stressor effects on a variety of animal traits suggests that some single phenomenon is acting as a “clearinghouse” for many or all of the stresses acting on an animal at any given time, and this phenomenon might be psychological stress. Specific situations animals may encounter in agricultural production settings are discussed with respect to the animals' subjective feelings.

Abstract: A telephone survey was conducted of 100 racing stables, 100 riding schools and 100 competition establishments (8,427 horses in total) to determine what management practices were being applied to horses showing stereotypic behaviour, and to determine the underlying reasons for them by assessing the perceptions and opinions of the people working with the horses. The results indicated that horse owners are concerned about stereotypic behaviour, first, because it reduces the performance of the animal (31, 30 and 27 per cent of the owners of racing stables, riding schools and competition establishments respectively), secondly, because it has adverse clinical effects on the horse (52, 55 and 56 per cent), and thirdly, because it reduces the monetary value of the animal (45, 59 and 31 per cent). The belief that these behaviours are learnt or copied also affects the management of affected horses: they are not allowed on to the premises by 4, 32 and 17 per cent of owners of racing stables, riding schools and competition establishments, respectively; attempts are made to remove the causal factors of the stereotypy by 35, 43 and 36 per cent; the behaviours are physically prevented by 77, 67 and 79 per cent, and the affected horses are kept separate from other horses by 39, 30 and 48 per cent.

Abstract: The value of behavioral techniques in assessing animal welfare, and in particular assessing the psychological well being of animals, is reviewed. Using cats and horses as examples, 3 behavioral methods are presented: (1) comparison of behavior patterns and time budgets; (2) choice tests; and (3) operant conditioning. The behaviors of intact and declawed cats were compared in order to determine if declawing led to behavioral problems or to a change in personality. Apparently it did not. The behavior of free ranging horses was compared with that of stabled horses. Using two-choice preference tests, the preference of horses for visual contact with other horses and the preference for bedding were determined. Horses show no significant preference for locations from which they can make visual contact with other horses, but they do prefer bedding, especially when lying down. Horses will perform an operant response in order to obtain light in a darkened barn or heat in an outside shed. These same techniques can be used to answer a variety of questions about an animal's motivation for a particular attribute of its environment.

Abstract: In general, codes that have been designed to safeguard the welfare of animals emphasize the importance of providing an environment that will ensure good health and a normal physiological and physical state, that is, they emphasize the animals' physical needs. If mental needs are mentioned, they are always relegated to secondary importance. The argument is put forward here that animal welfare is dependent solely on the cognitive needs of the animals concerned. In general, if these cognitive needs are met, they will protect the animals' physical needs. It is contended that in the few cases in which they do not safeguard the physical needs, it does not matter from a welfare point of view. The human example is given of being ill. It is argued that welfare is only adversely affected when a person feels ill, knows that he or she is ill, or even thinks that he or she is ill, all of which processes are cognitive ones. The implications for welfare of animals possessing certain cognitive abilities are discussed. For example, the extent to which animals are aware of their internal state while performing behavior known to be indicative of so-called states of suffering, such as fear, frustration, and pain, will determine how much they are actually suffering. With careful experimentation it may be possible to determine how negative they feel these states to be. Similarly, the extent to which animals think about items or events absent from their immediate environment will determine how frustrated they are in the absence of the real item or event but in the presence of the cognitive representation.