|
|
Quaranta, A., Siniscalchi, M., & Vallortigara, G. (2007). Asymmetric tail-wagging responses by dogs to different emotive stimuli. In Current biology : CB (Vol. 17, pp. R199–R201). Cell Press.
|
|
|
|
Paramastri, Y., Royo, F., Eberova, J., Carlsson, H. - E., Sajuthi, D., Fernstrom, A. - L., et al. (2007). Urinary and fecal immunoglobulin A, cortisol and 11-17 dioxoandrostanes, and serum cortisol in metabolic cage housed female cynomolgus monkeys (Macaca fascicularis). Journal of Medical Primatology, 36(6), 355–364.
Abstract: Background and methods Quantitative enzyme-immunoassays of urinary and fecal immunoglobulin A (IgA), cortisol and 11-17-dioxoandrostanes (11,17-DOA), and serum cortisol in eight metabolic-cage-housed female cynomolgus monkeys were performed. The monkeys were divided into two groups, B and NB. Group B animals were blood sampled every 6 hours, whereas Group NB animals were not handled/blood sampled. Results No differences were recorded between the amounts of feces and urine excreted by the two groups. Group B animals excreted more urinary cortisol than did Group NB animals indicating that restraint-blood sampling resulted in a stress response. Excreted amounts of IgA and 11,17-DOA (urine and feces) did not differ between the groups. Conclusions Urinary cortisol was a reliable marker of the stress associated with repeated blood sampling. Declining amounts of excreted urinary cortisol indicated that cynomolgus monkeys acclimated quickly to repeated blood sampling in metabolism cages. Within and between animal variation in amounts of feces voided demonstrated the importance of expressing fecal markers as ‘amounts excreted per time unit per kg body weight’ rather than just measuring the concentrations in fecal samples.
|
|
|
|
Silk, J. B. (2007). Social Components of Fitness in Primate Groups. Science, 317(5843), 1347–1351.
Abstract: There is much interest in the evolutionary forces that favored the evolution of large brains in the primate order. The social brain hypothesis posits that selection has favored larger brains and more complex cognitive capacities as a means to cope with the challenges of social life. The hypothesis is supported by evidence that shows that group size is linked to various measures of brain size. But it has not been clear how cognitive complexity confers fitness advantages on individuals. Research in the field and laboratory shows that sophisticated social cognition underlies social behavior in primate groups. Moreover, a growing body of evidence suggests that the quality of social relationships has measurable fitness consequences for individuals.
|
|
|
|
Pennisi, E. (2007). PSYCHOLOGY: Nonhuman Primates Demonstrate Humanlike Reasoning. Science, 317(5843), 1308–.
|
|
|
|
Wood, J. N., Glynn, D. D., Phillips, B. C., & Hauser, M. D. (2007). The Perception of Rational, Goal-Directed Action in Nonhuman Primates. Science, 317(5843), 1402–1405.
Abstract: Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences about a human experimenter's goal by attending to the environmental constraints that guide rational action. These findings rule out simple associative accounts of action perception and show that our capacity to infer rational, goal-directed action likely arose at least as far back as the New World monkeys, some 40 million years ago.
|
|
|
|
Wood, J. N., Glynn, D. D., Phillips, B. C., & Hauser, M. D. (2007). online material (Vol. 317).
Abstract: Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences about a human experimenter's goal by attending to the environmental constraints that guide rational action. These findings rule out simple associative accounts of action perception and show that our capacity to infer rational, goal-directed action likely arose at least as far back as the New World monkeys, some 40 million years ago.
|
|
|
|
Dunbar, R. I. M., & Shultz, S. (2007). Evolution in the Social Brain. Science, 317(5843), 1344–1347.
Abstract: The evolution of unusually large brains in some groups of animals, notably primates, has long been a puzzle. Although early explanations tended to emphasize the brain's role in sensory or technical competence (foraging skills, innovations, and way-finding), the balance of evidence now clearly favors the suggestion that it was the computational demands of living in large, complex societies that selected for large brains. However, recent analyses suggest that it may have been the particular demands of the more intense forms of pairbonding that was the critical factor that triggered this evolutionary development. This may explain why primate sociality seems to be so different from that found in most other birds and mammals: Primate sociality is based on bonded relationships of a kind that are found only in pairbonds in other taxa.
|
|
|
|
Herrmann, E., Call, J., Hernandez-Lloreda, M. V., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2007). online material. Science, 317(5843), 1360–1366.
Abstract: Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the hypothesis that humans simply have more “general intelligence,” we found that the children and chimpanzees had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world but that the children had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing with the social world.
|
|
|
|
Ash, C., Chin, G., Pennisi, E., & Sugden, A. (2007). Living in Societies. Science, 317(5843), 1337–.
|
|
|
|
Herrmann, E., Call, J., Hernandez-Lloreda, M. V., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis. Science, 317(5843), 1360–1366.
Abstract: Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the hypothesis that humans simply have more “general intelligence,” we found that the children and chimpanzees had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world but that the children had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing with the social world.
|
|
