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Reeve, H. Kern |
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Title |
Evolutionarily stable communication between kin: a general model |
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1997 |
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Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences |
Abbreviated Journal |
Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. |
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264 |
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(1384) |
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1037-1040. |
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Signalling Systems |
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At present, the most general evolutionary theory of honest communication is Grafen's model of Zahavi's 'handicap' signalling system, in which honesty of signals about the signaller's quality (e.g. mate suitability or fighting ability) is maintained by the differentially high cost of signals to signallers having lower quality. The latter model is here further generalized to include any communication between signallers and receivers that are genetically related (e.g. parents and begging offspring, cooperative or competing siblings). Signalling systems involving relatives are shown to be evolutionarily stable, despite a potential pay-off for false signalling, if the Zahavian assumption of differential signal costs holds and there are diminishing reproductive returns to the signaller as the receiver's assessed value of its attribute increases, or if, regardless of whether the Zahavian assumption holds, signallers with high values of the attribute benefit more from a given receiver assessment than signallers with low values (e.g. begging chicks that are hungrier benefit more from being fed). In stable systems of signalling among kin, it is also shown to be generally true that (i) levels of signalling and thus observed signal costs will decline as relatedness increases or as the receiver's reproductive penalty for erroneous assessment increases, and (ii) receivers will consistently, altruistically overestimate the true value of the signalled attribute. |
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557 |
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Schneider, A.-C.; Melis, A.P.; Tomasello, M. |
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Title |
How chimpanzees solve collective action problems |
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Journal Article |
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2012 |
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Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences |
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We presented small groups of chimpanzees with two collective action situations, in which action was necessary for reward but there was a disincentive for individuals to act owing to the possibility of free-riding on the efforts of others. We found that in simpler scenarios (experiment 1) in which group size was small, there was a positive relationship between rank and action with more dominant individuals volunteering to act more often, particularly when the reward was less dispersed. Social tolerance also seemed to mediate action whereby higher tolerance levels within a group resulted in individuals of lower ranks sometimes acting and appropriating more of the reward. In more complex scenarios, when group size was larger and cooperation was necessary (experiment 2), overcoming the problem was more challenging. There was highly significant variability in the action rates of different individuals as well as between dyads, suggesting success was more greatly influenced by the individual personalities and personal relationships present in the group. |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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5629 |
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Hunt, G.R.; Gray, R.D. |
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The crafting of hook tools by wild New Caledonian crows |
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Journal Article |
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2004 |
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Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences |
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Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. |
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271 |
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S88-S90 |
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The 'crafting' of tools involves (i) selection of appropriate raw material, (ii) preparatory trimming and (iii) fine, three-dimensional sculpting. Its evolution is technologically important because it allows the open-ended development of tools. New Caledonian crows manufacture an impressive range of stick and leaf tools. We previously reported that their toolkit included hooked implements made from leafy twigs, although their manufacture had never been closely observed. We describe the manufacture of 10 hooked-twig tools by an adult crow and its dependent juvenile. To make all 10 tools, the crows carried out a relatively invariant three-step sequence of complex manipulations that involved (i) the selection of raw material, (ii) trimming and (iii) a lengthy sculpting of the hook. Hooked-twig manufacture contrasts with the lack of sculpting in the making of wooden tools by other non-humans such as chimpanzees and woodpecker finches. This fine, three-stage crafting process removes another alleged difference between humans and other animals. |
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refbase @ user @ |
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