Abstract: A fundamental question in cognitive science is whether animals can represent numerosity (a property of a stimulus that is defined by the number of discriminable elements it contains) and use numerical representations computationally. Here, it was shown that rhesus monkeys represent the numerosity of visual stimuli and detect their ordinal disparity. Two monkeys were first trained to respond to exemplars of the numerosities 1 to 4 in an ascending numerical order (1 --> 2 --> 3 --> 4). As a control for non-numerical cues, exemplars were varied with respect to size, shape, and color. The monkeys were later tested, without reward, on their ability to order stimulus pairs composed of the novel numerosities 5 to 9. Both monkeys responded in an ascending order to the novel numerosities. These results show that rhesus monkeys represent the numerosities 1 to 9 on an ordinal scale.

Abstract: Two rhesus and two Japanese macaque infants were cross-fostered between species in order to study the effects of auditory experience on vocal development. Both the cross-fostered and normally raised control subjects were observed over the first 2 years of life and their vocalizations were tape-recorded. We classified 8053 calls by ear, placed each call in one of six acoustic categories, and calculated the rates at which different call-types were used in different social contexts. Species differences were found in the use of “coo” and “gruff” vocalizations among control subjects. Japanese macaques invariably produced coos almost exclusively. In contrast, rhesus macaques produced a mixture of coos and gruffs and showed considerable interindividual variation in the relative use of one call type or the other. Cross-fostered Japanese macaques adhered to their species-typical behavior, rarely using gruffs. Cross-fostered rhesus subjects also exhibited species-typical behavior in many contexts, but in some situations produced coos and gruffs at rates that were intermediate between those shown by normally raised animals of the two species. This outcome suggests that environmentally mediated modification of vocal behavior may have occurred, but that the resulting changes were quite limited.

Abstract: Humans are consciously aware of some memories and can make verbal reports about these memories. Other memories cannot be brought to consciousness, even though they influence behavior. This conspicuous difference in access to memories is central in taxonomies of human memory systems but has been difficult to document in animal studies, suggesting that some forms of memory may be unique to humans. Here I show that rhesus macaque monkeys can report the presence or absence of memory. Although it is probably impossible to document subjective, conscious properties of memory in nonverbal animals, this result objectively demonstrates an important functional parallel with human conscious memory. Animals able to discern the presence and absence of memory should improve accuracy if allowed to decline memory tests when they have forgotten, and should decline tests most frequently when memory is attenuated experimentally. One of two monkeys examined unequivocally met these criteria under all test conditions, whereas the second monkey met them in all but one case. Probe tests were used to rule out “cueing” by a wide variety of environmental and behavioral stimuli, leaving detection of the absence of memory per se as the most likely mechanism underlying the monkeys' abilities to selectively decline memory tests when they had forgotten.