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Lazareva, O. F., Smirnova, A. A., Bagozkaja, M. S., Zorina, Z. A., Rayevsky, V. V., & Wasserman, E. A. (2004). Transitive responding in hooded crows requires linearly ordered stimuli. J Exp Anal Behav, 82(1), 1–19.
Abstract: Eight crows were taught to discriminate overlapping pairs of visual stimuli (A+ B-, B+ C-, C+ D-, and D+ E-). For 4 birds, the stimuli were colored cards with a circle of the same color on the reverse side whose diameter decreased from A to E (ordered feedback group). These circles were made available for comparison to potentially help the crows order the stimuli along a physical dimension. For the other 4 birds, the circles corresponding to the colored cards had the same diameter (constant feedback group). In later testing, a novel choice pair (BD) was presented. Reinforcement history involving stimuli B and D was controlled so that the reinforcement/nonreinforcement ratios for the latter would be greater than for the former. If, during the BD test, the crows chose between stimuli according to these reinforcement/nonreinforcement ratios, then they should prefer D; if they chose according to the diameter of the feedback stimuli, then they should prefer B. In the ordered feedback group, the crows strongly preferred B over D; in the constant feedback group, the crows' choice did not differ significantly from chance. These results, plus simulations using associative models, suggest that the orderability of the postchoice feedback stimuli is important for crows' transitive responding.
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Whiten, A., Horner, V., Litchfield, C. A., & Marshall-Pescini, S. (2004). How do apes ape? Learn. Behav., 32(1), 36–52.
Abstract: In the wake of telling critiques of the foundations on which earlier conclusions were based, the last 15 years have witnessed a renaissance in the study of social learning in apes. As a result, we are able to review 31 experimental studies from this period in which social learning in chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans has been investigated. The principal question framed at the beginning of this era, Do apes ape? has been answered in the affirmative, at least in certain conditions. The more interesting question now is, thus, How do apes ape? Answering this question has engendered richer taxonomies of the range of social-learning processes at work and new methodologies to uncover them. Together, these studies suggest that apes ape by employing a portfolio of alternative social-learning processes in flexibly adaptive ways, in conjunction with nonsocial learning. We conclude by sketching the kind of decision tree that appears to underlie the deployment of these alternatives.
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Fragaszy, D., & Visalberghi, E. (2004). Socially biased learning in monkeys. Learn Behav, 32(1), 24–35.
Abstract: We review socially biased learning about food and problem solving in monkeys, relying especially on studies with tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and callitrichid monkeys. Capuchin monkeys most effectively learn to solve a new problem when they can act jointly with an experienced partner in a socially tolerant setting and when the problem can be solved by direct action on an object or substrate, but they do not learn by imitation. Capuchin monkeys are motivated to eat foods, whether familiar or novel, when they are with others that are eating, regardless of what the others are eating. Thus, social bias in learning about foods is indirect and mediated by facilitation of feeding. In most respects, social biases in learning are similar in capuchins and callitrichids, except that callitrichids provide more specific behavioral cues to others about the availability and palatability of foods. Callitrichids generally are more tolerant toward group members and coordinate their activity in space and time more closely than capuchins do. These characteristics support stronger social biases in learning in callitrichids than in capuchins in some situations. On the other hand, callitrichids' more limited range of manipulative behaviors, greater neophobia, and greater sensitivity to the risk of predation restricts what these monkeys learn in comparison with capuchins. We suggest that socially biased learning is always the collective outcome of interacting physical, social, and individual factors, and that differences across populations and species in social bias in learning reflect variations in all these dimensions. Progress in understanding socially biased learning in nonhuman species will be aided by the development of appropriately detailed models of the richly interconnected processes affecting learning.
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Cloutier, S., Newberry, R. C., & Honda, K. (2004). Comparison of social ranks based on worm-running and aggressive behaviour in young domestic fowl. Behav. Process., 65(1), 79–86.
Abstract: Worm-running is behaviour in which a chick runs carrying a worm-like object while flock mates follow and attempt to grab the object from its beak. We hypothesised that social ranks based on worm-running frequency are stable over time and are positively correlated with social ranks based on success in aggressive interactions when older. At 8-12 days of age, we scored worm-running in 17 groups of 12 female White Leghorn chicks during three 10-min tests. Based on instantaneous scans at 5-s intervals, the bird carrying the `worm' most often was placed in rank one and so on down the rank order. These tests were repeated at 68-70 days of age. An aggression index for each bird was calculated as the number of aggressive acts given, divided by the number given and received, during three 1-h observation periods when the birds were 68-70 days. Ranks obtained in worm-running tests were positively correlated over the two age periods (P<0.05) but were not correlated with ranks based on the aggression index (P>0.05). Our results indicate that worm-running ranks are not predictive of success in aggressive interactions. Instead, worm-running fits some criteria for play.
Keywords: Aggression; Social behaviour; Dominance; Play; Chickens; Animal welfare
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Jennings, D. J., Gammell, M. P., Carlin, C. M., & Hayden, T. J. (2004). Effect of body weight, antler length, resource value and experience on fight duration and intensity in fallow deer. Anim. Behav., 68(1), 213–221.
Abstract: We tested predictions of evolutionary game theory focusing on fight duration and intensity during contests between European fallow deer, Dama dama L. We examined the relation between contest duration and intensity and resource-holding potential (RHP; body weight and antler size), in an effort to reveal the assessment rules used by competing males. We examined other potential determinants of duration and intensity: resource value (the oestrous female) and experience of agonistic interactions. Asymmetry in body weight or antler length of contestants was not correlated with fight duration. Body weight and antler length of the fight winner or loser were also not correlated with fight duration. Neither were the body weight of the heavier or lighter animal or the antler length of the animal that had longer or shorter antlers. A measure of intensity (the jump clash) was positively related to the body weight of the losing animal and the lighter member of the dyad. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that opponents escalate contest intensity based on assessment of their own ability rather than through mutual assessment. There was no evidence that resource value is an important factor in either fight duration or intensity in this population. As the number of fights between pairs of males increased, there was a decrease in fight duration. Fights were longer when at least one member of a competing pair of males had previously experienced a victory.
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Gauvin, S., & Giraldeau, L. - A. (2004). Nutmeg mannikins ( Lonchura punctulata) reduce their feeding rates in response to simulated competition. Oecologia, 139(1), 150–156.
Abstract: Group feeding animals experience a number of competitive foraging costs that may result in a lowered feeding rate. It is important to distinguish between reductions in feeding rates that are caused by reduced food availability and physical interactions among foragers from those caused by the mere presence of foraging companions that may be self-imposed in order to obtain some benefit of group membership. Starlings ( Sturnus vulgaris) reduce their feeding rates when in the company of simulated competitors located in an adjacent cage that cannot affect the food availability or interact with the forager. In the present study, we investigate whether the presence of simulated competitors in another species of passerine, nutmeg mannikins ( Lonchura punctulata), can result in self-imposed reductions in feeding rates. When feeding in the company of simulated competitors, mannikins spent more non-foraging time near them, fed more slowly, reduced travel times between patches, reduced their scanning time and pecked more slowly. These results provide evidence that simulated competitors induce a reduction in pecking rate: behavioural interference. These self-imposed responses to competitors may have resulted from attempts to remain close to the non-feeding companions. Such self-imposed reductions in feeding rates may be a widespread yet generally unrecognised foraging cost to group feeding individuals.
Keywords: Animals; *Feeding Behavior; Population Density; *Social Behavior; *Songbirds
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Allcroft, D. J., Tolkamp, B. J., Glasbey, C. A., & Kyriazakis, I. (2004). The importance of `memory' in statistical models for animal feeding behaviour. Behav. Process., 67(1), 99–109.
Abstract: We investigate models for animal feeding behaviour, with the aim of improving understanding of how animals organise their behaviour in the short term. We consider three classes of model: hidden Markov, latent Gaussian and semi-Markov. Each can predict the typical `clustered' feeding behaviour that is generally observed, however they differ in the extent to which `memory' of previous behaviour is allowed to affect future behaviour. The hidden Markov model has `lack of memory', the current behavioural state being dependent on the previous state only. The latent Gaussian model assumes feeding/non-feeding periods to occur by the thresholding of an underlying continuous variable, thereby incorporating some `short-term memory'. The semi-Markov model, by taking into account the duration of time spent in the previous state, can be said to incorporate `longer-term memory'. We fit each of these models to a dataset of cow feeding behaviour. We find the semi-Markov model (longer-term memory) to have the best fit to the data and the hidden Markov model (lack of memory) the worst. We argue that in view of effects of satiety on short-term feeding behaviour of animal species in general, biologically suitable models should allow `memory' to play a role. We conclude that our findings are equally relevant for the analysis of other types of short-term behaviour that are governed by satiety-like principles.
Keywords: Cow; Feeding data; Bouts; Memory; Satiety; Latent structure; Model comparison
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Gothard, K. M., Erickson, C. A., & Amaral, D. G. (2004). How do rhesus monkeys ( Macaca mulatta) scan faces in a visual paired comparison task? Anim. Cogn., 7(1), 25–36.
Abstract: When novel and familiar faces are viewed simultaneously, humans and monkeys show a preference for looking at the novel face. The facial features attended to in familiar and novel faces, were determined by analyzing the visual exploration patterns, or scanpaths, of four monkeys performing a visual paired comparison task. In this task, the viewer was first familiarized with an image and then it was presented simultaneously with a novel and the familiar image. A looking preference for the novel image indicated that the viewer recognized the familiar image and hence differentiates between the familiar and the novel images. Scanpaths and relative looking preference were compared for four types of images: (1) familiar and novel objects, (2) familiar and novel monkey faces with neutral expressions, (3) familiar and novel inverted monkey faces, and (4) faces from the same monkey with different facial expressions. Looking time was significantly longer for the novel face, whether it was neutral, expressing an emotion, or inverted. Monkeys did not show a preference, or an aversion, for looking at aggressive or affiliative facial expressions. The analysis of scanpaths indicated that the eyes were the most explored facial feature in all faces. When faces expressed emotions such as a fear grimace, then monkeys scanned features of the face, which contributed to the uniqueness of the expression. Inverted facial images were scanned similarly to upright images. Precise measurement of eye movements during the visual paired comparison task, allowed a novel and more quantitative assessment of the perceptual processes involved the spontaneous visual exploration of faces and facial expressions. These studies indicate that non-human primates carry out the visual analysis of complex images such as faces in a characteristic and quantifiable manner.
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Griffin, D. R., & Speck, G. B. (2004). New evidence of animal consciousness. Anim. Cogn., 7(1), 5–18.
Abstract: This paper reviews evidence that increases the probability that many animals experience at least simple levels of consciousness. First, the search for neural correlates of consciousness has not found any consciousness-producing structure or process that is limited to human brains. Second, appropriate responses to novel challenges for which the animal has not been prepared by genetic programming or previous experience provide suggestive evidence of animal consciousness because such versatility is most effectively organized by conscious thinking. For example, certain types of classical conditioning require awareness of the learned contingency in human subjects, suggesting comparable awareness in similarly conditioned animals. Other significant examples of versatile behavior suggestive of conscious thinking are scrub jays that exhibit all the objective attributes of episodic memory, evidence that monkeys sometimes know what they know, creative tool-making by crows, and recent interpretation of goal-directed behavior of rats as requiring simple nonreflexive consciousness. Third, animal communication often reports subjective experiences. Apes have demonstrated increased ability to use gestures or keyboard symbols to make requests and answer questions; and parrots have refined their ability to use the imitation of human words to ask for things they want and answer moderately complex questions. New data have demonstrated increased flexibility in the gestural communication of swarming honey bees that leads to vitally important group decisions as to which cavity a swarm should select as its new home. Although no single piece of evidence provides absolute proof of consciousness, this accumulation of strongly suggestive evidence increases significantly the likelihood that some animals experience at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings. The next challenge for cognitive ethologists is to investigate for particular animals the content of their awareness and what life is actually like, for them.
Keywords: Animal Communication; Animals; Awareness; *Behavior, Animal; *Consciousness
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Roitberg, E., & Franz, H. (2004). Oddity learning by African dwarf goats ( Capra hircus). Anim. Cogn., 7(1), 61–67.
Abstract: Seventeen African dwarf goats (adult females) were trained on oddity tasks using an automated learning device. One odd stimulus and three identical nonodd stimuli were presented on a screen divided into four sectors; the sector for the odd stimulus was varied pseudorandomly. Responses to the odd stimulus were deemed to be correct and were reinforced with food. In phase 1, the goats were trained on eight stimulus configurations. From trial to trial the odd discriminandum was either a + symbol or the letter S, and the nonodd discriminandum was the symbol not used as the odd one. In phase 2, the animals were similarly trained using an unfilled triangle or a filled (i.e., solid black) circle. In phase 3, three new discriminanda were used, an unfilled, small circle with radiating lines, an unfilled heart-shaped symbol, and an unfilled oval; which of the three discriminanda was odd and nonodd was varied from trial to trial. Following these training phases, a transfer test was given, which involved 24 new discriminanda sets. These were presented twice for a total of 48 transfer test trials. Results early in training showed approximately 25% correct, which might be expected by chance in a four-choice task. After 500-2,000 trials, results improved to approximately 40-44% correct. The best-performing subject reached 60-80% correct during training. On the transfer test, this subject had 47.9% correct and that significantly exceeded 25% expected by chance. This finding suggests that some exceptional individuals of African dwarf goats are capable of learning the oddity concept.
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