Abstract: This paper explores the role of maternal influences on the acquisition of a tool-using task in wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii) in order to build on and complement previous work done in captivity. Young chimpanzees show a long period of offspring dependency on mothers and it is during this period that offspring learn several important skills, especially how to and on what to forage. At Gombe National Park, one skill that is acquired during dependency is termite-fishing, a complex behavior that involves inserting a tool made from the surrounding vegetation into a termite mound and extracting the termites that attack and cling to the tool. All chimpanzees observed at Gombe have acquired the termite-fishing skill by the age of 5.5 years. Since the mother is the primary source of information throughout this time period, I investigated the influence of mothers' individual termite-fishing characteristics on their offsprings' speed of acquisition and proficiency at the skill once acquired. Mother's time spent alone or with maternal family members, which is highly correlated to time spent termite-fishing, was positively correlated to offspring's acquisition of critical elements of the skill. I also investigated the specific types of social interactions that occur between mothers and offspring at the termite mound and found that mothers are highly tolerant to offspring, even when the behavior of the offspring may disrupt the termite-fishing attempt. However, no active facilitation by mothers of offsprings' attempts were observed.

Abstract: This paper reviews evidence that increases the probability that many animals experience at least simple levels of consciousness. First, the search for neural correlates of consciousness has not found any consciousness-producing structure or process that is limited to human brains. Second, appropriate responses to novel challenges for which the animal has not been prepared by genetic programming or previous experience provide suggestive evidence of animal consciousness because such versatility is most effectively organized by conscious thinking. For example, certain types of classical conditioning require awareness of the learned contingency in human subjects, suggesting comparable awareness in similarly conditioned animals. Other significant examples of versatile behavior suggestive of conscious thinking are scrub jays that exhibit all the objective attributes of episodic memory, evidence that monkeys sometimes know what they know, creative tool-making by crows, and recent interpretation of goal-directed behavior of rats as requiring simple nonreflexive consciousness. Third, animal communication often reports subjective experiences. Apes have demonstrated increased ability to use gestures or keyboard symbols to make requests and answer questions; and parrots have refined their ability to use the imitation of human words to ask for things they want and answer moderately complex questions. New data have demonstrated increased flexibility in the gestural communication of swarming honey bees that leads to vitally important group decisions as to which cavity a swarm should select as its new home. Although no single piece of evidence provides absolute proof of consciousness, this accumulation of strongly suggestive evidence increases significantly the likelihood that some animals experience at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings. The next challenge for cognitive ethologists is to investigate for particular animals the content of their awareness and what life is actually like, for them.

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Abstract: Developments in the scientific and philosophical study of animal cognition and mentality are of great importance to animal scientists who face continued public scrutiny of the treatment of animals in research and agriculture. Because beliefs about animal minds, animal cognition, and animal consciousness underlie many people's views about the ethical treatment of nonhuman animals, it has become increasingly difficult for animal scientists to avoid these issues. Animal scientists may learn from ethologists who study animal cognition and mentality from an evolutionary and comparative perspective and who are at the forefront of the development of naturalistic and laboratory techniques of observation and experimentation that are capable of revealing the cognitive and mental properties of nonhuman animals. Despite growing acceptance of the ethological study of animal cognition, there are critics who dispute the scientific validity of the field, especially when the topic is animal consciousness. Here, a proper understanding of developments in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science can help to place cognitive studies on a firm methodological and philosophical foundation. Ultimately, this is an interdisciplinary task, involving scientists and philosophers. Animal scientists are well-positioned to contribute to the study of animal cognition because they typically have access to a large pool of potential research subjects whose habitats are more controlled than in most field studies while being more natural than most laboratory psychology experiments. Despite some formidable questions remaining for analysis, the prospects for progress in assessing animal cognition are bright.