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Heath-Lange, S., Ha, J. C., & Sackett, G. P. (1999). Behavioral measurement of temperament in male nursery-raised infant macaques and baboons. Am. J. Primatol., 47(1), 43–50.
Abstract: We define temperament as an individual's set of characteristic behavioral responses to novel or challenging stimuli. This study adapted a temperament scale used with rhesus macaques by Schneider and colleagues [American Journal of Primatology 25:137-155, 1991] for use with male pigtailed macaque (Macaca nemestrina, n = 7), longtailed macaque (M. fascicularis, n = 3), and baboon infants (Papio cynocephalus anubis, n = 4). Subjects were evaluated twice weekly for the first 5 months of age during routine removal from their cages for weighing. Behavioral measures were based on the subject's interactions with a familiar human caretaker and included predominant state before capture, response to capture, contact latency, resistance to tester's hold, degree of clinging, attention to environment, defecation/urination, consolability, facial expression, vocalizations, and irritability. Species differences indicated that baboons were more active than macaques in establishing or terminating contact with the tester. Temperament scores decreased over time for the variables Response to Capture and Contact Latency, indicating that as they grew older, subjects became less reactive and more bold in their interactions with the tester. Temperament scores changed slowly with age, with greater change occurring at younger ages. The retention of variability in reactivity between and within species may be advantageous for primates, reflecting the flexibility necessary to survive in a changing environment.
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Cattell, R. B., & Korth, B. (1973). The isolation of temperament dimensions in dogs. Behav Biol, 9(1), 15–30.
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McClearn, G. E. (1971). Behavioral genetics. Behav Sci, 16(1), 64–81.
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Panksepp, J. (2005). Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans. Conscious Cogn, 14(1), 30–80.
Abstract: The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain-mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic (“instinctual”), albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems-including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones-effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain.
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Parker, S. T. (1997). A general model for the adaptive function of self-knowledge in animals and humans. Conscious Cogn, 6(1), 75–86.
Abstract: This article offers a general definition of self-knowledge that embraces all forms and levels of self-knowledge in animals and humans. It is hypothesized that various levels of self-knowledge constitute an ordinal scale such that each species in a lineage displays the forms of self-knowledge found in related species as well as new forms it and its sister species may have evolved. Likewise, it is hypothesized that these various forms of levels of self-knowledge develop in the sequence in which they evolved. Finally, a general hypothesis for the functional significance of self-knowledge is proposed along with subhypotheses regarding the adaptive significance of various levels of self-knowledge in mammals including human and nonhuman primates. The general hypothesis is that self-knowledge serves as a standard for assessing the qualities of conspecifics compared to those of the self. Such assessment is crucial to deciding among alternative reproductive and subsistence strategies. The qualities that are assessed, which vary across taxa, range from the size and strength of the self to its mathematical or musical abilities. This so-called assessment model of self-knowledge is based on evolutionary biological models for social selection and the role of assessment in animal communication.
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Sone, K. (1983). [Apropos of 5 cases of so-called “delusions of cutaneous and intestinal infestation”--psychopathologic and neuropsychological considerations]. Folia Psychiatr Neurol Jpn, 37(1), 37–55.
Abstract: Five cases with so-called “Dermato- und Enterozoenwahn” are reported, and the following themes are analysed from the “multidimensional” point of view: 1) process to build the shape of the intruder which is bothering the patients, 2) behavior against the intruding small animal and attitude towards the therapeutist; their characteristic manner to make complaints, 3) premorbid personality and 4) physical findings. In regard to one of the formation types of this disease, we have postulated through the neuropsychological analysis of case 5 (somatoparaphrenic patient) that patients of the typical cases 1, 2 and 3 suffer from a special kind of agnosia (perturbation of recognition; disturbance of aperception) in which they take their abnormal body sensations for causing by the small imaginary animals. Our cases showed the importance of a premorbid personality and present life-situations in combination with physical dissolution taking part in the pathoplastic process of this particular disease.
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Whiten, A. (2000). Social complexity and social intelligence. In Novartis Foundation Symposium (Vol. 233, pp. 185–96; discussion pp. 196–201).
Abstract: When we talk of the 'nature of intelligence', or any other attribute, we may be referring to its essential structure, or to its place in nature, particularly the function it has evolved to serve. Here I examine both, from the perspective of the evolution of intelligence in primates. Over the last 20 years, the Social (or 'Machiavellian') Intelligence Hypothesis has gained empirical support. Its core claim is that the intelligence of primates is primarily an adaptation to the special complexities of primate social life. In addition to this hypothesis about the function of intellect, a secondary claim is that the very structure of intelligence has been moulded to be 'social' in character, an idea that presents a challenge to orthodox views of intelligence as a general-purpose capacity. I shall outline the principal components of social intelligence and the environment of social complexity it engages with. This raises the question of whether domain specificity is an appropriate characterization of social intelligence and its subcomponents, like theory of mind. As a counter-argument to such specificity I consider the hypothesis that great apes exhibit a cluster of advanced cognitive abilities that rest on a shared capacity for second-order mental representation.
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[No authors listed]. (1979). International Conference on Environmental Cadmium: an overview. In Environmental Health Perspectives (Vol. 28, pp. 297–30).
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Pattison, P., & Wasserman, S. (1999). Logit models and logistic regressions for social networks: II. Multivariate relations. Br J Math Stat Psychol, 52 ( Pt 2), 169–193.
Abstract: The research described here builds on our previous work by generalizing the univariate models described there to models for multivariate relations. This family, labelled p*, generalizes the Markov random graphs of Frank and Strauss, which were further developed by them and others, building on Besag's ideas on estimation. These models were first used to model random variables embedded in lattices by Ising, and have been quite common in the study of spatial data. Here, they are applied to the statistical analysis of multigraphs, in general, and the analysis of multivariate social networks, in particular. In this paper, we show how to formulate models for multivariate social networks by considering a range of theoretical claims about social structure. We illustrate the models by developing structural models for several multivariate networks.
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Méary, D., Li, Z., Li, W., Guo, K., & Pascalis, O. (2014). Seeing two faces together: preference formation in humans and rhesus macaques. Animal Cognition, , 1–13.
Abstract: Humans, great apes and old world monkeys show selective attention to faces depending on conspecificity, familiarity, and social status supporting the view that primates share similar face processing mechanisms. Although many studies have been done on face scanning strategy in monkeys and humans, the mechanisms influencing viewing preference have received little attention. To determine how face categories influence viewing preference in humans and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), we performed two eye-tracking experiments using a visual preference task whereby pairs of faces from different species were presented simultaneously. The results indicated that viewing time was significantly influenced by the pairing of the face categories. Humans showed a strong bias towards an own-race face in an Asian–Caucasian condition. Rhesus macaques directed more attention towards non-human primate faces when they were paired with human faces, regardless of the species. When rhesus faces were paired with faces from Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus) or chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), the novel species’ faces attracted more attention. These results indicate that monkeys’ viewing preferences, as assessed by a visual preference task, are modulated by several factors, species and dominance being the most influential.
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