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Palagi, E., Paoli, T., & Tarli, S. B. (2004). Reconciliation and consolation in captive bonobos (Pan paniscus). Am. J. Primatol., 62(1), 15–30.
Abstract: Although reconciliation in bonobos (Pan paniscus) has previously been described, it has not been analyzed heretofore by the postconflict (PC) match-control (MC) method. Furthermore, although reconciliation has been investigated before in this species, consolation has not. In this study we analyzed agonistic and affiliative contacts in all sex-class combinations to clarify and reevaluate the occurrence of reconciliation in bonobos via the PC-MC method. We also investigated the occurrence of consolation by analyzing the victims' triadic contact tendency (TCT), the influence of the sex of victims, and the relative occurrence of consolation and reconciliation. We collected 167 pairs of PC-MC observations in a captive group of bonobos (in Apeldoorn, The Netherlands). The conciliatory tendency (CCT) we obtained was tendentially lower than the mean value previously found for Yerkes captive chimpanzees. Close relationships, which were present in all female-female (FF) and some male-female (MF) dyads, positively affected reconciliation rates. When only adult PC-MC pairs (157) were considered, the mean TCTs and CCTs did not differ significantly. When we focused on types of PC affiliative contact, in the case of consolation we found a striking preference for sociosexual patterns. As to the relative occurrence of consolation and reconciliation, the highest level of the former was found in the absence of the latter. When reconciliation took place, consolation generally preceded it, suggesting that consolation may be a substitutive behavior. Our findings suggest that even if reconciliation remains the best option, consolation may be an alternative substitute for reconciliation that is used to buffer the tension originating from an unresolved conflict. Reconciliation and consolation are complex phenomena that are probably related to the life history of a group. Given that few studies have been conducted on this subject, we can not at this time make any generalizations regarding conflict resolution in certain species by comparing results among studies.
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Cattell, R. B., & Korth, B. (1973). The isolation of temperament dimensions in dogs. Behav Biol, 9(1), 15–30.
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Hirata, S. (2007). A note on the responses of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) to live self-images on television monitors. Behav. Process., 75(1), 85–90.
Abstract: The majority of studies on self-recognition in animals have been conducted using a mirror as the test device; little is known, however, about the responses of non-human primates toward their own images in media other than mirrors. This study provides preliminary data on the reactions of 10 chimpanzees to live self-images projected on two television monitors, each connected to a different video camera. Chimpanzees could see live images of their own faces, which were approximately life-sized, on one monitor. On the other monitor, they could see live images of their whole body, which were approximately one-fifth life-size, viewed diagonally from behind. In addition, several objects were introduced into the test situation. Out of 10 chimpanzees tested, 2 individuals performed self-exploratory behaviors while watching their own images on the monitors. One of these two chimpanzees successively picked up two of the provided objects in front of a monitor, and watched the images of these objects on the monitor. The results indicate that these chimpanzees were able to immediately recognize live images of themselves or objects on the monitors, even though several features of these images differed from those of their previous experience with mirrors.
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Panksepp, J. (2005). Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans. Conscious Cogn, 14(1), 30–80.
Abstract: The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain-mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic (“instinctual”), albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems-including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones-effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain.
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Wolff, A., & Hausberger, M. (1994). Behaviour of foals before weaning may have some genetic basis. Ethology, 96(1), 1–10.
Abstract: In this preliminary study on foal behaviour, 13 French saddlebred foals (2-3 mo old) and their dams were observed on pasture. The most important findings are the interindividual quantitative differences in foal behaviour patterns as well as in the amount of mainly foal-initiated time spent at given distances from their mares. Interindividual differences seem in part due to a sire effect
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Romero, T., & Aureli, F. (2008). Reciprocity of support in coatis (Nasua nasua). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 122(1), 19–25.
Abstract: Primate sociality has received much attention and its complexity has been viewed as a driving force for the evolution of cognitive abilities. Improved analytic techniques have allowed primate researchers to reveal intricate social networks based on the exchange of cooperative acts and services. Although nonprimates are known to show similar behavior (e.g., cooperative hunting, food sharing, coalitions) there seems a consensus that social life is less complex than in primates. Here the authors present the first group-level analysis of reciprocity of social interactions in a social carnivore, the ring-tailed coati (<xh:i xmlns:search=“http://marklogic.com/appservices/search” xmlns=“http://apa.org/pimain” xmlns:xsi=“http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance” xmlns:xh=“http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml”>Nasua nasua</xh:i>). The authors found that support in aggressive conflicts is a common feature in coatis and that this behavior is reciprocally exchanged in a manner seemingly as complex as in primates. Given that reciprocity correlations persisted after controlling for the effect of spatial association and subunit membership, some level of scorekeeping may be involved. Further studies will be needed to confirm our findings and understand the mechanisms underlying such reciprocity, but our results contribute to the body of work that has begun to challenge primate supremacy in social complexity and cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Pepperberg, I. M. (2002). In search of king Solomon's ring: cognitive and communicative studies of Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus). Brain Behav Evol, 59(1-2), 54–67.
Abstract: During the past 24 years, I have used a modeling technique (M/R procedure) to train Grey parrots to use an allospecific code (English speech) referentially; I then use the code to test their cognitive abilities. The oldest bird, Alex, labels more than 50 different objects, 7 colors, 5 shapes, quantities to 6, 3 categories (color, shape, material) and uses 'no', 'come here', wanna go X' and 'want Y' (X and Y are appropriate location or item labels). He combines labels to identify, request, comment upon or refuse more than 100 items and to alter his environment. He processes queries to judge category, relative size, quantity, presence or absence of similarity/difference in attributes, and show label comprehension. He semantically separates labeling from requesting. He thus exhibits capacities once presumed limited to humans or nonhuman primates. Studies on this and other Greys show that parrots given training that lacks some aspect of input present in M/R protocols (reference, functionality, social interaction) fail to acquire referential English speech. Examining how input affects the extent to which parrots acquire an allospecific code may elucidate mechanisms of other forms of exceptional learning: learning unlikely in the normal course of development but that can occur under certain conditions.
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Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990). The representation of social relations by monkeys. Cognition, 37(1-2), 167–196.
Abstract: Monkeys recognize the social relations that exist among others in their group. They know who associates with whom, for example, and other animals' relative dominance ranks. In addition, monkeys appear to compare types of social relations and make same/different judgments about them. In captivity, longtailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) trained to recognize the relation between one adult female and her offspring can identify the same relation among other mother-offspring pairs, and distinguish this relation from bonds between individuals who are related in a different way. In the wild, if a vervet monkey (Cercopithecus aethiops) has seen a fight between a member of its own family and a member of Family X, this increases the likelihood that it will act aggressively toward another member of Family X. Vervets act as if they recognize some similarity between their own close associates and the close associates of others. To make such comparisons the monkeys must have some way of representing the properties of social relationships. We discuss the adaptive value of such representations, the information they contain, their structure, and their limitations.
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Jensen, G. D., Gordon, B. N., & Wolfheim, J. (1975). Nursing behavior in infant monkeys: a sequence analysis. Behaviour, 55(1-2), 115–127.
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Cancedda, M. (1990). [Social and behavioral organization of horses on the Giara (Sardinia): distribution and aggregation]. Boll Soc Ital Biol Sper, 66(11), 1089–1096.
Abstract: In this paper some considerations on the environment of the 42 Kmq of the volcanic-basaltic Giara tableland are discussed. Conditioning by the environment and its effect on the distribution of a population of 712 horses is illustrated in view of their social and behavioural organization.
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