Feh, C. (2005). Relationships and Communication in Socially Natural Horse Herds. In D. S. Mills, & S. M. McDonnell (Eds.), The domestic horse : the origins, development, and management of its behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Abstract: Horses are quite unique. In most mammals, sexes segregate and maintain bonds only during the breeding season (Clutton-Brock, 1989). Some canids, a few rodents and primate species such as gorillas, hamadryas baboons and red howler monkeys are the exception, where the same males stay with the same females all year round and over many breeding seasons. Typically, both sexes disperse at puberty in these species. In horses, it was clearly shown that the causes for female dispersal were incest avoidance and not intra-specific competition (Monard, 1996). As a rule, this is confirmed for mammal species where tenure length by males exceeds the age at first reproduction in females (Clutton-Brock, 1989). When horses are allowed to choose their mating partner freely, the inbreeding coefficient of the offspring is lower than expected should they mate randomly (Duncan et al, 1984).
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Nicol, C. J. (2000). Equine Stereotypies. In: Houpt K.A. (Ed.),. In Recent Advances in Companion Animal Behavior Problems. International Veterinary Information Service.
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Feh, C. (2001). Alliances between stallions are more than just multimale groups: reply to Linklater & Cameron (2000). Anim. Behav., 61, F27–F30.
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Bergstrom, C. T., & Lachmann, M. (1997). Signalling among relatives. I. Is costly signalling too costly? Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 352(1353), 609–617.
Abstract: ahavi's handicap principle,originally proposed as an explanation for sexual selection ofelaborate male traits, suggests that a sufficient cost to dishonest signals can outweigh the rewards of deception and allow individuals to communicate honestly. Maynard Smith (1991) and Johnstone and Grafen (1992) introduce the Sir Philip Sidney game in order to extend the handicap principle to interactions among related individuals, and to demonstrate that stable costly signalling systems can exist among relatives.
In this paper we demonstrate that despite the benefits associated with honest information transfer, the costs incurred in a stable costly signalling system may leave all participants worse off than they would be in a system with no signalling at all. In both the discrete and continuous forms of the Sir Philip Sidney game, there exist conditions under which costly signalling among relatives, while stable, is so costly that it is disadvantageous compared with no signalling at all. We determine the factors which dictate signal cost and signal benefit in a generalized version of this game, and explain how signal cost can exceed signal value. Such results raise concerns about theevolutionary pathways which could have led to the existence of signalling equilibria in nature. The paper stresses the importance of comparing signalling equilibria with other possible strategies, beforedrawing conclusions regarding the optimality of signalling.
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Allen, C. (2006). Transitive inference in animals: Reasoning or conditioned associations? In S. Hurley, & M. Nudds (Eds.), Rational Animals? (pp. 175–186). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Abstract: It is widely accepted that many species of nonhuman animals appear to engage in transitive inference,
producing appropriate responses to novel pairings of non-adjacent members of an ordered series
without previous experience of these pairings. Some researchers have taken this capability as
providing direct evidence that these animals reason. Others resist such declarations, favouring instead
explanations in terms of associative conditioning. Associative accounts of transitive inference have
been refined in application to a simple 5-element learning task that is the main paradigm for
laboratory investigations of the phenomenon, but it remains unclear how well those accounts
generalise to more information-rich environments such as social hierarchies which may contain scores
of individuals, and where rapid learning is important. The case of transitive inference is an example of
a more general dispute between proponents of associative accounts and advocates of more cognitive
accounts of animal behaviour. Examination of the specific details of transitive inference suggests
some lessons for the wider debate.
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Hall, C. (2007). The impact of visual perception on equine learning. Behav. Process., 76, 29–33.
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ANDREWS, R. C. (1933). The mongolian wild ass. Natural History, 33, 3–16.
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Dubuc, C., & Chapais, B. (2007). Feeding Competition in Macaca fascicularis : An Assessment of the Early Arrival Tactic. Int. J. Primatol., .
Abstract: In primate species with unidirectional dominance relationships, rank order restricts the access of nondominant females to clumped resources. However, females might attempt to bypass the rank order by reaching feeding sites before the highest ranking individuals (early arrival tactic) when there are net benefits. We therefore analyzed the order of arrival to the feeding site of the adult members of a captive group of long-tailed macaques. We used 2 experimental conditions that differed in the spatial distribution of a fixed amount of food (large vs. small patch). Though each condition induced contest competition, it was stronger in the small-patch condition. Arrival order does not correlate with dominance rank in either experimental condition. The α-male and α-female reached the feeding site 10-30 s after the beginning of the test. Some females seized on opportunities to reach the feeding site before them, especially in the large-patch condition. They used the early arrival tactic when the risks of aggression were relatively low, which subjects accomplished either by being dominant or by being nondominant but tolerated by the α-male. Social tolerance may provide individuals with an alternative means to obtain resources. In sum, variation in food abundance and distribution may affect the extent to which rank order determines order of arrival to feeding sites. A higher rank may confer priority in the choice of tactics, but not necessarily priority of access to the resources themselves.
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Packer, C., & Pusey, A. E. (1985). Asymmetric contests in social mammals: respect, manipulation and age-specific aspects. In P. J. Greenwood, M. Slatkin, & (Ed.), Evolution: Essays in Honour of John Maynard Smith (pp. 173–86). Camebridge: Camebridge University Press.
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Pusey, A. E., & Packer, C. (2003). The Ecology of relationships. In J. R. Krebs, N. B. Davis, & (Ed.), Behavioural Ecology (pp. 254–283). Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publication.
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